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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOMESTIC
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,
AND PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITIES
John Mukum Mbaku ∗
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Africans redoubled
their efforts to fight impunity and violations of human
rights. This renewed effort, however, was part of the
struggle that started during the colonial period by Africans
to free themselves from European domination and
exploitation. Unfortunately, most post-independence
African States failed to fully transform the critical domains
and provide themselves with institutional arrangements
capable of adequately constraining their civil servants and
political elites. As a consequence, these countries came to
be pervaded by high levels of government impunity,
particularly the violation of human rights. During the last
several decades, however, grassroots efforts to fight
human rights abuses, presidential abuse of power, and
government impunity, have increased throughout most
African countries. These domestic efforts, coupled with
those of the international community, have made it much
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more difficult for Africa’s political elites, including
presidents, to abuse their powers and engage in behaviors
that violate the rights of their fellow citizens. Nevertheless,
Africans still have a long way to go in order to eliminate
government impunity and create an environment in which
human rights are fully recognized and protected. Africans
must put in place institutional and legal structures that
effectively minimize the chances that government officials
will engage in activities that violate human rights and
threaten peace and security. In doing so, Africans can
benefit significantly from international law, particularly
international human rights law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the protection of human rights in Africa is the primary
responsibility of each African country, African courts, institutions,
and citizens, in conjunction with the international community, can
play a very important role in fostering an environment that is
conducive to the recognition of, respect for, and protection of human
rights. Within Africa, the African Union (AU) and regional
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) 1 and the Southern African Development

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is
a regional economic union of fifteen countries, which are located in West
Africa. ECOWAS has its headquarters in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. In
1
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Community (SADC), 2 are responsible for ensuring the recognition
and protection of human rights in the continent. Additionally, these
responsibilities
apply
to
domestic
and
international
nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and
national human rights organizations. The AU and these regional
organizations have a very important role to play in the protection of
human rights in the continent, especially in cases where national
governments are either unable or unwilling to assume the
responsibility to protect citizens, or where the violators of human
rights are state actors, other agents of the state, or non-state actors
with significant connections to the state. The Darfur Genocide is an
example of a situation in which the perpetrators of human rights
abuses are state actors and civil society organizations working on
behalf of the government. Unfortunately, the AU has not been very
successful in protecting the people of the Darfur region of Sudan. 3
Since 1945, the international community, working through the
United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations, has
provided a strong legal foundation for the recognition and protection
of human rights. For example, the UN General Assembly on
December 10, 1948, through Resolution 217, adopted the historic

2015, ECOWAS had a population of over 349 million. Since it was founded
on May 28, 1975, ECOWAS has played a significant part in maintaining
peace and security, as well as protecting human rights, in West Africa. See
generally ADEKEYE ADEBAYO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA,
SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU (2002) (examining the activities of
ECOWAS’ mechanism for managing conflicts and ensuring security and
peace called ECOMOG).
2
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an
inter-governmental organization that consists of sixteen Member States
with its headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. It was established in its
present form on August 17, 1992, and currently has a population of 277
million. See generally LAURIE NATHAN, COMMUNITY OF INSECURITY:
SADC’S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (2012)
(examining, inter alia, the evolution of the SADC’s effectiveness as a
regional security organization).
3
See generally JUDE COCODIA, PEACEKEEPING AND THE AFRICAN
UNION: BUILDING NEGATIVE PEACE (2018) (assessing the effectiveness of
peacekeeping operations of the AU).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 4 The UN and
other multilateral organizations have provided many of the
international legal instruments that formed the foundation for human
rights laws in many countries, including those in Africa. For
example, provisions of the UDHR have either been incorporated
into the constitutions of many African countries or reference has
been made to the UDHR in the constitutions of these countries. 5 For
example, Bénin Republic’s constitutional designers have directly
incorporated provisions of various international human rights
instruments into their national constitution. 6 In the Preamble to the
Constitution of the Republic of Bénin, one can find the following:
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE . . . Reaffirm our
attachment to the principles of democracy and human
rights as they have been defined by the Charter of the
United Nations of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization
of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986
and whose provisions make up an integral part of this
present Constitution and of Béninese law and have a value
superior to the internal law. 7
In Article 7 of the constitution of Bénin, it is stated that “[t]he
rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed by the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization
of African Unity . . . shall be an integral part of the . . . Constitution
[of Bénin] and of Béninese law.” 8 Finally, the Béninese constitution
imposes a duty on the government to make certain that citizens are
fully educated about the national constitution, the UDHR, the

4
See THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 3 (Gudmudur Alfredsson & Asbjorn
Eide eds. 1999) (presenting a series of essays that examine the UDHR since
its inception in 1948).
5
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2, 1990,
pmbl.
6
See generally id.
7
Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added).
8
Id. at art. 7.
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and other
international human rights instruments. 9
Angola’s constitution makes specific reference to the
applicability of international law when courts interpret and apply the
country’s constitution. 10 For example, Article 26’s title, Scope of
Fundamental Rights, is quite telling and reads as follows:
1. The fundamental rights established in this Constitution
shall not exclude others contained in the laws and
applicable rules of international law.
2. Constitutional and legal precepts relating to fundamental
rights must be interpreted and incorporated in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the
African Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and
international treaties on the subject ratified by the Republic
of Angola.
3. In any consideration by the Angolan courts of disputes
concerning fundamental rights, the international
instruments referred to in the previous point shall be
applied, even if not invoked by the parties concerned. 11
Additional support to the applicability of international law in
Angola is provided in Article 27, which states that “[t]he principles
set out in this chapter shall apply to the rights, freedoms and
guarantees and to fundamental rights of a similar nature that are
established in the constitution or are enshrined in law or
international conventions.” 12
In 2010, Kenya provided itself with a new constitution, which
introduced the concept of separation of powers with checks and
balances. 13 The new constitution created an independent judiciary

9
10

21, 2010.
11
12
13

See id. at art. 40.
See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan.
Id. at art. 26(1)–(3) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 27.
See generally CONSTITUTION (2010) (Kenya).
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and spoke directly to the applicability of international law within the
country. 14 For example, Article (2)(5) of the constitution states that
“[t]he general rules of international law shall form part of the law of
Kenya,” 15 effectively making “the rules of international law”
justiciable in the courts of Kenya. In addition, the 2010 Kenyan
constitution also states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this
Constitution.” 16
Many other African countries, however, do not make
international law—whether it is international human rights or
humanitarian law—directly justiciable in their domestic or national
courts. 17 For example, while the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa acknowledges and makes reference to international
law, it does not make any provision for the latter to be directly
justiciable in the courts of South Africa. 18 Nevertheless, the South
African constitution imposes on national courts an obligation to
“consider international law” when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 19
In Cabo Verde, the constitution states that “[c]onstitutional and legal
rules with respect to fundamental rights must be interpreted and
integrated in conformance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.” 20 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana imposes an
obligation on the government to “promote respect for international
law.” 21 However, Ghana’s constitution does not make any
provisions for international law to be directly justiciable in
Ghanaian courts. 22

See generally id. at art. 10.
See id. at art. 2(5).
16
Id. at art. 2(6).
17
See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
18
See generally id.
19
Id. at art. 39(1) (stating “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a
court, tribunal or forum . . . must consider international law; and may
consider foreign law”) (emphasis added).
20
See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CABO VERDE (1992)
(amended in 1995 & 1999), art. 17(3).
21
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended
1996), art. 40(c).
22
See generally id.
14
15
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In the struggle to protect human rights in Africa, international
law, particularly international human rights and humanitarian law,
is very important. International legal instruments, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 23
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), 24 and the UDHR, are very important to the struggle to
recognize and protect human rights in Africa. In fact, the ICCPR,
with two optional protocols; the ICESCR, with one optional
protocol; and the UDHR were given the name International Bill of
Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 217. 25
In Africa, the AU has also engaged in efforts to promote the
recognition and protection of human rights within the continent. At
the 1979 Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 26 a resolution was adopted
that called for experts to draft a continent-wide human rights
instrument. The committee was subsequently set up and produced a
draft that was unanimously approved at the 18th Assembly of the
Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in June 1981, in

23
The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly with resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16,
1966 and entered into force on March 23, 1976. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R
(Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
ccpr.aspx.
24
The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the UN
General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and came into force on January
3, 1976. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Dec. 16, 1966),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
25
See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III), International Bill of Human
Rights (Dec. 8, 1948). The International Bill of Human Rights also includes
two other treaties that were established by the UN; these are the ICCPR
(1966), with its two Optional Protocols, and the ICESCR (1966).
26
The OAU was succeeded by the AU, which was founded on May
26, 2001, in Addis Ababa, and officially launched on July 9, 2002 in South
Africa. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, AFR. UNION (July 11,
2000), https://au.int/en/constitutive-act [hereinafter Constitutive Act of the
African Union].
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Nairobi, Kenya. 27 The instrument, which was referred to as the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter)
entered into force on October 21, 1986. 28 The task of oversight and
interpretation of the Banjul Charter was placed in the hands of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) that was set up on November 2, 1987, in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the African Commission is presently
headquartered in Banjul, The Gambia. 29
Other relevant human rights instruments produced by the AU
include: the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance; 30 Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights of
Women in Africa; 31 Constitutive Act of the African Union; 32
Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court); 33 African

The Banjul Charter, CLAIMING HUM. RIGHTS: GUIDE TO INT’L
PREVENTION OF HUM. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFR. (Dec. 14, 2009, 4:56 PM)
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/au_charter.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2021) [hereinafter Claiming Human Rights].
28
See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR.
COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/.
29
See Claiming Human Rights, supra note 27.
30
See generally AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS
AND
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 30, 2007), http://archive.ipu.org/iddE/afr_charter.pdf.
31
See generally PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA,
https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/protocol_rights_women_africa_
2003.pdf.
32
See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note
26.
33
See generally PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN COURT ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/
36393-treaty-0019_-_protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_
peoplesrights_on_the_establishment_of_an_african_court_on_human_and
_peoples_rights_e.pdf [hereinafter AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL].
27
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Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; 34 and African Union
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa. 35
This article examines how the international community,
through its various legal instruments and institutions, can help
promote the recognition and protection of human rights in Africa. In
addition to looking at various international human rights instruments
and how they can inform and impact the protection of human rights
in the African countries, this article pays particular attention to the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P was developed by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) to serve as a framework for dealing with emerging threats
to international peace and security. The R2P is supposed to address
both the “root causes and the direct causes of international conflict
and other man-made crises putting populations at risk,” which
include threats to human rights. 36
In Section II, this article examines the various ways in which
international law, particularly international human rights law, can
help improve the protection of human rights in Africa. Specifically,
this section examines international human rights law and its
moderating impact on national legal systems, with specific emphasis
on Africa’s progressive independent judiciaries and their
interpretive powers, which they can use to interpret national laws,
including the constitution, and bring them into conformity with
international human rights norms. Reference in this section is made

See generally AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE
CHILD,
OAU
DOC.
CAB/LEGS/24.9/49
(1990),
https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/afr_charter_rights_welfare_child
_africa_1990.pdf.
35
See generally OAU CONVENTION GOVERNING SPECIFIC ASPECTS
OF REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA, UNHCR THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oauconvention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africaadopted.html.
36
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, UN (Dec. 2001),
http://www.julianhermida.com/justiceresptoprotect.htm
[hereinafter
Responsibility to Protect].
34
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to two important cases, one from Zimbabwe and the other from
South Africa. These two cases show how international law,
particularly international human rights law, can help in the
determination of the scope of fundamental rights in Africa.
Section III is devoted to examining other tools that can be used
by the international community to enhance the protection of human
rights in Africa. In this section, particular attention will be paid to
the responsibility to protect and the role that this principle plays in
the protection of human rights in Africa.
In Section IV, this article examines the failure of the erstwhile
OAU to deal effectively and fully with the violation of human rights
and other threats to peace and security. It is noted that the Rwandan
Genocide, which took place in early spring 1994 resulted in the
massacre of nearly a million Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers. 37
This represents the OAU’s most important failure at maintaining
continental peace and security. The OAU’s failure to act to prevent
genocide in Rwanda was due to its decision to adhere strictly to its
operating principles, particularly that of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of Member States.
The AU, founded on May 26, 2001, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
and launched on July 9, 2002, in South Africa, was established to
replace the OAU. 38 Section V is devoted to an examination of the
AU and its role in the protection of human rights in the continent.
Mention is made of the AU’s non-indifference policy and its relation
to the protection of human rights in the continent. In addition, this
section examines continental judicial institutions and the role that
they play in the protection of human rights.
In Section VI, the article examines the African Commission and
the role that it has played in the promotion and protection of human
rights in the continent. Section VII examines the Banjul Charter to
determine the extent to which it has contributed to improving the
environment for the protection of human rights in Africa. Section

37
See generally LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006) (examining, inter alia, the events leading to the
Rwandan Genocide and the genocide itself).
38
See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26.
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VIII is devoted to an examination of presidential immunities and
how they have contributed to the violation of human rights in the
continent. In Section IX, the article provides policy
recommendations and suggestions for a way forward for the
promotion and protection of human rights in the African countries.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
A. INTRODUCTION
One can view the demands of international law, including
international human rights law, on African countries as an
infringement on the right of these countries to govern themselves as
they see fit. In each African country, as is the case in other sovereign
states, the government is expected to be based on the constitution,
where the latter is generally “perceived as essentially a statecentered notion which is linked to the concept of statehood and the
idea of a state exercising its sovereign power.” 39 Sovereignty is
defined as “the supreme, undivided, absolute and exclusive power
attributed to the state within a demarcated territory.” 40 Although
sovereignty grants each African country the right to govern itself
without interference from external actors, each African government
is not expected to act without constraints. 41 Citizens of a country
impose constraints on their government in an effort to prevent civil
servants and political elites from acting opportunistically and
engaging in activities (e.g., self-dealing, corruption, and rent
seeking) that negatively affect wealth creation and economic
growth, as well as activities that violate human rights (e.g., denial of
a right to a fair trial or education, or failure to protect children
against sexual abuse and enslavement). 42 International law,
particularly international human rights law, also imposes constraints

Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional
Law and Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 441 (2012).
40
Id.
41
See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH
111–12, 129–32 (2018).
42
See id. at 111–12, 128–30.
39
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on national governments in an effort to prevent them from violating
the rights of their citizens. 43
In each African country, the people form and empower their
governments through a constitution to govern and perform certain
well-defined activities on their behalf. 44 Specifically, the
constitution defines the powers surrendered by the people to the
government; imposes constraints on the exercise of these powers in
order to minimize self-dealing and other forms of criminal activities;
mandates that the government derive all its power to govern from
the people; and regulates the allocation of “powers, functions and
duties among the various agencies and officers of government as
well as defining their relationship with the governed.” 45
As in other countries, the African people are at the center of
government and, thus, serve as an important constraint on the
exercise of government power. In each country, there are two
distinct centers of power, the State and the people. 46 Granted, the
government is empowered through the constitution to govern.
Nevertheless, it must derive its legitimacy to act from the people,
and as a consequence, the consent of the people is a critical
requirement for constitutional government. For the government to
be effective, it must be accountable, not just to the constitution, but
also to the people.
Another important constraint on the ability of each African
government to exercise its constitutionally granted powers is
international law. For example, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter
recognizes the right of States to govern themselves. 47 Specifically,
the UN is prohibited by its Charter from intervening in or interfering
with “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state.” 48 Nevertheless, Article 2(7) cautions that “this

See Fombad, supra note 39, at 445.
Some of these activities include maintaining law and order and
providing public goods and services. See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 41
(examining, inter alia, why people form governments).
45
Fombad, supra note 39, at 441–42.
46
See MBAKU, supra note at 41, at 85.
47
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
48
Id.
43
44
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principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII” 49 of this Charter. Hence, international
law has a significant role to play in the recognition and protection of
human rights in Africa.
Over the years, questions have arisen as to whether
international law can infringe on the sovereignty of States, including
those in Africa. If so, then to what extent can such intervention be
undertaken? In 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) was called upon to provide an advisory opinion on whether a
dispute between France and Great Britain was, by international law,
solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. 50 The dispute in question
concerned “Nationality Decrees” issued in Tunis and Morocco—
French territory—on November 8, 1921, and whether these decrees
applied to British subjects who resided in these territories. 51 The
PCIJ, in its advisory opinion, stated that “[t]he question whether a
certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is
an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of
international relations.” 52
The approach embodied in the PCIJ’s advisory opinion has
been criticized as being too broad 53 because it essentially “defines
the scope of domestic jurisdiction as what is left over after the rules
of international law have claimed their jurisdiction.” 54 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which was established in 1945
by the Charter of the UN and is the United Nations’ principal

49
Id. Article 2, ¶ 7 of the UN Charter deals with the various actions
that must be taken by the United Nations in order to deal generally with
threats to international peace and security, and, in particular, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression.
50
League of Nations Covenant art. 15.
51
See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French
Zone), Advisory Opinion, 1921 P.C.I.J (ser. B) No. 4, at 143 (Feb. 7).
52
Id. ¶ 40.
53
See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Domestic Jurisdiction, in
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., 1091 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1992).
54
Fombad, supra note 39, at 442.
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judicial institution, 55 provided what is considered “a more
authoritative position” in the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. The
United States of America). 56 In its judgment, the ICJ held that as a
consequence of the principle of sovereignty, each State has the
“choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and the
formulation of foreign policy.” 57 However, as the evidence has since
shown, “[a] purposive interpretation of the proviso to Article 2(7) of
the Charter [of the UN] and the practice of the UN over the decades
has shown that the organization could in fact intervene in
constitutional matters, which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state if international peace and security were said
to be threatened.” 58
Many of today’s international legal experts argue that the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been granted the
power by the UN to intervene in domestic constitutional law, and in
the process, limit, for example, the jurisdiction of domestic courts,
if international peace and security are threatened. 59 Thus, in
situations where international peace and security are threatened, the
UNSC can infringe on a state’s sovereign right to govern itself and
determine the content of its constitutional law. 60
Countries that enter into international treaties, including those
in Africa, can impose constraints on themselves that limit their
sovereign right to determine the content of their constitutional

55
In addition to serving as the UN’s principal judicial institution,
the ICJ also gives advisory opinions to authorized UN organs and
specialized agencies. For more on the ICJ, see generally FIFTY YEARS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIR ROBERT
JENNINGS (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds. 1996) and HUGH
THIRLWAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2016).
56
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. United States), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J 14 (June 27) (citing
Merits).
57
Id. ¶ 205.
58
Fombad, supra note 39, at 443; see also A. A. Conçado Trindale,
The Domestic Jurisdiction of States in the Practice of the United Nations
and Regional Organizations, 25 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 715, 751 (1976).
59
See Trindale, supra note 58, at 751.
60
See Fombad, supra note 39, at 443.
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matters. 61 For example, the ICCPR imposes certain obligations on
States Parties that have ratified the treaty. This treaty, which is part
of international human rights law, “limit[s] states’ sovereign right to
exclusively determine the content of their domestic constitutional
law.” 62 While the ICCPR states that “[a]ll peoples have the
right . . . [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social[,] and cultural development,” 63 the ICCPR
also imposes various obligations on State Parties. For example, the
ICCPR requires that each State Party must “respect and . . . ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth[,] or other
status.” 64
The ICCPR, with its two optional protocols, is one of three
instruments that constitute the International Bill of Human Rights.
The binding obligations that it imposes on States Parties represent
one way in which international law impacts the recognition and
protection of human rights in Africa and other parts of the world. 65
One way to improve the protection of human rights in Africa is for
each country’s government to sign and ratify all the international
human rights instruments and then meet its obligations under these
instruments, even if doing so infringes on each state’s sovereign
right to govern itself and determine the content of its domestic
constitutional law. 66
The infringement on a state’s sovereign right to determine the
content of its constitutional law by international human rights law
must not be viewed negatively—these commitments to uphold
provisions of the various international human rights instruments can
significantly minimize impunity, improve governance, and promote
the recognition and protection of human rights. In the case of

61

Id.
Id.
63
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
64
Id. at art. 2.
65
See Fombad, supra note 39, at 443.
66
See generally id.
62
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African countries, the need for each of these countries to design and
adopt constitutions that conform with the provisions of international
human rights instruments should significantly reduce the ability of
national governments to act with impunity and abuse the human and
fundamental rights of citizens.
There are at least six ways to make certain that human rights are
protected in Africa. First, national courts can be empowered and
provided with the capacity to enforce existing laws and protect
citizen’s rights. 67 More importantly, domestic courts can make
certain that domestic laws conform with international human rights
laws and norms; and the interpretation of domestic laws takes into
consideration international human rights instruments. 68 Second,
legislators can make certain that national laws, including the
constitution, comply with or reflect the provisions of international
human rights instruments. 69 Third, the government can make sure
that the appropriate officials sign and ratify all international human
rights instruments and, if possible, make the provisions of these
instruments directly justiciable in domestic courts. 70 Fourth, civil
society and its organizations can help develop a human rights
culture—one in which citizens voluntarily accept and respect the
laws designed to protect human rights. 71 Fifth, each country’s
institutional arrangements should adequately constrain civil
servants and political elites, including the president, so as to
minimize impunity and enhance the protection of human rights. 72
Finally, each African country must provide itself with a governing
process that is characterized by separation of powers with checks

See Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights
Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 103, 125 (2002).
68
See generally Adjami, supra note 67.
69
See generally id.
70
See id. at 109.
71
See generally id.
72
See John M. Mbaku, Constitutional Coups as a Threat to
Democratic Governance in Africa, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y, & ETHICS L. REV.
77, 98 (2018) [hereinafter Constitutional Coups].
67
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and balances. 73 Checks on the exercise of government power must
include, but are not limited to, an independent judiciary; a robust
and politically active civil society; and an independent and viable
press.

B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S MODERATING
IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA
How international law, and international human rights law in
particular, affects legal systems in African countries is explained by
two alternative theories: monism and dualism. 74 Within the monist
framework, international law and municipal law make up one single
legal order “within a national legal system, with international law
superior to national law.” 75 Within such a legal system, national
courts are obligated to “give effect to principles of international law
over superseding or conflicting rules of domestic law.” 76 Umozurike
argues, however, that although monists generally believe that
international law has primacy over conflicting domestic law, there
is a small school of “inverted monists” who believe and argue that
municipal law takes precedence over international law. 77
Dualist theorists, on the other hand, argue that international law
and municipal law make up two separate, distinct, and independent

73
See John M. Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against
Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661, 761
(2016).
74
See Adjami, supra note 67, at 108–09. See also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31–33, 41–51 (5th ed. 1998)
(examining, inter alia, monist and dualist approaches to international law);
Tijanyana Maluwa, The Incorporation of International Law and Its
Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Explanatory
Survey, 23 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 45 (1998) (examining, inter alia, the
interpretive role of international law in municipal legal systems in Africa)
& U. OJI UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 29–36 (1993)
(noting, inter alia, the concept of “inverted monism”).
75
See Adjami, supra note 67, at 109; see also UMOZURIKE, supra
note 74, at 29–33.
76
Adjami, supra note 67, at 109.
77
UMOZURIKE, supra note 74, at 30–31.
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legal systems. 78 While municipal law takes precedence and enjoys
primacy in the governing and regulation of national legal systems,
international law is directed exclusively at regulating the relations
between “sovereign States in the international system.” 79 According
to the dualist theory, a municipal legal system can only give effect
to international law when the country’s lawmakers use legislation to
incorporate international law into domestic law, and by doing so,
create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. 80
In examining international law’s “binding status in domestic
legal systems,” 81 international legal scholars and jurists distinguish
between the different types and sources of international law. Under
both the monist and dualist theories, all international norms that
have achieved or attained the status of “international customary
law” 82 are considered part of domestic or municipal law. In order
for an international law principle to attain the status of customary
international law, it must meet the definition of Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers to
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.” 83 If treaties or conventions have not yet attained the status of
international customary law, their status in municipal legal systems
depends on whether the State in question follows the dualist or
monist model. 84
Most of today’s African states inherited their legal systems and
international law frameworks 85 from the countries that colonized

Adjami, supra note 67, at 109.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
84
Adjami, supra note 67, at 109.
85
Most Francophone countries in Africa have legal systems based
on the French Civil law, while Britain’s former colonies base their legal
systems on the Common law of England and Wales. Nevertheless, South
Africa, which at one time was colonized by Great Britain, has a mixed legal
system, consisting of the English common law and Roman-Dutch law
model. Id.
78
79
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them. The continent’s Francophone countries, which were colonized
by France and Belgium, adopted the monist approach to
international law while those states under British colonial rule
inherited the dualist theory. 86
It is also important to note that the “properties of international
law instruments themselves” 87 determine how and the extent to
which international law affects a national legal system. For example,
the UDHR is “hortatory and aspirational, recommendatory rather
than, in a formal case, binding.” 88 Nevertheless, international legal
scholars have argued that “the years have further blurred the
threshold contrast between ‘binding’ and ‘hortatory’ instruments.” 89
While the UDHR does not have the legal status of a treaty, its
position in international law has changed significantly, and it has
received favorable treatment in many domestic legal systems since
it was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10,
1948. 90 Perhaps more important is the fact that over the years
arguments have developed which favor viewing “all or parts of [the
UDHR] as legally binding, either as a matter of customary
international law or as an authoritative interpretation of the UN
Charter.” 91
What is usually referred to as the International Bill of Human
Rights consists of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR—the
ICCPR and the ICESCR, however, are binding treaties. 92 Africaspecific human rights treaties include the Banjul Charter, which

Id. at 109–110.
Id. at 110.
88
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 152 (2008).
89
Id. at 152.
90
See id. at 152, 160–61.
91
Id. at 152.
92
A treaty, of course, is only binding on States Parties to the treaty.
The international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is codified in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is the basis for
the binding effect of treaties. Article 26, which is titled “Pacta Sunt
Servanda,” reads as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
86
87
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entered into force on October 21, 1982. 93 Article 1 of the Banjul
Charter obligates States Parties to incorporate provisions of the
Charter in their domestic laws. 94 According to Article 1, “[t]he
Member States . . . to the present Charter shall recognize the rights,
duties[,] and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake
to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.” 95
Given the binding nature of treaties, any African country that is a
State Party to the Charter who fails to give effect to the provisions
of the Charter in its domestic law is in breach of the Charter. The
nature of Article 1 of the Banjul Charter implies that the treaty is
binding on States Parties regardless of whether they are monist or
dualist States. 96
The OAU, and its successor, the AU, considered the need to
give effect to the Charter’s provisions in States Parties’ municipal
law so important that, besides the obligations created by Article 1,
they found it necessary to impose additional requirements on States
Parties through Article 62. 97 The latter states as follows: “Each State
Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the
present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other
measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and
freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter.” 98
As mentioned earlier, several African countries, such as Bénin
and Angola, have specific provisions in their constitutions that
directly define the role of international law in their municipal legal
systems. 99 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
imposes an obligation on national courts to consider international

93
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
94
Id. at art. 1.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at art. 1, 62.
98
Id. at art. 62.
99
See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
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law when they interpret the country’s Bill of Rights. 100 Since the
post-apartheid constitution went into effect, South Africa’s judiciary
has developed a significant body of human rights jurisprudence that
has gained international attention. 101 According to Article 39,
“[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal[,] or forum
. . . must consider international law; and may consider foreign
law.” 102 Article 233 deals with the application of international law
and states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation
that is inconsistent with international law.” 103 Together, these two
provisions in South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution have
significantly “broadened the scope of the courts’ power to employ
international law as an interpretive guidance when adjudicating
domestic Bill of Rights provisions.” 104
Unlike South Africa and a few other countries, most African
countries do not explicitly approve the use of international law as an
interpretive tool for the adjudication of cases in domestic courts. The
failure of many African countries to incorporate the provisions of
various international human rights instruments into their domestic
law has created a “technical obstacle” to the “use of international
human rights instruments as persuasive authority in national court
decisions.” 105 Nevertheless, many African judiciaries have found
ways to overcome this technicality. For example, in New Patriotic

100
See generally Richard Cameron Blake, The World’s Law in One
Country: The South African Constitutional Court’s Use of Public
International Law, 115 S. AFR. L. J. 668 (1999) (noting, inter alia, the use
of international law by South Africa’s Constitutional Court); Hoyt Webb,
The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998)
(providing more insight on the above referenced jurisprudence).
101
Id.
102
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, at art. 39(1)(b)–(c) (emphasis added).
103
Id. at art. 233.
104
Adjami, supra note 67, at 109; see also Andre Stemmet, The
Influence of the Recent Constitutional Development in South Africa on the
Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 33 INT’L L.
47 (1999).
105
Adjami, supra note 67, at 112.
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Party v. Inspector-General of Police (1993), the Chief Justice of
Ghana declared as follows:
Ghana is a signatory to this African Charter and Member
States of the [OAU] and parties to the Charter are expected
to recognize the rights, duties, and freedoms enshrined in
the Charter and to undertake to adopt legislative and other
measures to give effect to the rights and duties. I do not
think the fact that Ghana has not passed specific legislation
to give effect to the Charter means that the Charter cannot
be relied upon. 106
This approach to the incorporation of international law into the
domestic legal system has been referred to as “transjudicial” 107 and
“accounts for the actual use of international law and comparative
case law in domestic courts, regardless of the binding or nonbinding
status of their sources.” 108 Some international legal scholars argue
that this leads to the “cross-fertilization of international law and
comparative case law in domestic courts in continents around the
globe” 109 and “evidences the dawn of an era of ‘judicial dialogue’
and ‘judicial comity.’” 110

1. An Introduction to Human Rights Protections in Postindependence African Countries
Some African constitutions contain bills of rights that were
either inserted into their constitutions upon independence or were
later incorporated through constitutional amendments during postindependence periods. 111 Various international human rights

106
New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, Accra
[Ghana 1993] 1 N.L.P.R. 73, suit 3/93.
107
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial
Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (examining and explaining
the transjudicial model).
108
Adjami, supra note 67, at 112–113.
109
Id. at 113.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 114.
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instruments inspired these bills of rights, 112 which are considered
important parts of constitutionalism, a process concerned with “the
protection of individual rights and freedom from governmental
encroachment.” 113 Bills of rights are designed to provide for the
legal protection of the rights of citizens. Municipal judiciaries are
granted the right by the constitution to guarantee these rights and to
hold other branches of the government accountable regarding
recognition and protection of these rights—this, it is argued, is the
“foundation for human rights constitutionalism.” 114
Although many African countries have been committed to
constitutionalism and protection of human rights since the 1990s,
significant resistance against the practice of constitutional
government in many regions of the continent still remains. 115 This
resistance has led to the widespread abuse of human rights in
countries such as Cameroon, 116 Burundi, 117 Central African

Id. at 113.
Id. at 114. See also Carla M. Zoethout & Piet J. Boon, Defining
Constitutionalism
and
Democracy:
An
Introduction,
in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: A QUEST FOR AUTOCHTHONOUS PRINCIPLES
1, 5 (Carla M. Zoethnout & Marlies E. Pietermaat-Kros eds., 1996)
(examining, inter alia, constitutionalism and its relation to democracy).
114
Adjami, supra note 67, at 114.
115
Fombad argues, for example, that “[w]hile the quality of human
rights protection in most African countries increased somewhat after
1990, . . . there has been a steady decline in the quantum of human rights
protection enjoyed in the last six years.” Charles Manga Fombad,
Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on
Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1007,
1016 (2011).
116
Amnesty International has documented human rights violations
in Cameroon, “including unlawful killings, destruction of private property,
arbitrary arrests, and torture committed by the Cameroonian security forces
during military operations conducted in the Anglophone regions.”
Cameroon: A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations
in Anglophone Cameroon, AMNESTY INT’L (June 12, 2018).
117
See Burundi: Events of 2017, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/burundi
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2021) (recounting, inter alia, the political and human rights
crisis that began in Burundi in April 2015 following the announcement by
President Pierre Nkurunziza that he would run for a disputed third term).
112
113
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Republic, 118 Democratic Republic of Congo, 119 South Sudan, 120
Uganda, 121 the Republic of Sudan, 122 and several other countries in
the continent. 123 While ruling elites in these countries have at one
time or the other openly acknowledged the importance of
constitutional limits on the government, they have, nevertheless,
been unwilling to acknowledge the inviolability or sacredness of
their national constitutions. Instead, they have proceeded to change
them at will to meet their political ambitions. In Cameroon, for

118
Central
African
Republic,
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/africa/central-african-republic (last visited Feb. 4,
2021) (presenting a series of reports that detail the abuse of human rights in
the Central African Republic).
119
Democratic Republic of Congo, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/pages/
cdindex.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (presenting a series of reports that
shows that the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
has continued to deteriorate with increases in arbitrary executions; rape;
torture; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, all of which are
committed primarily by the army, police, and intelligence services).
120
See Elise Keppler, UN Report Details Abuses and War Crimes in
South Sudan: Trials Needed to Bring Justice for these Atrocities, HUM.
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/02/27/un-report-details-abuses-and-war-crimes-south-sudan
(stating that the UN has determined that fighters in South Sudan’s civil war,
which started in 2013, have committed many atrocities against civilians,
targeting them primarily on the basis of their ethnic identity).
121
Maria Burnett, Addressing Torture in Uganda: Five Actions
Police Can Take, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/addressing-torture-uganda
(revealing, inter alia, the extent to which Ugandan police torture and
mistreat suspects and suggests ways to reform the police and improve
respect for human rights).
122
Sudan, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/
sudan/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021) (detailing, inter alia, human rights
violations in Sudan with an emphasis on the Darfur region).
123
See BONNY IBHAWOH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2018)
(providing a historical overview of the struggle to protect human rights in
Africa); see also CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1995) (examining strategies for the protection of human rights in Africa
with emphasis on the role played by nongovernmental organizations).
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example, while the country’s president, Paul Biya, talks about
“consolidating the rule of law [and opening] a new page in [the
country’s] democratic process,” he is unwilling to engage in
dialogue with Anglophone citizens who have been protesting
against his government’s efforts to politically and economically
marginalize them. 124 Instead, he has sent security forces to brutalize
and kill peaceful Anglophone protesters, as well as burn down their
villages. 125 In 2008, he changed the constitution to grant himself
another term in office, as well as exempt himself from all crimes
that he may have committed while in office. 126 In 2018, he and his
political party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement,
engaged in election malpractices in order to secure a win and a
seventh term in office. 127 Thus, while he asks other Cameroonians
to obey the law, he considers himself above the law. 128
Some scholars argue that “the lack of autochthonous principles
of . . . constitutions [in Africa] presents an obstacle for their societal
legitimacy.” 129 Others argue that “because of the inherited nature of
constitutionalism in postcolonial Africa, resistance to
constitutionalism is not only inevitable, but also indispensable to the
internalization of viable mechanisms for constraining power.” 130
Many scholars cite this argument contending that democratic and
constitutional governments did not exist in precolonial Africa and
that democracy was an alien institution brought to the continent by
the European invaders. Some politicians have gone as far as calling

See generally Sudan, supra note 122.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Adjami, supra note 67, at 114. See also Moki Edwin
Kindzeka, Cameroon President Vows to ‘Deal’ with Separatists, VOA
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democracy an “imperialist dogma.” 131 It was this belief in the alien
origins of democracy in Africa that gave impetus to many of the
military coups that swept the continent in the first few decades of
independence. 132 Professor George Ayittey, an expert on indigenous
African institutions, argues that scholars’ and policymakers’ claims
that democracy is alien to Africa portray “a rather shameful
ignorance of indigenous African heritage.” 133 Professor Eme Awa,
a former chairman of the Nigerian National Electoral Commission,
agreed with Professor Ayittey when he proclaimed: “I do not agree
that the idea of democracy is alien in Africa because we had
democracy of the total type—the type we had in the city-states
where everybody came out in the market square and expressed their
views, either by raising their hands or something like that.” 134
With respect to constitutions and the practice of constitutional
government, many researchers have concluded that there did exist,
in many precolonial African societies, what has been described as
“indigenous African constitutions” which, like the Constitution of
the United Kingdom, were unwritten and based on customs and
traditional practices. 135 These were, as argued by several scholars,

131
For example, Ayittey states that “after independence, African
leaders dismissed democracy as an imperialist dogma, denounced markets
as capitalist institutions, and set out to destroy Western institutions. In so
doing, these leaders destroyed their own native institutions.” KWAME BADU
ANTWI-BOASIAKO & OKYERE BONNA, TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN DEMOCRATIC AFRICA at 147–48 (2009).
132
See generally A. B. ASSENSOH & YVETTE ALEX-ASSENSOH,
AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND POLITICS: COUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL
INCURSIONS, 1900–PRESENT (2001) (presenting a rigorous examination of
military incursions into African politics and their consequences on peaceful
coexistence and development).
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GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 469
(2d ed. 2006).
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Quoted in AYITTEY, supra note 133, at 469–470. See also West
Africa, Feb. 22, 1988, at 310.
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See Fatou K. Camara (Faculty of Law, Cheik Anta Diop
University, Dakar, Senegal), The Three Most Important Features of
Senegal’s Legal System that Others Should Understand 187–92,
Presentation at the International Association of Law Schools Conference:
Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School Curriculum in an
Interrelated World (May 30, 2008).
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quite effective in regulating sociopolitical interaction in various
subcultures in the continent. 136
While the discussion of whether democracy and
constitutionalism are alien to African societies might be of interest
to academics and could greatly inform the discourse on human rights
in the continent, it is unlikely to appeal to the many Africans who,
today, live in extreme poverty and are subjected to various forms of
tyranny directed at them by their governments. Individuals and
groups that have been forced by the policies of their governments to
remain trapped on the economic and political margins indefinitely
are not likely to be interested in the historical development of
democracy and constitutionalism in Africa. 137 Their interest lies in
the type of institutional reforms that would provide their societies
with institutional arrangements that safeguard their rights, enhance
their ability to participate fully and effectively in political and
economic markets, and significantly enhance peaceful
coexistence. 138 For example, the establishment of national
judiciaries capable of safeguarding the rights of citizens must be a
policy imperative for each and every African country. This will
allow each African country to develop a “more entrenched human
rights constitutionalism.” 139 Thus, regardless of the nature of
constitutionalism and democracy in precolonial Africa, the public
policy imperative in the continent today is the recognition and
protection of human rights, which invariably calls for the

136
AYITTEY, supra note 133, at 295–297. See also SALIBA G. SARSAR
& JULIUS ADEKUNLE, DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: POLITICAL CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES (Toyin Falola et al. eds., 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that
elements of democracy existed in pre-colonial African societies).
137
See Venessa Humpries, Democracy Is Not Necessarily Good for
the Poor, Research Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:04 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/africa-democarypoverty-relief (noting, inter alia, that democracy may not necessarily lead
to good outcomes for the poor).
138
See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, What Should Africans Expect
from Their Constitutions?, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 149 (2013)
(arguing, inter alia, that at independence, most Africans wanted
constitutions that would protect their fundamental rights from being
violated by both state- and non-state actors).
139
Adjami, supra note 67, at 115.
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institutionalization of human rights constitutionalism in each and
every African country. 140
The institutionalization of human rights constitutionalism
stresses, at the minimum, three important issues: (1) the centrality
of human rights in the structure of each country’s constitution—
each constitution must have a bill of rights which recognizes and
provides effective protections for the rights of citizens and
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments;
(2) the constitution must provide for a truly independent judiciary
empowered to enforce the bill of rights; and (3) the creation of a
culture of respect for human rights. Scholars and human rights
activists recognize the significant influence that international human
rights instruments have on the design of bills of rights for African
countries and see this as a positive development in the struggle to
improve the human condition on the continent. 141

2. Should International Human Rights Instruments Be Used
for Adjudication in Africa?
Some scholars have argued that Africa’s present state structures
trace their origins to the colonial era. 142 Given the fact that the
Europeans did not come to Africa to practice constitutionalism and
democratic government, colonial institutional frameworks did not
facilitate the practice of constitutionalism or democracy. 143 Instead,
colonial laws and institutions were designed to enhance the ability
of the European colonizers to dominate and impose their will on
Africans and, as a consequence, the protection of the rights of
Africans was hardly of interest to the colonial state. 144 Consider, for

140
See, e.g., Franck Moderne, Human Rights and Postcolonial
Constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 315, 323
(Louis Henkin and Albert Rosenthal eds. 1990); Adjami, supra note 67, at
115.
141
See, e.g., Moderne, supra note 140, at 322–27; Adjami, supra
note 67, at 113.
142
See, e.g., Moderne, supra note 140.
143
See generally id.
144
See RICHARD M. BRACE, MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA 48
(Prentice-Hall 1964).
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example, the attitudes of French colonial officers in Algeria
regarding the acquisition of land by French farmers. 145 In 1841, the
French Governor of the colony of Algeria, General Thomas Robert
Bugeaud, declared that “[w]henever the water supply is good and
the land fertile, there we must place colonists without worrying
about previous owners. We must distribute the lands [with] full title
to the colonists.” 146 It is obvious that, in this statement, the French
Governor of Algeria and his administration had no interest in
protecting and upholding the property rights of native Algerian
landowners. 147
Of course, the French were not the only European colonialists
who ignored the rights of African residents in the territories they
colonized. 148 Even the United Kingdom, which in 1953 rendered the
provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
and Fundamental Rights (European Convention) applicable to its
African colonies, was comparably disrespectful of Africans’
rights. 149 For example, Edward Lugard, the brother of Lord Lugard
who at the turn of the twentieth century was the British High
Commissioner in the Northern Nigerian colony, was bewildered and
embarrassed by the level of brutality visited on defenseless peoples
in the colony. 150 On May 21, 1908, he wrote a letter to his brother
in which he stated that “they [colonial soldiers, military police, and
regular police units] killed every living thing before them” 151 and

See id. at 48–50.
Id. at 48.
147
See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku & Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Rent
Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa, 8 INDIAN J. SOC. SCI. 277 (1995)
(arguing, inter alia, that, as a colonial institution, the police were used
effectively not to simply maintain law and order, but to help maximize
British interests in the colony of Nigeria).
148
See, e.g., Michael Crowder, Whose Dream Was It Anyway?
Twenty-Five Years of African Independence, 86 AFR. AFF. 7 (1987).
149
European Convention, infra note 161. For examples of British
brutality towards citizens of their colonies in Africa, see Crowder, supra
note 148.
150
See Crowder, supra note 148, at 12.
151
Quoted in id.
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that “[w]omen’s breasts had been cut off and the leader spitted on a
stake.” 152
In some European colonies, brutality against Africans and the
violation of their rights were considered an important requirement
of the job for soldiers and other paramilitary groups. 153 This type of
colonial brutality is aptly illustrated by King Leopold II’s Force
publique 154 in the Congo Free State. A junior officer of the Force
publique provided an eyewitness account of the level of colonial
brutality in the Congo Free State, stating:
We were a party of thirty . . . [sent to] a village to ascertain
if the natives were collecting rubber, and, if not, to murder
all, men, women, and children. We found the natives sitting
peacefully. We asked what they were doing. They were
unable to reply, thereupon we fell upon them and killed
them all without mercy. 155
Professor Michael Crowder, 156 an expert on European
colonialism in Africa, provided an overview of the extent and level
of the brutality visited on Africans by the Europeans during the
colonial period. Crowder argues that any “form of resistance” by
Africans to colonial rule was “visited by punitive expeditions that
were often quite unrestrained by any of the norms of warfare in
Europe.” 157 He goes on to cite as an example “the bloody
suppression of the Maji Maji and Herero uprisings in German East

152

Id.
See, e.g., Force publique, infra note 154.
154
The Force publique was the main military force in King
Leopold’s Congo Free State as well as in the Belgian Congo. For more on
the Force publique, see generally BRYANT P. SHAW, FORCE PUBLIQUE,
FORCE UNIQUE: THE MILITARY IN BELGIAN CONGO, 1914–1939 (1984)
[hereinafter Force publique]. After Belgian Congo gained independence in
1960, the Force publique was converted into the Congolese National Army
(L’Armée nationale congolaise).
155
HENRY RICHARD FOX BOURNE, CIVILIZATION IN CONGOLAND: A
STORY OF INTERNATIONAL WRONG-DOING 253 (P. S. King & Son, 1903).
156
See generally Crowder, supra note 148.
157
Id. at 12.
153
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and South West Africa,” 158 and several atrocities associated with the
British-sponsored “suppression of the Satiru revolt in Northern
Nigeria.” 159 As a consequence, one was not likely to find a bill of
rights in colonial constitutions nor did many colonies practice
constitutionalism and constitutional government. 160
Some scholars have argued that the European Convention 161
“had a particularly powerful impact on the creation of . . . national
rights instruments” 162 in post-independence Africa. There are at
least two reasons why the European Convention is seen as a major
influence on the construction of bills of rights in the African
countries. First, the rights found in the European Convention, it is
argued, “are more explicitly defined than those in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.” 163 Second, the European Convention
contains a clause that empowered any State Party to the Convention
to extend the protections of the Convention to its colonies. 164
According to Article 56(1), “[a]ny State may at the time of its
ratification or at any time thereafter declare by notification
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the
present Convention shall . . . extend to all or any of the territories
for whose international relations it is responsible.” 165 In 1953, the
United Kingdom rendered the Convention applicable to its colonies
in Africa until they gained their independence. 166
While the European Convention is said to not have had a major
impact on the advancement of human rights in the African colonies
through Article 56(1), it nevertheless “is credited with inspiring the
bills of rights of at least twenty-six Commonwealth countries, an

158

Id.
Id.
160
See id.
161
See generally European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention].
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Adjami, supra note 67, at 116.
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Id.
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See generally id.
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Id.
166
Christof Heyns, African Human Rights Law and the European
Convention, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM. RIGHTS 252, 255 (1995).
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influence of unprecedented scale and geographic scope.” 167 Other
influences on the development of human rights protections in the
African countries include the struggle for civil rights in the United
States and the rights jurisprudence developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 168
Several authors have examined issues about the applicability
and legitimacy of international human rights norms in Africa. 169 In
this article, we do not plan to revisit that subject. Instead, we argue
that international human rights instruments, regardless of their
origins, are critical to the struggle to recognize and protect human
rights in African countries. Thus, any African country that seeks to
create a domestic environment and culture of respect for human
rights must begin by: (1) incorporating the provisions of
international human rights instruments into its national constitution,
as well as its national legislation, and making these rights justiciable
in national courts; and (2) providing a constitutional role for its
judiciaries in enforcing human rights.

C.

AFRICAN JUDICIARIES AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

Since many African countries have not incorporated provisions
of major international human rights instruments into their national
constitutions, there is a limitation on the ability of international law
to positively impact the protection of human rights. This is

167
Adjami, supra note 67, at 117. See also Anthony Lester, The
Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541
(1988).
168
See, e.g., C. R. M. DLAMINI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: WHICH
WAY SOUTH AFRICA? (1995) (arguing, inter alia, that the bill of rights
contributed significantly to the elimination of racial injustices in the United
States and could function similarly in South Africa); MARK S. KENDE,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED
STATES (showing, inter alia, the progressive nature of human rights
jurisprudence of post-apartheid South African courts compared to the more
conservative decisions of U.S. courts).
169
See Adjami, supra note 67 (providing an overview of the
applicability and legitimacy of human rights norms in the African
countries).
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especially critical, not only when national legislation conflicts with
international human rights norms, but also when customary law and
practices offend provisions of international human rights
instruments or universal human rights norms. Nevertheless, this
deficiency in national constitutions and national legislation can be
cured by the judiciary, especially if a system of separation of powers
allows for a truly independent judiciary. This would allow the
judiciary to use its interpretive powers to interpret national laws in
light of international human rights norms. Independent and
progressive judiciaries in some African countries are already taking
advantage of their ability and right to interpret the constitution and
determine the constitutionality of all the country’s laws, including
customary laws, to strike down laws that they determine are not in
line with the national constitution or international human rights
norms. For example, in Ephrahim v. Pastory, a case that involved
conflict between customary law and the Bill of Rights in Tanzania’s
constitution, the Tanzanian High Court, after establishing the
country’s commitment to international human rights norms,
concluded as follows: “The [international human rights] principles
enunciated in the above-named documents are a standard below
which any civilized nation will be ashamed to fall. It is clear from
what I have discussed that the customary law under discussion flies
in the face of our Bill of Rights as well as international conventions
to which we are signatories.” 170
By using their interpretive power this way, the courts can give
effect to international human rights norms even if these norms are
not incorporated into national constitutions and/or national
legislation. Thus, in the effort to protect human rights in Africa,
lawyers and judges have an important role to play—they can help
bring “life to the rights guarantees enshrined in national
constitutions.” 171
Unfortunately, many African judiciaries have not always been
eager to take a leadership role in promoting adherence to the rule of

Ephrahim v. Pastory, 87 I.L.R. 106, 110 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990).
The Court went on to rule that when there exists a conflict between
customary law and fundamental rights, the international standard of the
fundamental rights must prevail over the customary or traditional rules.
171
Adjami, supra note 67, at 124.
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law and the protection of human rights. In fact, many critics have
argued that in many African countries, national judiciaries are
actually actively involved in helping incumbent governments
undermine the rule of law and commit atrocities against some
subcultures, notably religious and ethnic minorities. 172 For example,
as argued by noted Abuja, Nigeria-based human rights lawyer and
activist, Chidi Odinkalu:
[T]he judiciaries in Common Law African countries must
take substantial responsibility for the collapse of
constitutional government . . . . [T]he judiciary in many of
these countries deliberately and knowingly abdicated its
constitutional role to protect human rights and, in many
cases, actively connived in the subversion of constitutional
rule and constitutional rights by the executive arm of
government. 173
Judiciaries, such as those in Cameroon, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire,
Rwanda, Uganda, Tunisia, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Zambia, and Angola, failed to take action while their presidents
manipulated their constitutions to extend their mandates and punish
their political opponents. 174 In fact, in countries such as Cameroon,

Professor Makau Mutua has argued that many newly-independent
African countries failed to fully transform the critical domains and that
efforts to indigenize and Africanize the judiciary “failed to transform the
justice sector from a colonially racist, anti-people, and oppressive
instrumentality.” Makau Mutua, Africa and the Rule of Law, 13 INT’L J.
HUM. RIGHTS 159, 161 (2016). In addition, argues Professor Mutua,
“[j]udges became extensions of the executive and served at its whim.
Instead of becoming fountains of justice, courts were used to instill fear in
the populace at the behest of the executive. The courts were used to crush
political dissent and curtail civil society.” Id.
173
Quoted in Adjami, supra note at 67, at 124.
174
See, e.g., Isaac Mufumba, Presidents Who Amended Constitution
to Stay in Power, DAILY MONITOR (UGANDA) (Sept. 18, 2017) http://www.
monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Presidents-who-amendedconstitution-to-stay-in-power/689844-4099104-qj5n58z/index.html (last
172
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the judiciary evolved into a legal tool used by the president to punish
his opponents, impose his will on citizens, and ensure his continued
monopolization of political power. 175 The judiciary has a very
important role to play in national elections in Cameroon—judges
perform a supervisory function over the counting of votes and the
determination of who is the winner. 176 Fombad notes that in
“preparations for the 1996 and 1997 elections, a presidential decree
doubled [judicial] salaries, and in the case of Supreme Court judges,
the increase of almost 200 percent came with numerous perks and
privileges. 177 There was nothing fortuitous in this. Judges preside
over the divisional election supervisory and vote-counting
commissions that tabulate election results, which are then sent to the
national vote-counting commission.” 178 This was designed, of
course, to ensure electoral victory for the incumbent president.
Throughout the one-party era in Africa, most judiciaries served
almost exclusively at the pleasure of the president and not to enforce
the constitution or enhance adherence to the rule of law or safeguard
the rights of citizens. In countries whose governments had been
seized by the military, the courts either did not function or were
transformed into tools used by the ruling elites to suppress antigovernment opinion. 179

visited on Feb. 23, 2021); Takudzwa Hillary Chiwanza, African Presidents
and Their Love for Changing the Constitutions, AFRICAN EXPONENT (Oct.
10, 2017) https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8604-african-presidentsare-always-chaging-their-constitutions (last visited on Feb. 6, 2021).
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See infra note 179.
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Id.
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Id.
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Fombad argues, for example, that in Cameroon, the judiciary has
been “reduced to allies and partners of the executive in enjoying the spoils
of power.” Charles Manga Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon:
Insights on Consequences and Control, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 234, 247–48 (Kempe
Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds. 2000).
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For example, there were military coups in Nigeria;
Dahomey/Bénin; Upper Volta/Burkina Faso; Republic of Congo; Mali;
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In the early 1990s, when many African countries began their
transition to democracy and governance processes undergirded by
the rule of law, renewed interest emerged in making certain that the
judiciary was granted enough independence by the constitution to
enable it to function, not only as an effective check on the exercise
of government power, but also as a major tool to ensure that
international human rights law is given effect in the interpretation of
domestic or national laws. 180 At this time, there was also talk in the
continent of the need to take cognizance of the Bangalore
Principles, 181 which were developed in 1988 at a judicial colloquium

Central African Republic/Empire; and Mauritania. See Victor T. LeVine,
The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 181, 190 (1997). Karen A. Mingst argues that during military rule in
Nigeria, “when the government claimed it was necessary to refrain from
implementing issues in the constitution, the courts did not resist the
argument. Both courts and judges acted very circumspectly, perhaps the
reason that the military preserved the institution [i.e., the judiciary].” Karen
A. Mingst, Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect,
31 AFR. STUD. REV. 135, 140 (1988) (examining, inter alia, judicial and
legal systems in Africa, including that in Uganda).
180
Some legal scholars, however, have questioned the so-called
“global expansion of judicial power.” Specifically, they argue that
“American-style judicial review” may actually subvert “the democratic
ideal of government by the people and is therefore deeply problematic.”
Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for
the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 637 (2003). It is important to
note, however, that in the African countries, which have imperial
presidencies and relatively weak civil societies, the courts may be the only
effective tool to fight government impunity and safeguard the fundamental
rights of citizens. Of course, in some African countries, human rights
activists no longer have faith in national courts to fully and effectively
prosecute international crimes. As a consequence, these activists are
looking to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a court of last resort.
See Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, Africa and the International Criminal
Court: Then and Now, in AFRICA & THE INT’L CRIM. CT. 13, 16 (Gerhard
Werle, Lovell Fernandez & Moritz Vormbaum eds. 2014).
181
The Bangalore Principles, 1 DEVELOPING HUM. RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE (Commonwealth Secretariat ed., 1988). See also The Hon.
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in Bangalore, Pakistan and represented a statement by judges from
several countries regarding the need to incorporate international
human rights norms into their national constitutions and how to do
so. 182 For example, Principle 7 states:
[T]here is a growing tendency for national courts to have
regard to these international norms for the purpose of
deciding cases where the domestic law—whether
constitutional, statute or common law—is uncertain or
incomplete. It is within the proper nature of the judicial
process and well-established judicial functions for national
courts to have regard to international obligations which a
country undertakes—whether or not they have been
incorporated into domestic law—for the purpose of
removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national
constitutions, legislation, or common law. 183
Some international legal scholars argue that, as a result of the
existence of the Bangalore Principles, judges now have an
obligation to adopt and follow this interpretive principle. 184 It is
important to note, however, that the Bangalore Principles will not
apply in the case where the domestic constitution is clear,
unambiguous, and is not inconsistent with international law. 185 The
Bangalore Principles, argue some legal scholars, “are a statement of
understanding among judges recognizing the extent of their power
in interpreting laws in their common law systems and the degree to
which using this power in the incorporation of international human
rights in national jurisprudence will advance human rights at the
national level.” 186

Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, The Road from Bangalore: The First Ten
Years of the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of
International Human Rights Norms, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/
publications/speeches/former-justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_bang11.htm (last visited
on Mar. 2, 2021).
182
See The Bangalore Principles, supra note 181.
183
Id. at art. 7.
184
Fombad, supra note 39, at 457–58.
185
Id. at 457.
186
Adjami, supra note 67, at 126.
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In Africa, the real challenge to the enforcement of human rights
is not likely found in countries that have governing processes
characterized by separation of powers, with a fully independent
judiciary, even if international human rights law has not been
incorporated into national constitutions and legislation. Instead, the
major challenge is posed by “countries in which a legal
infrastructure exists to enforce rights provisions yet a repressive
government is in power that would stifle and intimidate efforts to
enforce rights against the government before the courts.” 187 In these
countries, lawyers and judges represent important gatekeepers who
can minimize the abuse of human rights, even in countries with
opportunistic politicians. 188

1. International Law and the Scope of Fundamental
Rights in Africa: Catholic Commission for Justice
and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General and
Others
The question of interest is: To what extent can international law
help in the determination of the scope of a fundamental right in
Africa? An examination of a case from the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe can help us appreciate how making reference to
“regional and African and international [legal] sources has led to
progressive decision making” in many African countries. 189

Id. at 129.
See, e.g., Hon. Justice Philip Nnaemeka-Agu, The Role of
Lawyers in the Protection and Advancement of Human Rights, 18 COMMW.
L. BULL. 734, 736, 744 (1992) (examining, inter alia, the role of lawyers in
the protection of human rights in Nigeria). The Hon. Justice Philip
Nnaemeka-Agu was, at the time, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
and this article is part of an address he delivered during the Law Week
celebrations of the Nigerian Bar Association, Imo State of Nigeria, on
February 10, 1992.
189
Adjami, supra note 67, at 146.
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On March 13, 1993, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Justice, Legal, and
Parliamentary Affairs announced that four men 190 who had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death would be hanged within
a few days. 191 In reaction to the Justice Minister’s decision to
proceed with the execution of the four men, the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (Catholic
Commission) 192 filed a “chamber application” with the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe, seeking the Court to order the respondents—
“the Attorney-General, the Sheriff of Zimbabwe, and the Director
of Prisons”—to delay the executions. 193 Specifically, the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe was being called upon to decide whether to:
(i) declare that the delay in carrying out the sentence of
death constitutes a contravention of section 15(1) of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe (the Constitution); and
(ii) order that such sentences be permanently stayed. 194
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, under the
direction of Chief Justice Gubbay, was called upon to decide
whether carrying out the sentence of execution by hanging of the
four men for convictions of murder violates the “inhuman and
degrading punishment” provision of Article 15(1) of the

The men were “Martin Bechani Bakaka, Luke Kingsize Chiliko,
Timothy Mhlanga, and John Chakara Zacharia Marichi.” Catholic Comm’n
for Justice and Peace in Zim. v. Attorney-General of Zim. and Others (Zim.
Sup. Ct. 1993), at 5 [hereinafter Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace].
191
See John Hatchard, Delay and the Death Sentence: The
Zimbabwean Approach, 37 J. AFR. L. 185, 1 (School of Oriental & Afr.
Studies, Univ. of London, 1993) (providing a preliminary analysis of
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace).
192
The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
(CCJPZ) is a non-governmental organization that is dedicated to the
recognition and protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. It was established
in 1972 as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia. The
name of the organization was changed in 1980 when Southern Rhodesia
gained independence and took the name Zimbabwe.
193
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at
5.
194
Id.
190
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Constitution of Zimbabwe. 195 The four men were actually convicted
of capital murder in 1988 and they subsequently appealed their
convictions, but those appeals failed. 196 The men remained in prison
until the Minister of Justice announced their executions on March
13, 1993. 197 In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe noted
the claim by the petitioners that “by March 1993 the executions had
been rendered unconstitutional due to the dehumanizing factor of
prolonged delay, viewed in conjunction with the harsh and
degrading conditions under which prisoners are confined in the
condemned section at Harare Central Prison.” 198 Chief Justice
Gubbay noted that the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe’s earlier
judgment “dismissing the appeals of the condemned prisoners
[could not] be disturbed” and that “the constitutionality of the death
penalty per se, as well as the mode of its execution by hanging,
[were] also not susceptible to attack.” 199
In the view of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the main issue
to be decided was as follows:
[W]hether, even though the death sentences were the only
fitting and proper punishments to have imposed,
supervening events 200 establish that their execution on the
appointed dates would have constituted inhuman or
degrading treatment in violation of section 15(1) of the
Constitution. 201

195
Section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980 is found in
Chapter III, which is titled The Declaration of Rights, and it states as
follows: “No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
punishment or other such treatment.” CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE (1980),
ch. 3, § 15(1), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5720.html.
196
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at
6.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 5.
199
Id.
200
The supervening events were the long delays in carrying out the
executions. Id. at 5–6.
201
Id.
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Gubbay then made reference to § 24(1) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe, 202 which “vests in the Supreme Court the power to deal
with constitutional issues as a court of first instance.” 203
Gubbay began the analysis by examining “the availability of
constitutional protection to condemned prisoners” in Zimbabwe. 204
Arguing that prisoners “by mere reason of a conviction,” 205 are not
“denuded of all the rights they otherwise possess,” 206 he concluded
that “a prisoner who has been sentenced to death does not, therefore,
forfeit the protection afforded by § 15(1) [of the constitution of
Zimbabwe] in respect to his treatment while under confinement.” 207
The structure of the analysis undertaken in the Catholic Commission
opinion follows the opinion Gubbay provided in State v. Ncube &
Others. 208 In the Ncube opinion, Gubbay “expressed the view that
section 15(1) is nothing less than the dignity of man. It is a provision
that embodies broad and idealistic notions of dignity, humanity and
decency.” 209 Chief Justice Gubbay then proceeded to consult
international jurisdictions, including academics, in order “to

202
Section 24(1) of the Constitution states as follows: “If any person
alleges that the Declaration of Rights has been, is being or is likely to be
contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of the person detained, if any
other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person),
then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter
which is lawfully available that person (or that other person) may, subject
to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Supreme Court for redress.”
CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE (1980), ch. 3, § 24(1), http://www.refworld.
org/docid/3ae6b5720.html.
203
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at
9.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. (citing Conjwayo v. Minister of Justice, Legal &
Parliamentary Affairs & Another (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1992)).
208
Compare State v. Ncube & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1987), with
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 9–10.
209
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at
9 (citing State v. Ncube & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1987)).
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establish the factual record of the suffering involved in delayed
death sentences.” 210
Gubbay then undertook a survey of “judicial attitudes towards
the constitutionality of executions given a long delay” 211 by
searching for precedents “in Zimbabwe, India, the United States,
and the West Indies.” 212 After examining the attitude of courts to the
delay in executing a sentence of death in these countries, 213 the Chief
Justice then undertook a detailed examination of the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in Soering v.
United Kingdom—that decision had blocked the extradition to the
United States from the United Kingdom of a suspect who was
wanted by American authorities for trial. 214 The suspect, Soering,
was a German national who was wanted for murder in Bedford
County, Virginia (USA). 215 He fled to Europe but was later arrested
in England on a charge of check fraud. 216 After he was indicted in
Bedford County on two counts of brutal murders, the United States
filed an order for his extradition based on a 1972 Extradition Treaty
with the United Kingdom. 217
A court in the UK subsequently found Soering extraditable to
the United States. 218 Appeals against the decision were unsuccessful

210
Adjami, supra note 67, at 147 (citing Catholic Comm’n for
Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 9).
211
Id. (citing Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct.
1993), at 9, 13–25)
212
Id.
213
That is Zimbabwe, India, the United States, and the West Indies.
See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 13–
14; India at 14–16; United States of America at 16–19; the West Indies at
19–22.
214
Id. at 22–24.
215
See infra note 218.
216
Id.
217
See 1972 UK-USA Extradition Treaty, U.K.-U.S., entered into
force Jan. 21, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 227.
218
After several UK courts, including the House of Lords (then, the
country’s highest judicial body), rejected Soering’s petition against
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and Soering was ordered to be handed over to U.S. authorities. 219
Nevertheless, Soering filed a complaint with the European
Commission of Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECHR advised the
UK government to delay the extradition until the ECHR had fully
investigated the situation. 220 The UK government complied. In
arguments before the ECHR, Soering alleged that should the UK
extradite him to the United States, the UK would involve itself in a
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
because the conditions under which death row prisoners were
detained at Virginia’s Mecklenburg Correctional Center were
inhuman and degrading. 221 The ECHR ruled, six votes to five,
against Soering 222 but decided to refer the case to the European
Court, which unanimously held that there existed a real risk that if
Soering was extradited to the United States, he was likely to be
found guilty by a Virginia court and sentenced to death, and that the
suffering Soering would experience on death row would violate
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 223

extradition, the UK Secretary of State, on August 3, 1988, signed a warrant
ordering Soering’s extradition to the United States authorities.
Nevertheless, Soering was not transferred to U.S. custody because of his
pending timely appeal to the European Commission of Human Rights. See
Soering v. United Kingdom (No. 161), 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (ser. A) 444–
48 (1989).
219
Id.
220
See generally Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88.
221
Article 3 states as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Eur. Ct. H.R. (1950),
Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 3, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf. See also Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88, ¶ 90.
222
The European Commission of Human Rights held “by six votes
to five, that the extradition of the applicant [Jens Soering] to the United
States of America in the circumstances of the present case would not
constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the [European]
Convention [on Human Rights].” Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88, ¶ 154.
223
The European Court based its determination on a thorough
assessment of death row conditions at Virginia’s Mecklenburg Correctional
Center. Chief Justice Gubbay quotes extensively from the European Court’s
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Next, Zimbabwean Chief Justice Gubbay referred to the
decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) 224 and considered the UNHRC’s attitude toward “the
death row phenomenon,” 225 given Member States’ obligations under
Article 7 of the ICCPR. 226 The UNHRC made decisions in several
cases and in one of them, the majority held:
In States whose judicial system provides for a review of
criminal convictions and sentences, an element of delay
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and
the exhaustion of available remedies is inherent in the
review of the sentence; thus, even prolonged periods of
detention under a severe custodial regime on death row
cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely
availing himself of appellate remedies. A delay of ten years
between the judgment of the Court of Appeal and that of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is disturbingly
long. However, the evidence before the Committee

judgment regarding its assessment of conditions at the death row part of the
Mecklenburg Correctional Center. See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and
Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 22–24. See also Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88,
¶ 154. In its ruling, the European Court declared that in the event of the
Secretary of State’s decision to extradite the applicant to the United States
of America being implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.
224
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at
24–25.
225
That is, “whether the length of detention on death row amounted
to a violation of the prohibition against ‘torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’ under [A]rt[icle] 7 of the
[International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights].” Catholic Comm’n
for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 24.
226
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A., 2 J. INT’L L. &
PRAC. 603, 622, at 606 (1993). See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace
(Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 24.
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indicates that the Court of Appeal rapidly produced its
written judgment and that the ensuing delay in petitioning
the Judicial Committee is largely attributable to the
authors. 227
However, a dissent from one of the members of the UNHRC
read as follows:
The conduct of the person concerned with regard to the
exercise of remedies ought to be measured against the
States involved. Without being at all cynical, I consider
that the author cannot be expected to hurry up in making
appeals so that he can be executed more rapidly. . . . In this
type of case, the elements involved in determining the time
factor cannot be assessed in the same way if they are
attributable to the State [P]arty as if they can be ascribed to
the condemned person. A very long period on death row,
even if partially due to the failure of the condemned
prisoner to exercise a remedy, cannot exonerate the State
[P]arty from its obligations under art 7 of the Covenant. 228
The Zimbabwe Supreme Court’s survey of international
sources, nevertheless, was not designed to review the country’s
compliance with its obligations under international law. 229 Instead,
the Court “viewed its role primarily as one of elevating its national
human rights jurisprudence to the international or civilized standard
. . . .” 230 The Court’s review of international sources, nevertheless,
did not provide a consensus on the issue of delayed death sentences.
Gubbay, however, found foreign and international authorities that
supported and bolstered “his eventual holding that struck down the
pending execution of the prisoners as unconstitutional.” 231 He relied

227
Quoted in Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
v. Attorney-General & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 25.
228
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
229
Adjami, supra note 67, at 147.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 148.
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on majority opinions in several Indian cases, 232 dissenting opinions
in a Jamaican case, 233 a dissenter in the UN Human Rights
Committee decision, 234 and a Canadian case. 235 The Chief Justice
also surveyed the death row phenomenon with respect to cases from
several U.S. states and ordered as follows:
1. The application is allowed with costs.
2. The sentence of death passed upon Martin Bechani
Bakaki, Luke Kingsize Chiliko, Timothy Mhlanga[,] and
John Chakara Zacharia Marichi is, in each case, set aside
and substituted with a sentence of imprisonment for life. 236
Thus, in this landmark decision, the Chief Justice set aside the
death sentences against the four convicts and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. 237 Zimbabwe’s Chief Justice, in rendering the
decision in the Catholic Commission case, consulted and sought
guidance from foreign and international law. 238 In doing so, the
Chief Justice remarked that § 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
“ . . . is nothing less than the dignity of man.” 239 He went on to state
that § 15(1) “is a provision that embodies broad and idealistic
notions of dignity, humanity[,] and decency . . .” and “. . . guarantees
that punishment or treatment of the individual be exercised within
the ambit of [civilized] standards.” 240 Addressing the case before the
Court, the Chief Justice noted that the determination of “whether a
form of torture, punishment[,] or treatment, is inhuman or degrading
is dependent upon the exercise of a value judgment” and

232

¶¶ 76–77.
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993),
Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
Id. ¶ 89.
Id. ¶¶ 86–87.
Id. ¶ 130.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 13–27, 130.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
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[o]ne that must not only take account of the emerging
consensus of values in the [civilized] international
community (of which this country [i.e., Zimbabwe] is a
part), as evidenced in the decisions of other Courts and the
writings of leading academics, but of contemporary norms
operative in Zimbabwe and the sensitivities of its people. 241
In interpreting domestic law, including constitutional
provisions, regarding human rights in Zimbabwe, argued the Chief
Justice of Zimbabwe, courts must take cognizance of the “emerging
consensus of values in the civilized international community”; the
fact that Zimbabwe is part of that “[civilized] international
community;” “. . . decisions of other Courts”—that is, courts in other
countries; “the writings of leading academics;” “contemporary
norms operative in Zimbabwe;” and “the sensitivities of [the]
peoples” of Zimbabwe. 242

2. The Use of International and Comparative Sources in

Domestic Interpretation: State v. Makwanyane (South Africa)

In the matter of the State v. Makwanyane, the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of South Africa, the country’s highest court,
was called upon to determine whether the death penalty is
“consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.” 243 This case
was decided under South Africa’s Interim Constitution. Although
Chapter Three of South Africa’s Interim Constitution sets out the
fundamental rights to which every South African is entitled under
the constitution and “contains provisions dealing with the way in
which the Chapter is to be interpreted by the Courts,” 244 the
constitution does not deal specifically with the death penalty.
Nevertheless, § 11(2), prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment[,] or punishment.” 245 Since the constitution does not
provide a “definition of what is to be regarded as ‘cruel, inhuman or

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 3.
243
The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94,
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Const. Ct. of the Republic of S. Afr. 1995).
244
Id. ¶ 8.
245
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. ACT 200 OF 1993, § 11(2).
241
242
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degrading,’” the Constitutional Court was called upon to “give
meaning to these words.” 246
The challenge to the death penalty in the Republic of South
Africa arose under § 11(2) of the Interim Constitution, 247 and was
also examined under §§ 8–10 of the Interim Constitution. 248 Our
interest in this case is in the use, by the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, of international and foreign comparative law in determining
the constitutionality of the death penalty. In a section titled
“International and Foreign Comparative Law,” 249 the Constitutional
Court’s president, Chaskalson P, examined capital punishment in
the United States 250 and India. 251 Chaskalson P also surveyed
opinions of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European
Court that deal specifically with “the treatment of the rights to
dignity, life, and freedom from cruel, inhuman[,] and degrading
punishment.” 252 The examination of these various opinions on the
death penalty was designed to help the Constitutional Court “. . .
contextualize the South African decision with international attitudes
and to offer comparative views on the scope of rights in national
views and international forums.” 253 In doing so, Chaskalson P stated
the South African position on the role of international and
comparative law: “We can derive assistance from public
international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound
to follow it.” 254

246
The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94,
Judgment, ¶ 8.
247
See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. ACT 200 OF 1993, § 11(2).
248
Id. §§ 8-10.
249
The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94,
Judgment, at 22.
250
Id. ¶¶ 40–62.
251
Id. ¶¶ 70–79.
252
Adjami, supra note 67, at 151; see also The State v. T.
Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, Judgment, at 48–73.
253
Adjami, supra note 67, at 151.
254
The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94,
Judgment, ¶ 39.
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The Constitutional Court held that the death penalty offends the
South African constitution, and hence is unconstitutional. 255
Chaskalson P, speaking for the Constitutional Court, anchored the
Court’s opinion on the following principle:
The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all
human rights and the source of all other personal rights in
Chapter Three. By committing ourselves to a society
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required
to value these two rights above all others. And this must be
demonstrated by the State in everything that it does,
including the way it punishes criminals. This is not
achieved by objectifying murderers and putting them to
death to serve as an example to others in the expectation
that they might possibly be deterred thereby. 256
In addition to relying on international and foreign comparative
law, the Makwanyane decision also consulted African cases dealing
with the death penalty; specifically the Catholic Commission
(Zimbabwe) 257 case, which describes the death row phenomenon. 258
In addition, the Makwanyane decision also paid close attention to
Chief Justice Gubbay’s reasoning in the decision of the Catholic
Commission case. 259 Finally, concurring judgments in Makwanyane
make references to other African cases, notably Ex parte AttorneyGeneral, Namibia 260 and Ncube. 261
The cases discussed here reveal that courts in many African
countries are gradually turning to international sources as “. . .
interpretive devices and authoritative precedent for determining the
scope of fundamental rights enshrined in constitutional bills of

255
256
257

¶ 1.

See generally id.
Id. ¶ 144.
See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993),

258
See, e.g., the State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No.
CCT/3/94, Judgment, ¶ 177.
259
Id.
260
Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment
(3) SA 76 (1991 NmSC).
261
State v. Ncube (2) SA 702 (Zim. 1988).
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rights.” 262 Judges in the African countries are looking to
international law, particularly international human rights law, to
provide them with the necessary tools to help them determine the
scope of the fundamental rights enshrined in their domestic
constitutions. 263 In doing so, they shy away from invoking
provisions of international human rights instruments, which have
not yet been incorporated into their municipal legal orders. 264
Nevertheless, these African judges do not grant any “. . . interpretive
primacy to these [international human rights instruments] over
nonbinding instruments or other informal statements of
principles.” 265

III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
authored a report called An Agenda for Peace, 266 in which he spelled
out ways in which he believed intergovernmental organizations
could respond more effectively and fully to threats to international
peace and security. 267 The report looked specifically at three
important areas that were suggested by the UN Security Council:
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping. 268 The

Adjami, supra note 67, at 151.
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 152.
266
The document was officially called An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping and was produced
by the Secretary-General at the request of the UN Security Council. It was
subsequently presented to the UN Security Council at its summit meeting
on January 31, 1992. See U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UN Doc.
A/47/277 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
267
Agenda for Peace, supra note 266.
268
Id.
262
263
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Secretary-General added one more area, which he believed was a
“closely-related concept:” post-conflict peace-building. 269
The Secretary-General’s report was released in early 1992 at a
time when there were tremendous changes in the global system—
both the Soviet Union and socialism in Eastern Europe had
collapsed and the Cold War was coming to an end. 270 In Africa,
South Africa’s dreaded and racially-based apartheid system was in
the process of being replaced and the country was about to usher in
a new nonracial democratic system; 271 and many of Africa’s
dictatorships had fallen or were about to fall. 272 Throughout the
world, previously exploited and marginalized peoples were rising
up to assert their right to govern themselves, and it was becoming
quite evident that the recognition and protection of human rights
were gaining significant importance in the global legal order. 273 In
fact, in his report to the UN Security Council, Boutros-Ghali
emphasized the need and urgency for the post-Cold War global
society to “enhance respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.” 274 The end of the Cold War, the Secretary-General
believed, had offered “all nations large and small,” the opportunity

Id. ¶ 5.
NICK BISLEY, THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE CAUSES OF
SOVIET COLLAPSE (2004) (examining, inter alia, the causes of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War).
271
See generally THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O.
Ihonvbere eds. 2003) (examining, inter alia, changes that were taking place
in Africa in the early-to-mid-1990s). See also JOHN C. EBY & FRED
MORTON, THE COLLAPSE OF APARTHEID AND THE DAWN OF DEMOCRACY IN
SOUTH AFRICA, 1993 (2017) (examining, inter alia, the collapse of South
Africa’s apartheid system and the emergence of a non-racial democratic
dispensation); ROBERT HARVEY, THE FALL OF APARTHEID: THE INSIDE
STORY FROM SMUTS TO MBEKI (2001) (examining, inter alia, events leading
to the collapse of apartheid in South Africa).
272
See, e.g., CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE &
DECLINE OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE (1985) (examining, inter alia, the rise and
collapse of the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, dictator of Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of Congo), who came to power through a military
coup in 1965 and was ousted by rebel forces in 1997).
273
See Agenda for Peace, supra note 266.
274
Id. ¶ 5.
269
270
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to achieve the cherished objectives of the UN Charter, which
included “a United Nations capable of maintaining international
peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of
promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom.’” 275
The Secretary-General went on to argue that the opportunity,
made possible by the end of the Cold War, must not be squandered
by the type of intergovernmental bickering that had characterized
the global order that followed the end of the Second World War and
lasted through the Cold War. 276 Instead, the UN and its Member
States must dedicate themselves to improving conditions for
peaceful coexistence and the recognition and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 277
For many years, the Security Council, in its capacity as the
primary UN organ charged with maintaining international peace and
security, had failed to take an active role in dealing quickly,
effectively, and fully, with threats to international peace and
security. 278 As a consequence, the international community was
unable to respond effectively to the pervasive abuse of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in many parts of the world, including
atrocities committed against citizens in many African countries, for

275
276
277
278

Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3–5.
Id.
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example, Nigeria, 279 Republic of Sudan, 280 and Rwanda. 281 In fact,
the failure of the UN and other regional organizations, such as the
AU, to develop and implement effective legal mechanisms for
dealing with threats to peace, security, and human rights has
produced genocidal wars in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda, and other
parts of the continent. 282

During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), the OAU considered
the conflict an internal affair and one that had to be resolved by Nigerians
themselves. As a consequence, the OAU made no effort to prevent the
atrocities committed against civilians, many of them Biafran children. See,
e.g., JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (1977) (providing, inter alia, an overview of the
atrocities committed against civilian populations during the Nigerian Civil
War). Despite the fact that the OAU’s successor organization, the AU, has
adopted a more progressive approach to conflicts that involve the violation
of human rights, it is still slow to respond. For example, since 2016, the
Francophone-dominated central government in Cameroon has launched a
genocidal war on the country’s Anglophone Regions—North West and
South West—which has resulted in the killing of many civilians and the
destruction of many Anglophone villages. See Peter Zongo, ‘This Is a
Genocide’: Villages Burn as War Rages in Blood-Soaked Cameroon,
GUARDIAN (UK), May 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis.
Yet, after more than two years of what the international press is calling
genocide against Anglophones by government security forces, the AU is yet
to take any action to stop these government-induced atrocities.
280
See LEVY, infra note 282 (examining, inter alia, atrocities
committed against the peoples of the Darfur region of Sudan by government
forces and those of militias affiliated with the government).
281
See MELVERN, infra note 282 (describing atrocities committed
against Rwanda’s Tutsi citizens and their Hutu sympathizers by the Hutudominated government and the Interahamwe, a Hutu paramilitary
organization).
282
See, e.g., JANEY LEVY, GENOCIDE IN DARFUR (2009) (examining,
inter alia, the genocide in the Darfur region of the Republic of Sudan);
LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
(2004) (recounting events leading to and including the Rwandan Genocide);
PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (2014)
(examining, inter alia, the various atrocities committed during the civil war
that took place in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970).
279
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As the world moved into the twenty-first century, and as
previously oppressed peoples continued to fight for their rights and
freedoms, including their right to self-determination, the protection
of human rights emerged as an important issue in global
governance. 283 Former UN Secretary-General and Ghanaian
diplomat Kofi Annan 284 appealed to the UN General Assembly to
find ways to deal with threats to international peace and security,
including, if necessary, “humanitarian intervention” to deal with
sectarian and other types of violence that violate human rights in
particular and threaten international peace and security in general. 285
Annan then posed a question to the international community—one
that dealt directly with whether intervention by the international
community in the internal affairs of Member States of the UN would
represent an interference in the sovereignty of these States. 286 He
inquired: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
affect every precept of our common humanity?” 287
In response to this challenge to the international community
regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
and other threats to international peace and security, the Canadian
Government, with the help of several foundations, established the
ICISS and announced the latter’s formation to the UN General

283
See OHCHR and Good Governance, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF
HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Good
Governance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
284
Kofi Annan served as the Secretary-General of the United
Nations from January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2006. He passed away on
August 18, 2018, in Bern, Switzerland. Biography, KOFI ANNAN FOUND.
(Aug.
19, 2018), https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/kofi-annan/
biography/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
285
See Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
286
See id.
287
Id.
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Assembly in September 2000. 288 The ICISS was tasked with
wrestling with a range of questions, including “legal, moral,
operational[,] and political” issues, and in doing so, the organization
was expected to “consult with the widest possible range of opinion
around the world and to bring back a report that would help the
Secretary-General and others find some new common ground.” 289
After research and consultation with various stakeholders, the
ICISS established a new approach to dealing with threats to
international peace and security, including those involving the abuse
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 290 The ICISS called this
new approach to dealing with threats to international peace and
security the R2P. As detailed in the ICISS Report, the R2P
incorporates three important elements, which are:
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other manmade crises putting populations at risk.
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which
may include coercive measures like sanctions and
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military
intervention.
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly
after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery,

288
See generally The Responsibility to Protect, DEP’T OF PUB. INFO.
(2014),
https://www.un.org/es/preventgenocide/rwanda/assets/pdf/Back
grounder%20R2P%202014.pdf (stating, inter alia, that “[f]ollowing the
tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international
community began to seriously debate how to react effectively when
citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated” and that
“[t]he expression ‘responsibility to protect’ was first presented in the report
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government in December 2001”).
289
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
290
See id.
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reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of
the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. 291
Since 2005, the R2P has been recognized as global society’s
unanimous commitment to confront threats to international peace,
including activities of state and nonstate actors that violate human
rights, such as genocides, ethnic cleansings, and other mass
atrocities. In Resolution 60/1 of September 16, 2005, the UN
General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document (2005WSOD), 292 and by doing so, the international
community formally registered its commitment to combat threats
against international peace and security, including those that were
targeted at preventing and protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms. According to Article 138 of the 2005WSOD, “[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing[,] and crimes against
humanity. 293 This responsibility entails the prevention of such
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means.” 294 Of course, the atrocities listed in Article 138
of the 2005WSOD represent direct assaults on human rights and
fundamental freedoms; hence, the obligation imposed on Member
States of the UN to prevent these crimes also represents an
understanding on their part to protect human rights. 295
But what happens when and if a Member State fails to fulfill its
R2P obligations and does not protect its citizens from atrocities
committed by state or nonstate actors? The international
community, working through and with the help of the UN—
particularly the UN Security Council—“has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . .
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing[,] and crimes against humanity.” 296 Implied in this
statement is that the international community has the responsibility

291
292
293
294
295
296

Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
Id. at art. 138.
Id.
See id.
Id. at art. 139.
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to ensure the recognition and protection of human rights. If,
however, the peaceful approach is not successful in fully and
effectively resolving various threats to international peace and
security, including the protection of human rights, the international
community is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the UN Security Council, in accordance
with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate.” 297
It is important to recognize the fact that the R2P is a political
commitment and not a legally binding obligation on the part of
Member States of the UN. 298 Nevertheless, this commitment flows
directly from binding international norms—specifically norms that
have either been assumed under or have evolved from various
international human rights instruments, including, for example, the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, as well as various norms of customary international
law. 299
During his service as Secretary-General, Kofi Annan showed
significant support for and interest in using the UN and various
regional organizations, such as the AU, to minimize threats against
international peace and security, including atrocities committed
against peoples around the world. 300 For example, in 2003, Annan
convened a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
(High-Level Panel), and the following year, the High-Level Panel
produced a report titled The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel
Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secured World:

297

Id.
See About, UN OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION & THE RESP. TO
PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibilityto-protect.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
299
See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
300
Mr. Annan was particularly concerned about the possibility of
repeat atrocities, such as those that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. See, e.g.,
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
298
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Our Shared Responsibility (High-Level Panel Report). 301 In the
High-Level Panel Report, the UN endorsed the “emerging norm that
there is a collective international responsibility to protect,
exercisable by the [UN] Security Council authorizing military
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other largescale killing, ethnic cleansing[,] or serious violations of international
humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved
powerless or unwilling to prevent.” 302 In 2005, Annan presented a
report titled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General, which
made clear that “the primary responsibility for implementing human
rights lies with governments.” 303
In 2006 the UNSC formally and officially recognized the R2P
through Resolution 1674 304 and affirmed “the provisions of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing[,] and crimes against
humanity.” 305 Ban Ki-moon, who took over from Kofi Annan as the
UN Secretary-General on January 1, 2007, also fully supported the
R2P. 306 In early 2008, Ban Ki-moon appointed Edward C. Luck as
the UN’s first Special Adviser on the R2P. 307 The Secretary-General
indicated that: “Mr. Luck’s work will include the responsibility to

301
U.N. Secretary-General, The Secretary-General’s High-Level
Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secured World:
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
302
Id. ¶ 203.
303
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3, ¶ 22 (May 26, 2005).
304
S.C. Res. 1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
305
Id. ¶ 4.
306
See UN Press Release: Secretary-General Appoints Edward C.
Luck of United States Special Adviser, U.N. Press Release No. SG/A/1120–
BIO/3963 (Feb. 21, 2008) (noting the appointment, by the UN SecretaryGeneral, of Edward C. Luck, as the UN’s first Special Adviser on the R2P).
307
Id.
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protect, as set out by the General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.” 308
In several reports produced by or under the direction of Ban Kimoon, it was made clear that the primary responsibility for
protecting populations against international crimes (e.g., genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing)
belonged to each Member State. 309 The UN Secretary-General also
stressed the need for international assistance to help countries build
the necessary capacity to confront threats to international peace,
including the abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 310
In 2009, Ban Ki-moon presented a report titled Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect to the UN General Assembly. 311 In the
report, the Secretary-General articulated a three-pillar strategy for
the implementation of the R2P. 312
The first pillar deals with “[t]he protection responsibilities of
the State”—each State must shoulder the responsibility to protect its
citizens from international crimes, including making certain that
human rights are respected and protected. 313 The second pillar deals
with the need for the international community to help each country
develop the capacity to confront international crimes. 314 This pillar
emphasizes the cooperation of Member States, regional and subregional organizations, civil society, and the private sector in
dealing with international crimes, including the creation of a culture
of respect for human rights. 315 The third pillar addresses the

308
Id. Paragraphs 138 and 139 deal with the “responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity.” See G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), at art. 138–39.
309
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
310
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309, at
summary.
311
Id.
312
See id. ¶ 11.
313
International crimes include: genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. All these crimes represent major
threats to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Africa. See id. ¶ 11(a).
314
See id. ¶ 11(b).
315
See id.
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contributions 316 of the international community and advises the
latter to respond “collectively in a timely and decisive manner when
a state is manifestly failing to” 317 protect its citizens against
international crimes. 318

316
These are the contributions of the international community to the
protection of all global citizens from international crimes; the development
of necessary capacity within each country and within regions of the globe
to respond fully and effectively to international crimes (e.g., genocide); and
the creation, within each country and region, of a culture that recognizes,
promotes, and defends human rights. In Africa, there have been significant
achievements in the area of human rights, many of them inspired by events
taking place in the international community (e.g., the end of the Cold War
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union). For example, Africans have
adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, which makes the protections and
promotion of human rights an explicit and important part of the AU’s
mandate; and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See, e.g.,
THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Danwood Mzikenge
Chirwa & Lilian Chenwi eds. 2016) (presenting a series of essays that argue,
inter alia, that the movement to recognize, promote, and defend human
rights in Africa has benefited significantly from the international
community, but unlike Europe and the United States, Africa has given
recognition, not just to civil and political rights, but also to economic, social,
and cultural rights as well).
317
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309,
¶ 11(c).
318
Pillar number three, which calls for the international community
to act in a “timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing
to” protect its citizens, is especially important given the genocides in
Rwanda and Darfur (Sudan). Id. In addition to the fact that both the
Rwandan and Sudanese states failed to protect their peoples from
international crimes, the governments themselves were the actual source of
the atrocities committed against citizens of both countries. Furthermore, the
international community failed to act (i.e., intervene) in a “timely and
decisive manner.” Id; See, e.g., ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE
DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004) (examining, inter
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In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the
R2P through Resolution 63/308 of October 7, 2009. 319 The United
Nations General Assembly indicated that it would “continue [its]
consideration of the responsibility to protect,” 320 and that it would
engage in several interactive dialogues to deal with different aspects
of the R2P and its implementation. 321 One of the dialogues, the one
held in 2012, focused exclusively on “timely and decisive responses
and the 2013 dialogue was devoted to state responsibility and
prevention.” 322
In 2011, then UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, presented
a report titled The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements
in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 323 to the UN General
Assembly and the UN Security Council. In the report, he addressed
the role that can be played by regional and sub-regional
organizations in protecting populations against international

alia, the failure of the international community to intervene to prevent the
massacre of Tutsis and their Hutu sympathizers in Rwanda in the spring of
1994); FRANCIS DENG, ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (2010) (arguing, inter alia, that sovereignty can no
longer be seen or used as protection against international intervention to end
the abuse of human rights when national governments are either unwilling
or unable to prevent the perpetuation of atrocities against citizens);
RICHARD BARLTROP, DARFUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE
CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN (2011) (detailing the
challenges faced by the international community as it has sought to deal
with the atrocities committed against the peoples of Darfur by the
government of Sudan and its affiliated militias).
319
G.A. Res. 63/308, The Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. (Oct.
7, 2009).
320
Id. ¶ 2.
321
See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309,
¶¶ 51, 72.
322
From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union
and the Responsibility to Protect, at 8, INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE
(Sept. 2017), http://refugee-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/AUR2P-final.pdf [hereinafter INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE].
323
U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc.
A/65/877–S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011).
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crimes. 324 He went on to declare that “[o]ver the last three years, [the
UN had] applied principles of the responsibility to protect in [its]
strategies for addressing threats to populations in about a dozen
specific situations,” and “[i]n every case, regional and/or subregional arrangements have made important contributions, often as
full partners with the United Nations.” 325
The R2P represents an important mechanism through which the
international community can participate in and contribute to the
prevention of atrocities, such as genocide and crimes against
humanity, that violate human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Africa. However, in order for the international community to
contribute positively to the fight against international crimes and the
improvement of the environment for the protection of human rights
in Africa, regional, sub-regional, and national organizations in the
continent must grant their cooperation. For example, the AU, as well
as sub-regional organizations, such as the ECOWAS, working in
cooperation with the UNSC, are more likely to deal successfully
with threats to international peace and security in Africa than any of
these organizations working alone. 326

See id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 4.
326
Such cooperation was critical in forcing Yahya Jammeh, former
president of The Gambia, out of power. Jammeh, who came to power
through a military coup in 1994, had lost his re-election bid in a December
2016 presidential election. Nevertheless, after first acknowledging and
conceding his defeat to opposition leader, Adama Barrow, he later refused
to leave office. ECOWAS, with the support of the UN Security Council and
the AU, finally pushed him out, clearing the way for the president-elect,
Barrow, to take the oath of office. See, e.g., Colin Freeman, Gambia’s
Ousted Dictator Is Living the Good Life in a Palace in Equatorial Guinea,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2017, 11:05 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/
04/03/gambias-ousted-dictator-is-living-the-good-life-in-a-palace-inequatorial-guinea/; Dionne Searcey & Jaime Yaya Barry, Yahya Jammeh,
Gambian President, Now Refuses to Accept Election Defeat, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/africa/
yahya-jammeh-gambia-rejects-vote-defeat-adama-barrow.html.
324
325
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IV. THE FAILURE OF THE OAU TO DEAL FULLY WITH
THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA
On May 25, 1963, African countries met at Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia where they founded the OAU and granted it the power to
undertake certain activities on their behalf. 327 In addition to making
sure that all remaining colonies and non-self-governing territories in
the continent were liberated and granted their independence, the
OAU was directed to promote regional cooperation among the new
countries in order to promote peace and security as well as rapid
economic growth and development. 328
Given the fact that the OAU was not granted the power to enact
legislation that was binding on its Member States, it was expected
to undertake its objectives through the harmonization of its Member
States’ policies. 329 Within the OAU, the highest governing organ
was the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and its main
function was to “discuss matters of common concern to Africa with
a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the
Organization.” 330 The Council of Ministers, which consisted of
foreign ministers of the Member States, was responsible for the
operationalization of the work of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government. 331 Specifically, the Council of Ministers was
tasked with implementing “the decision of the Assembly of Heads

See OAU Charter, art. XVIII(2), May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
Id. at arts. II(1)(d), 2(a)–(b).
329
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 9.
330
Article VIII of the OAU Charter states as follows: “The Assembly
of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the
Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss
matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and
harmonizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition
review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized
agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.”
OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. VIII.
331
The OAU’s Council of Ministers usually held two meetings a year
and it was subordinate to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
(AHSG). Its principal responsibility was to prepare the AHSG’s agenda and
implement the latter’s decisions. The CM eventually emerged as the OAU’s
driving force. OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. XII(1).
327
328
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of State and Government,” as well as “coordinat[ing] inter-African
cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly.” 332
In addition to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government, the OAU was also armed with two other
institutions or organs, namely, the General Secretariat 333 and the
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
(CMCA). 334 The CMCA was designed to function as the OAU’s
dispute resolution mechanism. 335 In addition to the fact that the
CMCA could only deal with disputes between Member States,
disputes could be referred to the CMCA only with the prior consent
or approval of the Member States. 336 The CMCA was a judicial
dispute resolution mechanism, 337 but it was “stillborn and has never
worked” 338 because “. . . member states have shown a strong
preference for political processes of conflict resolution rather than
for judicial means of settlement.” 339
Africa experienced many challenges to peace and security
during most of the OAU’s existence. 340 In addition to struggles of
the many colonies that had yet to gain independence by 1963 when
the OAU came into existence, there were several civil wars and
interstate conflicts that required urgent action from the continental
organization. 341 There were also struggles for independence in the
Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and

Id. at art. XIII(2).
Id. at arts. XVI–XVIII.
334
Id. at art. XIX.
335
See id.
336
See generally id.
337
See INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 9.
338
Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, AFR. UNION (July 2000),
¶ 11.4, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html.
339
Id.
340
See MONDE MUYANGWA & MARGARET A. VOGT, AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE OAU MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND
RESOLUTION, 1993–2000, at 5 (2000).
341
Id. at 5.
332
333
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Cape Verde, 342 as well as efforts to liberate Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), 343 South West Africa (Namibia), 344 and apartheid
South Africa from white supremacist regimes. 345 During the period

See generally AL VENTER, PORTUGAL’S GUERRILLA WARS IN
AFRICA: LISBON’S THREE WARS IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND
PORTUGUESE GUINEA 1961–74 (2013) (detailing the struggle for
independence in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, GuineaBissau (Guiné-Bissau), and Cape Verde (Cabo Verde)). Note that during
the colonial period, Guinea-Bissau was referred to as Portuguese Guinea.
343
See generally ELIAKIM M. SIBANDA, THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN
PEOPLE’S UNION, 1961–87: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF INSURGENCY IN
SOUTHERN RHODESIA (2005) (presenting a detailed analysis of the struggle
for independence in Southern Rhodesia); LOUISE WHITE, SOVEREIGNTY:
RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (2015)
(examining the struggle for independence and democracy in Southern
Rhodesia with special emphasis on white and African perspectives).
344
See generally RICHARD DALE, THE NAMIBIAN WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE, 1966–1989: DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
CAMPAIGNS (2014) (detailing the struggle for independence in the former
German colony of South West Africa, which gained independence in 1990
and took the name Namibia).
345
See generally DAVID MERMELSTEIN, THE ANTI-APARTHEID
READER: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHITE RACIST RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1987) (detailing the struggle against the racist apartheid regime in South
Africa); SHERIDAN JOHNS & R. HUNT DAVIS, MANDELA, TAMBO, AND THE
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1948–
1990: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY (1991) (examining the struggle for
independence in South Africa, beginning with the formal establishment of
the apartheid regime in 1948 to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison
in 1991).
342
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lasting from 1963 to 1993, there were civil wars or major conflicts
in Nigeria, 346 Chad, 347 Liberia, 348 Sierra Leone, 349 and Somalia. 350
In its first thirty years of existence, the OAU was quite
successful in managing some conflicts—notably those dealing with
“colonially-inherited borders.” 351 Nevertheless, the OAU played its
most significant role in the struggle to end European colonialism in
Africa, including the elimination of the dreaded apartheid system in
South Africa. 352 It worked cooperatively with various international
actors, including the UN and the Frontline States, 353 to support

346
See generally PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR,
1967–1970 (providing a critical overview of the Nigerian civil war).
347
See generally MARIELLE DEBOS, LIVING BY THE GUN IN CHAD:
COMBATANTS, IMPUNITY AND STATE FORMATION (Andrew Brown trans.,
Zed Books Ltd. 2016) (examining the pervasiveness of sectarian violence
in Chad, as well as state-sponsored repression of citizens).
348
See generally MARK HUBAND, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1998)
(providing an overview of the civil war that began in Liberia in 1989).
349
See generally LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA:
THE RUF AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE (2005) (providing a firstperson account of the civil war in Sierra Leone); KIERAN MITTON, REBELS
IN A ROTTEN STATE: UNDERSTANDING ATROCITY IN SIERRA LEONE (2015)
(detailing the transformation of ordinary people into sadistic killers during
the civil war in Sierra Leone).
350
MARY HARPER, GETTING SOMALIA WRONG?: FAITH, WAR AND
HOPE IN A SHATTERED STATE (2012) (examining the transformation of
Somalia into a failed state).
351
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 5. (the OAU was
successful, for example, in managing border disputes between Algeria and
Morocco; Mali and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso); Somalia and Kenya; and
Ethiopia and Somalia).
352
See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
353
The Frontline States (FLS) were a loose coalition of countries in
southern Africa, which, from the 1960s to the 1990s, committed significant
resources to ending the apartheid system and white minority rule in South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The FLS included Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See generally STUDIES IN
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE FRONT-LINE STATES
(Zbigniew A. Konczacki et al. 1990) (examining, inter alia, economic
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liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. 354
The OAU, however, was not successful in fully resolving the
question of the independence of the Western Sahara. 355 Aside from
these few successes, the OAU failed miserably in its efforts to
confront threats to peace and security in the continent. 356
Researchers have identified several factors that they believe explain
why the OAU had a disappointing record in dealing with challenges
to peace and security in Africa from its founding in 1963 to the early
1990s. 357 These include limitations imposed on the OAU by its
founding document; the inadequacies of its conflict management
institutions; the lack of political will among Member States’ leaders;
the lack of capacity, experience, and financial resources; and the
constraints imposed on the OAU by external actors, many of which
intervened in the continent’s affairs. 358

developments in the Frontline States); CAROL B. THOMPSON, CHALLENGE
TO IMPERIALISM: THE FRONTLINE STATES IN THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE
(1985) (examining the contributions of the Frontline States to the liberation
of Zimbabwe); GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, ALLIES IN ADVERSITY: THE
FRONTLINE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY, 1975–1993 (2007)
(providing a comprehensive examination of the founding of the Frontline
States alliance and its contributions to liberation movements in Southern
Africa).
354
See generally SAUL DUBOW, APARTHEID, 1948–1994 (2014)
(examining, inter alia, the contributions of the Frontline States to the end of
apartheid in South Africa and the coming into place of a non-racial
democratic system).
355
See generally PERSPECTIVES ON WESTERN SAHARA: MYTHS,
NATIONALISMS, AND GEOPOLITICS (Anouar Boukhars & Jacques Roussellier
eds. 2014) (examining, inter alia, the struggle for independence in the
Western Sahara and the failure of the OAU to resolve the Morocco’s claims
over most of the territory).
356
See Abu Alhassan (Ghana Army), The African Peace and
Security Architecture: Myth or Reality, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA 17013, Strategy Research Project (March 2013), at 4–5,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a588906.pdf (noting, inter alia, that
the “OAU’s overall record of providing peace and security in Africa from
1963 to 1993 was a fiasco”).
357
See id.
358
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6.
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One of the most important limitations on the OAU’s ability to
deal with threats to peace and security in the continent was its
founding document’s Article III, which set forth the principles under
which the organization was to operate. 359 One of those principles
was “[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of [Member]
States.” 360 The non-interference principle and the requirement that
Member States of the OAU dutifully exercise “[r]espect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its
inalienable right to independent existence,” 361 effectively
“hampered the OAU’s role in resolving intra-state conflicts.” 362 This
is illustrated by the civil war, which raged in Nigeria from 1967 to
1970; this conflict was, perhaps, the greatest challenge to the OAU
during the period 1963–1993. 363
The OAU saw the position taken by Biafra to secede as a threat
to the territorial integrity of the Nigerian Federation. 364
Nevertheless, the OAU considered the conflict an internal matter
and one that the Nigerians needed to resolve without external
interference. 365 The conflict also caused a schism within the
organization, demonstrated by the fact that four countries—Gabon,
Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zambia—“challenged the [OAU]
[C]harter’s stipulations on territorial integrity and non-interference
by pledging their support for the Biafran secessionist cause.” 366 The
civil war ended in 1970 after Biafra surrendered, but the OAU had

OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. III(2).
Id.
361
Id. at art. III(3).
362
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6.
363
See generally JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (Princeton Univ. Press 1977)
(examining, inter alia, the OAU’s failed efforts to act to stop the bloody
confrontation between the Republic of Biafra and the government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria).
364
See Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right of SelfDetermination: An O.A.U. Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD., 355, 364, 373–
74 (1974) (discussing OAU action during Biafran secession conflict).
365
See id. at 372.
366
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6.
359
360
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contributed virtually nothing to bring an end to the conflict and
avoid the atrocities committed against civilians. 367
Given the OAU’s inherent weaknesses, Member States usually
preferred to take their cases to other multilateral institutions,
including the International Court of Justice. 368 Even in cases where
Member States decided to seek assistance from the OAU in
resolving their conflicts, they often chose to bypass the
organization’s Commission on Mediation, Arbitration, and
Reconciliation, and instead opt for “ad hoc mediation and
consultation committees and delegations, diplomacy, and good
offices.” 369
The OAU’s failure in resolving the civil war in Chad revealed
its lack of capacity and experience with confronting threats to peace
and security in the continent. 370 Although the OAU did eventually
intervene militarily in Chad, the effort was a total failure because it
“was late, poorly planned and financed, [and] lacked a clear mandate
and the resources necessary to accomplish the mission. 371 The
mission, which had been approved in 1980, failed to arrive in Chad
until 1981 by which time the cease-fire had broken down.” 372 The
OAU’s poorly equipped peacekeeping force was eventually forced
to leave Chad in 1981 while the civil war raged and political and
economic conditions continued to deteriorate. 373
The lack of financial resources significantly contributed to the
OAU’s failure to undertake humanitarian intervention. 374 Some
observers argue that this lack of resources was due to the fact that

367
See 1ANTHONY KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA:
A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK, 1966–1970 (1971) (examining military
intervention in the First Republic and its aftermath, the civil war, and efforts
to bring about peace in Nigeria).
368
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6–7.
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Id. See also TERRY M. MAYS, AFRICA’S FIRST PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION: THE OAU IN CHAD, 1981–1982 (Praeger Publishers 2002)
(providing an overview of the OAU’s intervention efforts in Chad).
374
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 7.
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Member States did not have faith in the organization and were not
willing to pay their dues. 375 Since the OAU’s main source of
financing was contributions from Member States, the failure of these
countries to fulfil their financial obligations to the organization had
a significant negative impact on its performance. 376
The persistent interest of external actors in Africa and their
determined efforts to exploit Africa and Africans represented an
important constraint on the ability of the OAU to engage in
humanitarian intervention in the continent. 377 During the Cold War,
Africa became “a battleground for the United States and the Soviet
Union as the two superpowers competed for ideological and
strategic dominance.” 378 In the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa,
superpower intervention, which included the supply of military
equipment and financial resources to both sides in each conflict,
prolonged these conflicts and intensified the “devastation caused”
by these interventions. 379
In 1993, the OAU moved to establish the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR) with
the objective of managing and resolving conflicts throughout the
continent. 380 The MCPMR emerged at a time when the continent
was overwhelmed by refugees and internally displaced persons. 381
Nevertheless, the OAU was unable to move quickly and work
efficiently and effectively to resolve many of the sectarian conflicts

375

Id.
Id. See generally ISIAKA A. BADMUS, THE AFRICAN UNION’S ROLE
IN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY
OPERATIONS (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) (describing, inter alia, the failure
of Member States to meet their financial obligations to the OAU/AU).
377
See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 7.
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
Larry Benjamin et al., Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1 S. AFR.
J. INT’L AFF. 126 (1993).
381
It has been estimated that at this time, there were as many as 5.2
million refugees and 13 million internally displaced persons in the
continent. See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 11.
376
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that were pervading the continent. 382 This is evidenced by the
conflict that emerged in Rwanda in the Spring of 1994 when the
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was killed after a plane he
was flying in was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali on April
6, 1994. 383 In just 100 days, members of the Hutu paramilitary
organization, Interahamwe, killed over 800,000 Tutsi and their Hutu
sympathizers. 384 The Rwandan Genocide represented the OAU’s
most significant failure in maintaining continental peace and
security in the post-Cold War period. It was this failure that gave
impetus to the founding of the AU. 385
The decision of the OAU to strictly adhere to its operating
principles, particularly that of “non-intervention,” as well as the
failure of the organization to secure the necessary financial
resources to finance its various intervention missions effectively
prevented the organization from coordinating efforts to deal fully
with threats against peace and security in the continent. 386

V. THE AFRICAN UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
A. INTRODUCTION
Although there are many reasons why Africans had decided to
replace the OAU with a new organization called the African Union

382

Id.
See LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE (Verso 2004).
384
See id.
385
See generally JOHN ILIFFE, OBASANJO, NIGERIA & THE WORLD
220 (James Currey 2011) (arguing, inter alia, that the creation of the AU
came from three directions, including widespread dissatisfaction with the
OAU, which was ill-equipped to deal with the continent’s economic decline
and to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to prevent
atrocities, such as the Rwandan Genocide).
386
See GABRIEL S. NDUGULILE, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY (OAU), ITS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE:
A CASE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE (Centre for Foreign Relations 1981)
(examining the OAU’s successes and failures in Africa’s liberation
movements using Zimbabwe as a case study).
383
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(AU), the most important one concerns the failure of the OAU to
deal fully and effectively with many of the continent’s conflicts,
including especially the Rwandan Genocide, which had been
responsible for the deaths of thousands of people. 387 In addition to
causing the deaths of many people, these conflicts also destroyed the
productive capacities of many of the continent’s already fragile
economies. 388
The release of the 1990 Declaration on the Political and SocioEconomic Situation in Africa indicated that the OAU had outlived
its usefulness. 389 The declaration emphasized the belief that Africa
was entering a new era in its political and economic transformation
in which less emphasis would be placed on liberation from
colonialism in favor of economic growth and development and
regional integration. 390 Specifically, the declaration stated that
Member States of the OAU were determined to “work assiduously
towards economic integration through regional cooperation” and
were also “determined to take urgent measures to rationalize the
existing economic groupings in our continent in order to increase
their effectiveness in promoting economic integration and
establishing an African Economic Community.” 391
In 1991, African countries, in keeping with the post-Cold War
emphasis on economic development and regional integration,

For example, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone caused
significant damage to their infrastructures and significantly reduced their
productive capacities. See FELIX GERDES, CIVIL WAR AND STATE
FORMATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR AND PEACE IN LIBERIA
(Campus Verlag 2013) (examining, inter alia, the impact of war on state
formation, economic development, and peace-making in Liberia); see also
LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE (Indiana University Press 2005)
(examining, inter alia, the impact of the civil war on the economic and
political systems in Sierra Leone).
388
See generally GERDES, supra note 387.
389
Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in
Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, ORG. OF
AFR. UNITY, AHG/Decl. 1 (XXVI) (1990), https://archives.au.int/handle/
123456789/715.
390
Id. ¶ 8.
391
Id. ¶ 8.
387
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adopted a treaty establishing the African Economic Community
(Abuja Treaty). 392 The main objective of the Abuja Treaty was “to
promote economic, social and cultural development and the
integration of African economies in order to increase economic selfreliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained
development.” 393 This important objective was to be accomplished
through “the strengthening of existing regional economic
communities and the establishment of other communities where
they do not exist.” 394
In 1999, at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government summit in Sirte, 395 Libya, African leaders, under the
leadership of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, announced their
intention to create a new continental organization they believed
would “fast track the creation and implementation of the institutions
contemplated by the Abuja Treaty.” 396 The new institution was the
AU, which took over the duties of the OAU and incorporated the
African Economic Community. 397 The AU has been described as
“essentially a merger of the largely political ambitions of the OAU
and the mainly economically minded African Economic
Community, with the addition of some organs and with an
acceleration of pace in economic integration, as stipulated in the
Sirte Declaration.” 398 The AU is said to have “supplanted the OAU
largely out of a sense of frustration among African leaders about the

392
The treaty was officially referred to as The Treaty Establishing
the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), adopted on June 3, 1991,
and entered into force on May 12, 1994. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, ORG. OF AFR. UNITY (June 3, 1991).
393
Id. at art. 4(1)(a).
394
Id. at art. 4(2)(a).
395
Robert Nolan, The African Union After Gaddafi, J. DIPL. & INT’L
REL. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/12/the-africanunion-after-gaddafi/ (arguing that during the Sirte (Libya) summit in 1999,
“Gaddafi helped convince 45 African heads of state to approve the creation
of the African Union, and for more than a decade, he was the largest patron
and most outspoken advocate.”).
396
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 10.
397
Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26.
398
FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA
164 (2nd ed. 2012).
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slow pace of economic integration and awareness that the many
problems on the continent necessitated a new way of doing
things.” 399
When African leaders created the AU, they modified the
principles of the OAU. 400 In doing so, they were fully “[c]onscious
of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major
impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and
of the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite
for the implementation of our development and integration
agenda.” 401 The Constitutive Act of the African Union, 402 like its
predecessor, the OAU Charter, continues a prohibition on “the use
of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union” 403
and retains the OAU’s principle of “non-interference by any
Member State in the internal affairs of another.” 404 However, unlike
the OAU, the AU reserves the right to intervene in “a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly [of Heads of State and
Government] in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” 405 The Constitutive
Act of the African Union grants each Member State the right “to
request intervention from the [African] Union in order to restore
peace and security.” 406
The designers of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, like
those who developed the R2P, were concerned about inaction on the
part of Member States and consequences for peace and security in
the continent. 407 For example, in 1994, inaction by the UN, the
global community, and the AU, resulted in the Rwandan

399
400

26.

401
402
403
404
405
406
407

INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 10.
See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note
Id. at pmbl.
Id.
Id. at art. 4(f).
Id. at art. 4(g).
Id. at art. 4(h).
Id. at art. 4(j).
See id.; see also Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
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Genocide. 408 In the introduction to the R2P document, the ICCIS
states:
The United Nations (UN) Secretariat and some permanent
members of the Security Council knew that [Rwandan]
officials connected to the then government were planning
genocide; UN forces were present, though not in sufficient
number at the outset; and credible strategies were available
to prevent, or at least mitigate, the slaughter which
followed. But the Security Council refused to take the
necessary action. That was a failure of international will—
of civic courage—at the highest level. Its consequence was
not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the
genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and
continues to do so. 409
Although the Constitutive Act of the African Union does not
specifically mention the Rwandan Genocide, like the R2P
document, it nevertheless indicates that the Heads of State and
Government of the Member States were quite aware of the inaction
that had led to genocide and other types of atrocities in various parts
of the continent. 410 It has been argued that the “inclusion of . . . R2Plike provisions [in the Constitutive Act of the African Union] arose
from concern about the OAU’s failure to stop internal conflicts, as
well as widespread human rights violations occurring within states,
including those instigated by the regimes of Idi Amin in Uganda and
Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic.” 411 Although
the OAU mitigated and minimized some types of conflicts,
particularly those involving “trans-boundary claims” 412 and those
“fueled by irredentism,” 413 it greatly intensified others by
“legitimizing the preservation of the status quo and delegitimizing

Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36.
Id.
410
See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26, at pmbl.
411
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 11.
412
James Busumtwi-Sam, Architects of Peace: The African Union
and NEPAD, 7 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 71, 74 (2006).
413
Id.
408
409
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the grievances of disaffected groups.” 414 In fact, the failure of public
policy in many African countries to grant a hearing to the grievances
of many excluded and marginalized groups (e.g., religious and
ethnic minorities) gave rise to violent and destructive mobilization
as groups fought to improve their levels of political and economic
participation. Examples of ethnocultural groups that have engaged
in violent and destructive mobilization in an effort to minimize their
political and economic marginalization include the Igbos of Nigeria,
several indigenous ethnic groups in Liberia, and the Anglophones of
Cameroon. 415 The Igbos of Nigeria, together with other minority
groups from the then Eastern Region of Nigeria, fought a brutal civil
war that lasted from 1967 to 1970 in an attempt to secede from the
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 416 Several indigenous ethnic groups in
Liberia, under the leadership of Sargent Samuel K. Doe of the Krahn
ethnic group, engaged in violent activities to dismantle the more
than 100-year old minority Americo-Liberian hegemony and
replace it with a governing process that was supposed to improve
political and economic participation for indigenous groups. 417 The
Anglophones of Cameroon took up arms in 2018 to fight what they
argue is domination and exploitation by the Francophone-dominated
central government. 418
By the early-to-mid-1990s, as grassroots pro-democracy
movements continued to dismantle dictatorships and authoritarian
governments throughout the continent, there emerged new emphasis
on the recognition and protection of human rights, including
especially those of heretofore marginalized groups (e.g., women,
children, the poor, ethnic and religious minorities, and other
vulnerable groups). 419 Nevertheless, despite these transformations

414

Id.
See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS
IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
APPROACH 2–3 (2018).
416
See id.
417
See id.
418
See id.
419
See id.
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in the governance architectures of many countries on the continent,
the violation of human rights remained a major problem. 420
This lack of progress in minimizing impunity and enhancing the
protection of human rights on the continent came from the failure of
many African countries to provide themselves with effective
institutional arrangements—that is, those capable of adequately
constraining the State and minimizing the ability of state custodians
(i.e., civil servants and political elites) to engage in activities that
violate the rights of citizens. For example, after the dictatorship of
Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was
ousted in 1997, subsequent governments were either unable or
unwilling to engage the country’s various subcultures in robust
institutional reforms to create effective governance structures. 421
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who ruled the country from 1997 until his
assassination in 2001, never made any effort to engage the people of
the DRC in necessary institutional reforms. 422 Instead, he chose to
retain the dysfunctional governance architecture that had allowed
impunity to become pervasive throughout Mobutu’s more than 30year rule. 423 When Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001,
his son, Joseph, took over as president of the DRC, and like his
father, Joseph Kabila did not undertake the necessary reforms to
improve governance in the DRC. 424 As a consequence, state and
non-state agents continued to violate human rights with impunity. 425

420

See id.
See infra note 425.
422
See infra note 425.
423
See infra note 425.
424
See infra note 425.
425
See generally MICHAEL DEIBERT, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR (2013) (examining, inter alia, the
failure of DRC governments, including that of Joseph Kabila, to fully
transform the country and provide it with effective institutional
arrangements); see generally JEAN-LOUIS PETA IKAMBANA, MOBUTU’S
TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS (2006)
(arguing, inter alia, that Mobutu’s political system, which began in 1965
and ended in 1997, was totalitarian, with Mobutu putting his own personal
421
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It was within this type of institutional environment, one
characterized by dysfunctional economic and political institutions,
that African leaders began the effort to transform the OAU into the
AU. Of course, there were exceptions. Countries such as Ghana and
post-apartheid South Africa had managed to provide themselves
with progressive constitutions and governing processes undergirded
by separation of powers with effective checks and balances. Of
particular interest in these countries was the fact that fair, free, and
credible elections were producing change in government without
any resort, by losing political groups, to violent mobilization, as was
occurring in other African countries. 426 The post-apartheid
constitution of the Republic of South Africa, for example, created
the position of president and limited the president’s mandate to a
maximum of two terms. 427 Nelson Mandela was elected postapartheid South Africa’s first president and took office on May 10,
1994. 428 He chose not to compete for a second term and left office
peacefully after the end of his term in 1999. 429 On April 28, 1992,
Ghana approved a new constitution and ushered in the Fourth
Republic. 430 Since then, there has been peaceful change of
government; for example, in the 2016 presidential election that took
place on December 7, 2016, the incumbent president John Dramani
Mahama lost to opposition candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo. 431
Mahama conceded and left office, allowing for a peaceful
transition. 432

interests at the center of public policy); FRANÇOIS NGOLET, CRISIS IN THE
CONGO: THE RISE AND FALL OF LAURENT KABILA (2010) (examining, inter
alia, the ascent of Kabila to the pinnacle of power in the DRC in 1997 and
his fall through an assassin’s bullet in 2001).
426
See generally infra note 432.
427
See infra note 432.
428
See infra note 432.
429
See infra note 432.
430
See infra note 432.
431
See infra note 432.
432
See, e.g., Ghana: John Mahama’s Concession Speech, NEWS24
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ghana-john-
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The AU is governed by sixteen principles, 433 and of these, six
of them make explicit or implicit reference to human rights,
including “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule
of law and good governance,” 434 and “respect for the sanctity of
human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities.” 435 The
AU’s “objectives” also reference human rights—the AU pledged to
“promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other
relevant human rights instruments.” 436 Finally, the AU pledged to
work closely and cooperatively with its Member States to promote
peace, security, stability, democracy, and good governance. 437
It is argued that “[t]he legal and policy documents of the
African Union (AU) are founded on a human security paradigm that
obliges the continental body to maintain a non-indifference stance
on human rights abuses.” 438 The AU’s non-indifference policy is
significantly different from the “state-centric security principle of
the Organization of African Unity, which gave excessive privileges

mahamas-concession-speech-20161212. The peaceful regime changes that
have taken place in both South Africa and Ghana are a contrast to the
violence that has accompanied presidential elections in Kenya or the
unwillingness of Yahya Jammeh to leave office after losing the presidential
election in The Gambia. See generally Gambia Talks Fail as President
Refuses to Step Down, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-38621092; see generally Eyder Peralta, PostElection Violence Continues in Kenya, as Opposition Leader Returns, NPR
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/18/5650951
26/post-election-violence-continues-in-kenya-as-opposition-leader-returns
(detailing the sectarian violence that took place in the aftermath of general
elections in Kenya in August 2017).
433
See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26, at art.
4.
434
Id. at art. 4(m).
435
Id. at art. 4(o).
436
Id. at art. 3(h).
437
See id. at art. 3(a), (f), (g), & (h).
438
Ndubuisi Christian Ani, The African Union Non-Indifference
Stance: Lessons from Sudan and Libya, 6 AFR. CONFLICT & PEACEBUILDING
REV. 1, 1 (2016).
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to state elites.” 439 To implement its non-indifference principle,
minimize threats to peace and security, and promote good
governance in all its Member States, the AU created “a dedicated . .
. machinery” 440 which “supports the [AU’s] commitment to
intervene in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity.” 441 This new machinery, which was dedicated to fighting
threats to peace and security, consisted of the Peace and Security
Council (PSC) 442 and subsidiary organs, namely, the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development; 443 the Banjul Charter; 444 the
African Court; 445 the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on

Id. at 1.
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 12.
441
Id. at 12.
442
Id. at 12. The AU was established by the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
which entered into force on December 26, 2003. Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, AFR.
UNION,
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-relating-establishment-peaceand-security-council-african-union (last visited on November 18, 2018).
443
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 14. The
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established in
2002 as a “strategic framework for the socio-economic development of the
continent.” New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), AFR.
UNION, https://au.int/en/organs/nepad (last visited on Nov. 16, 2018). It was
expected to serve as the “primary mechanism to coordinate the pace and
impact of Africa’s development in the 21st century.” Id.
444
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 15. The
Africa Charter on Human and People’s Rights was adopted on June 27,
1981 and entered into force on October 21, 1986. Africa (Banjul) Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49.
445
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 15. The
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACtHPR”) is a continental
court that was established by African countries to “ensure . . . the protection
of human and peoples’ rights in Africa.” Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. UNION, adopted June 10, 1998,
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples439
440
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the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights; 446 and
the Ezulwini Consensus. 447

B. THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF
THE AFRICAN UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE R2P
On July 9, 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (PSC Protocol) 448 and established the PSC. 449 The PSC was
established specifically to serve as a “collective security and earlywarning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to

rights-establishment-african-court-human-and (last visited on Nov. 19,
2018). The ACtHPR was designed to “complement and reinforce the
functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” Id.
It was established by virtue of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights—the Protocol was adopted by
Member States of the then OAU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June
1998 and came into effect on January 25, 2004. Welcome to the African
Court, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, http://en.african-court.org/
(last visited on Feb. 10, 2021).
446
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 16;
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights, art. 7, AFR. UNION, adopted June 27, 2014,
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-africancourt-justice-and-human-rights (last visited on Mar. 2, 2021).
447
INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 17; The
Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations:
“The Ezulwini Consensus,” AFR. UNION, at 1, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2(VII)
(Mar. 7–8, 2005).
448
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union, art 22, AFR. UNION, adopted July 9, 2002,
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-relating-establishment-peace-andsecurity-council-african-union [hereinafter PSC Protocol].
449
Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1. According to Article 2(1) of the PSC Protocol,
“[t]here is hereby established, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitute Act
[of the African Union], a Peace and Security Council within the [African]
Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention,
management and resolution of conflicts.” Id.
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conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” 450 In addition, it was also
designed to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order
to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the
well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as
the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development.” 451
With respect to human rights, the PSC was empowered to “promote
and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule
of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for
the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part
of efforts for preventing conflicts.” 452
The PSC is made up of fifteen Member States elected on the
basis of equal rights—ten countries are elected to serve a term of
two years and five are elected to serve a term of three years. 453 The
PSC adopted a voting rule allowing decisions to be made by
consensus. 454 However, if consensus cannot be reached, a simple
majority may decide procedural matters. Nevertheless, decisions on
all other matters must be made by a two-thirds majority of “its
Members voting.” 455
The PSC is assisted by the African Union Commission, the
PSC’s Peace and Security Department, and four dedicated
institutions that were created through the PSC Protocol. These are

450
451
452
453
454
455

Id.
Id. at art. 3, ¶ a.
Id. at art. 3, ¶ f.
Id. at art. 5, ¶ 1.
Id. at art. 8, ¶ 13.
Id.
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the Panel of the Wise; 456 the Continental Early Warning System; 457
the African Standby Force; 458 and the Peace Fund. 459 The AU’s
“overall security architecture . . . has the primary responsibility for
promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.” 460 The AU’s
relationship with “the Regional Economic Communities/Regional
Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Panel of the Wise (PoW), AFR. UNION PEACE & SEC. (Apr. 24,
2018), http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow. The
Panel of the Wise is “one of the critical pillars of the Peace and Security
Architecture of the (APSA). Article 11 of the [PSC Protocol] . . . sets up a
five-person panel of ‘highly respected African personalities from various
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause
of peace, security and development on the continent’ with a task ‘to support
the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission,
particularly in the area of conflict prevention.” Id.
457
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), AFR. UNION
PEACE & SEC. (May 15, 2018) http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28continental-early-warning. The CEWS is “one of five pillars of the African
Peace and Security Architecture” it collects and analyzes the data and
provides the PSC and institutions with interest in peace and security in
Africa with important advice. Id.
458
The African Standby Force (ASF), AFR. UNION PEACE & SEC.
(Feb. 26, 2019), http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-forceasf-amani-africa-1. The Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the
AU the right to intervene in a Member State in grave circumstances (war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity). Id. The PSC Protocol’s
Article 13 establishes an African Standby Force and indicates that “[s]uch
Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with
civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for
rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” PSC Protocol, supra 448, at art.
13, ¶ 1. The ASF functions under the direction of the AU and supports the
AU’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states as prescribed
by article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The African
Standby Force (ASF), supra note 458.
459
Peace Fund, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/peace-fund (last
visited Feb. 17, 2021). The African Union Peace Fund was established
under Art. 21 of the PSC Protocol and charged with financing the AU’s
peace and security operations. Id. In July 2016, the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the AU “decided that the Peace Fund would be
endowed with $325m in 2017, rising to a total of $400m by 2020 from the
0.2% levy.” Id.
460
PSC Protocol, supra note 448, at art. 16, ¶ 1.
456
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is [considered] a key APSA component.” 461 The PSC also
cooperates and works with other AU organs such as the Pan-African
Parliament, the African Commission, and civil society
organizations, all of which are important to minimizing threats to
peace and security, as well as protecting human rights. 462 Such
cooperation is very important if the PSC is to succeed in preventing
impunity and enhancing the protection of human rights in the
African countries. 463

C. CONTINENTAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
The AU’s institutional architecture includes judicial and other
legal institutions tasked with promoting the protection of human
rights and minimizing threats to peace and security. 464 The Banjul
Charter is the continent’s main instrument for the promotion and
protection of human rights. 465 The Banjul Charter is “an
international human rights instrument that is intended to promote
and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African
continent.” 466 Oversight and interpretation of the Banjul Charter is
placed in the hands of the African Commission—the African
Commission was established in 1987 and currently has its
headquarters in Banjul, The Gambia. 467 In 1998, the AU adopted a
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), AFR.
UNION PEACE & SEC. (Oct. 02, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/theafrican-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa.
462
Id.
463
Id.
464
AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last
visited Feb. 17, 2021).
465
Banjul Charter, supra note 93.
466
Id.
467
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR.
COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://www.achpr.org/home (last
visited Feb. 10, 2021).
461
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Rights (African Court Protocol) 468—the Protocol provided for the
establishment of an African Court.
The African Court was “established by virtue of Article 1 of the
[African Court Protocol]” 469 and, as of the writing of this article,
“only nine (9) of the thirty (30) States Parties to the [African Court
Protocol] had made the declaration recognizing the competence of
the Court to receive cases from NGOs and individuals.” 470 The
African Court has “jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the [Banjul
Charter, the African Court Protocol] and any other relevant human
rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.” 471
The African Court Protocol mandates that “[t]he Court shall
consist of eleven judges, nationals of Member States of the OAU,
elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of high moral
character and of recognized practical, judicial or academic
competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’
rights.” 472 In addition to the requirement that judges must be
personally qualified and have experience in the field of human and
peoples’ rights, the judges chosen to serve on this continental
tribunal must represent the continent’s five major regions, “the
various African legal systems of Islamic law, Common and Civil
law, African customary law and South African Roman-Dutch law,
as well as ensuring that African traditions are taken into account.” 473
In addition to the requirement that “there is adequate gender
representation,” 474 only “States Parties to the Protocol may each
propose up to three candidates, at least two of whom shall be

468
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
AFR. UNION (June 10, 1998).
469
Welcome to the African Court, supra note 445.
470
Id.
471
Id.
472
AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 11.
473
Andreas Zimmermann & Jelena Bäumler, Current Challenges
Facing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 7 KAS INT’L REP.
38, 41 (2010).
474
AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 14(3).
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nationals of that State.” 475 It is quite likely, then, that judges from
States that are not party to the African Court Protocol can be
nominated to serve on the African Court. 476
The African Court’s first eleven judges were selected in 2006.
While they represented various regions and legal systems, the
selection was criticized because some of the judges lacked expertise
and experience in the field of human rights law. The selection also
received criticism for its lack of gender representation—only two
women were nominated. 477
Whether one is submitting a case to the African Commission or
the African Court, a very important and fundamental question of law
(that includes human rights law) “is whether a given mechanism
(commission, committee or court) has jurisdiction to preside over a
given case.” 478 A question that deals with the issue of the jurisdiction
of the African Court, can be “broken down into three
components,” 479 viz: “jurisdiction over the subject matter
(competence ratione materiae); jurisdiction over the person
(competence ratione personae); and jurisdiction to render the
particular judgment sought.” 480 The African Commission and the
African Court have jurisdiction over subject matter or persons “to
the extent granted to [them] by [their] enabling act or legislation.” 481

Id. at art. 12(1).
See Zimmermann & Bäumler, supra note 473, at 41.
477
See generally VILJOEN, supra note 398 (examining, inter alia, the
failure of the selection process for judges to serve on the African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights to provide for adequate gender representation).
478
Robert Wundeh Eno, The Jurisdiction of the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RIGHTS L. J. 223, 224 (2002).
479
Id.
480
Id.
481
Id.
475
476
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The African Court Protocol 482 defines the jurisdiction of the
African Court and provides for “three heads of jurisdiction” 483—the
“contentious (adjudicatory), advisory and conciliatory”
jurisdictions. 484 With respect to the adjudicatory (contentious)
jurisdiction, the African Court deals with “subject matter
jurisdiction” and “personal jurisdiction.” 485 According to Article
3(1) of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court
shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any
other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the State
concerned.” 486
Article 3(1) should be read together with Article 7—the latter
provides: “[t]he Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and
any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States
concerned.” 487 Such a reading allows the reader to recognize that the
jurisdiction of the African Court is significantly wider than that of
other regional instruments. 488 For example, unlike the European and

482
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
AFR. UNION, June 10, 1998. The African Court Protocol came into force on
January 25, 2004. The African Court Protocol was replaced by the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights on July 1,
2008. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights Protocol merged the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the Court of Justice of
the African Union. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights, AFR. UNION (July 1, 2008), at ch. I.
483
Eno, supra note 478.
484
Id. at 225. See also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at
arts. 3, 4, 9.
485
Personal jurisdiction deals with who can file a complaint with the
African Court. See, e.g., Eno, supra note 478, at 225.
486
AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3(1).
487
Id. at art. 7.
488
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR
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American Conventions on Human Rights, the Banjul Charter
provides for the protection of “not only civil and political rights but
also economic, social and cultural rights.” 489
Although the African Charter can “be interpreted drawing
inspiration from other international human rights instruments,” 490
any case brought before the African Court “must be decided with
reference to the African Charter.” 491 According to Article 45(2) of
the African Charter, the African Commission must “[e]nsure the
protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid down
by the [African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights].” 492 As
mandated by the African Court Protocol, the African Court “will
exercise direct jurisdiction over all human rights instruments
‘ratified by the states concerned.’” 493 This provision has been
interpreted to imply that the African Court’s jurisdiction extends to
“all regional, sub-regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international
treaties.” 494 The African Court, then, must not “limit itself to the
African Charter, but can refer to other treaties ratified by [African

THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND
PROTOCOL, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 4, 1950), https://www.echr.coe.int/

Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=; American Convention on Human
Rights, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RIGHTS (Nov. 22, 1969),
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.
htm.
489
PRACTICAL GUIDE: THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: TOWARDS THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, INT’L FEDERATION FOR HUM. RIGHTS (Apr. 2010),
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/african_court_guide.pdf, at 55. For
example, article 22 of the Banjul Charter states that “[a]ll peoples shall have
the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard
to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common
heritage of mankind.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 22.
490
Eno, supra note 478, at 226.
491
Id.
492
Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(2).
493
Eno, supra note 478, at 226; see also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL,
supra note 33, at art. 7.
494
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RIGHTS & DEV.
L.J. 45, 90 (2000).
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States], including UN treaties, bilateral and multilateral treaties at
regional and sub-regional level.” 495
Such wide jurisdiction for the African Court is critical to the
protection of human rights because it provides additional protections
for individuals “whose rights are not adequately protected in the
African Charter.” 496 Such persons can “easily hold the state
concerned accountable by invoking another treaty to which that state
is a party—either at UN level or sub-regional level.” 497 It has been
argued, for example, that the African Charter does not provide
adequate protections to women’s rights. 498 As argued by Odombana,
“[r]ather than rely on the Charter then, an aggrieved woman or group
of women could bring a case to the African Court under another
international treaty that better protected her [their] rights.” 499
In addition, if a State were to invoke a “clawback clause” in an
effort to “justify a breach of internationally protected rights: the
victim could simply invoke a treaty protecting the same rights, such
as the ICCPR, that did not include a similar clawback clause.” 500
Some scholars have argued that if this interpretation is accepted and
utilized by the African Court, that could imply that “all human rights
treaties ratified by a [S]tate [P]arty to the [African Court] Protocol
in the past will become justiciable, and future ratifications will have
the same consequence.” 501 Within such a framework, it is further
argued, African States “might be deterred not only from ratification
of the [African Court] Protocol, but from ratification of any human
rights treaty.” 502

See Eno, supra note 478, at 226–227.
Id. at 227.
497
Id.
498
See The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: An
Instrument for Advancing Reproductive and Sexual Rights, CTR. FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2006), at 2–3 (arguing that in response to
widespread activism, subsequent protocols were enacted to supplement the
African Charter in an effort to protect women’s rights).
499
Udombana, supra note 494, at 91.
500
Id.
501
See Eno, supra note 478, at 227.
502
See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System:
In Need of Reform?, 2 AFR. HUM. RIGHTS L. J. 155, 167 (2001).
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496

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

92

VOL. 16.1

Human rights law professor and expert on human rights in
Africa, Professor Christof Heyns, has argued that “[i]n one fell
swoop, Africa will have jumped from a region without a court, to a
region where all human rights treaties, whether they are of UN,
OAU or other origin, are enforced by a regional court, even though
the UN itself does not enforce them through a court of law. It would
be highly unusual for an institution from one system (AU) to enforce
the treaties of another system (UN).” 503
Udombana, however, argues that these fears are totally
unfounded and that “the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction over
cases filed by individuals and NGOs will limit the number of cases
that actually reach the Court to a manageable number, ensuring that
those with the greatest merit are heard.” 504 Nevertheless, despite
arguments to the effect that a “broad interpretation would open a
Pandora’s box and may flood the African Court with a lot of
cases,” 505 it is important and critical that the Court have wide
jurisdiction so that it can more effectively carry out its functions to
safeguard the rights of the citizens of African countries. 506
Regarding the argument that granting broad jurisdiction to the
African Court could negatively affect the willingness of some
countries to ratify a particular human rights instrument, it should be
noted that any country that would use the excuse of “broad
jurisdiction for the Court” to decline to sign and ratify human rights
instruments is a State that “is not committed to the promotion and
protection of human rights.” 507 In addition to the fact that granting
broad jurisdiction to the African Court would significantly frustrate
those African countries which have devised “sophisticated
strategies” to avoid being held accountable for their violation of
human rights, it will also “expose those states that took ratification
as [merely] a public relations exercise.” 508

503
504
505
506
507
508

Heyns, supra note 502, at 167.
Udombana, supra note 494, at 91.
Eno, supra note 478, at 227.
See id. at 228.
See id.
See id.
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2. Personal Jurisdiction
Article 5 of the African Court Protocol defines the African
Court’s competence with respect to persons who can appear before
the Court or who can submit matters to the Court. 509 Article 5
divides jurisdiction into (i) compulsory (automatic); and (ii) optional
jurisdictions. 510 With respect to compulsory jurisdiction, Article 5
(1) provides that the following have the right to submit cases and/or
matters to the African Court:
(a) The Commission
(b) The State Party which had lodged a complaint to the
Commission
(c) The State Party against which the complaint has been
lodged at the Commission
(d) The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human
rights violation
(e) African Intergovernmental Organizations. 511
A State Party that “has an interest in a case . . . may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to join.” 512 Article 5(3) deals
with other claimants and includes individuals and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs): “The Court may entitle relevant Non
Governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in
accordance with [A]rticle 34(6) of this Protocol.” 513 Article 34(6)
states that “[a]t the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any
time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration accepting the
competence of the Court to receive cases under [A]rticle 5(3) of this

509
510
511
512
513

AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 5.
See id.
Id. at art. 5(1).
Id. at art. 5(2).
Id. at art. 5(3).
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Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under [A]rticle
5(3) involving a State Party which has not made such a
declaration.” 514
It is important to note that the discretion to allow individuals
and NGOs to have direct access to the African Court “lies jointly
with the target state and the Court.” 515 If an individual or NGO files
a case with the African Court, the latter can only proceed with the
case if the State has already “made an express declaration accepting
the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.” 516 In addition, “the Court
has a discretion to grant or deny access at will.” 517 It has been argued
that the requirement that States make a separate declaration “in the
case of individual and NGO communications is in line with the
procedural law of other human rights systems.” 518
Since, in the African human rights system, “no special
declaration is required to access the Commissions,” the latter “could

514
515
516

34(6).

Id. at art. 34(6).
Eno, supra note 478, at 230.
Id. See also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art.

Eno, supra note 478, at 230.
Id. For example, Article 41(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states that “[a] State Party to the present Covenant
may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that
a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations
under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be
received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made
a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the
Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.” See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN HUM. RIGHTS
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (December 16, 1966),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; Article 21
of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, makes a similar declaration; see Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 (Dec. 10, 1984), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/
pages/cat.aspx.
517
518
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therefore be seen as a necessary barrier to weed out frivolous and
unnecessary communications that might find their way to the courts
if direct access were allowed.” 519 It is argued that “[w]hile [the]
limitation [under Article 5(3) of the African Court Protocol] may
have been necessary to get states on board [to ratify the Protocol], it
is nevertheless disappointing and a terrible blow to the standing and
reputation of the [African Court] in the eyes of most Africans.” 520
Mutua goes on to argue that “it is individuals and NGOs, and not the
African Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or
states parties, who would be the primary beneficiaries and users of
the court.” 521 In addition, argues Mutua, “[t]he court is not an
institution for the protection of the rights of states or OAU [AU]
organs”; instead, “[a] human rights court is primarily a forum for
protecting citizens against the state and other governmental
agencies” and hence, the “limitation [to access placed by the
Protocol on individuals and NGOs] will render the court virtually
meaningless unless it is interpreted broadly and liberally.” 522

3. The African Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction
In addition to the African Court’s contentious jurisdiction, 523
the African Court Protocol also empowers the Court to render
advisory opinions. 524 As provided for in Article 4(1) of the Protocol:
“At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its
organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the
Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the
Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided
that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being
examined by the Commission.” 525 When compared to other
international rights tribunals, the African Court exercises relatively

Eno, supra note 478, at 230.
See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights System: A Critical
Evaluation, at 28, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf.
521
Id.
522
Id.
523
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3.
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See id. at art. 4.
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See id. at art. 4(1).
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wider jurisdiction “in terms of who may submit requests for
advisory opinions on legal matters.” 526
For example, under the American Convention on Human
Rights, only Member States of the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the OAS’ organs are granted the right to seek advisory
opinions from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 527
According to Article 64(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, “[t]he member states of the Organization may consult the
Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other
treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American
states. 528 Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in
Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner
consult the Court.” 529
The African Court as designed by the OAU, on the other hand,
is granted power to exercise “advisory jurisdiction” over the OAU
(now the AU), Member States of the AU, AU organs, as well as “any
African organization recognized by the OAU [AU].” 530 Scholars,
such as Udombana, have argued that this relatively wide advisory
jurisdiction, which has been granted to the African Court, “should
allow for a more robust and sustained analysis of the meaning of the
Charter, the Protocol, and the compatibility of domestic legislation
and regional initiatives with the rights norms contained therein.” 531
It is also argued that the “African Court’s advisory jurisdiction
is also the broadest of the three regional systems 532 in terms of
subject matter.” 533 Within the African system, the African Court is

Udombana, supra note 494, at 91–92.
See Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 at art.
64.
528
Id. at art. 64(1).
529
Id.; see also Udombana, supra note 494, at 91–92.
530
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 4(1).
531
Udombana, supra note 494, at 92.
532
The three regional systems are the American Convention on
Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the African
Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
533
Udombana, supra note 494, at 92.
526
527

2019

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

97

empowered to “provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to
the Charter,” 534 the Protocol, as well as “any other relevant human
rights instruments [ratified by the States concerned].” 535 Udombana
states, for example, that according to Article 4(1), the African Court
“could conceivably issue an advisory opinion on the compatibility
of domestic legislation affecting land rights, housing availability, or
food prices with the obligations assumed under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by an African
State Party thereto.” 536
But, when must the African Court exercise its power to render
advisory opinions? Unfortunately, the African Court Protocol does
not provide any guidelines on how the African Court can determine
when it should or should not exercise its advisory jurisdiction. While
the African Court has wide discretion as to the situations in which it
can exercise its advisory jurisdiction, it is required to “give reasons
for its advisory opinions” and “every judge [of the Court is] entitled
to deliver a separate or dissenting decision.” 537
Although the African Court’s advisory opinions are not
“formally binding on any specific party,” they, nevertheless, “derive
their value as legal authority from the character of the Court as a
judicial institution.” 538 The African Court’s advisory jurisdiction is
generally considered very critical to the development of “human
rights jurisprudence” 539 in the continent. In addition to the fact that
the Court’s advisory opinions can have a significant impact on the
development of human rights jurisprudence in Africa, these
opinions are likely to also “significantly impact the domestic
application of the Charter and other international human rights
principles.” 540 As the main legal authority on the Banjul Charter, the
African Court is the appropriate institution to be called upon to

534
535
536
537
538
539
540

AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 4(1).
Id.
Udombana, supra note 494, at 92.
AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 4(2).
Udombana, supra note 494, at 93.
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determine whether a country’s legislation is “inconsistent with the
Charter” and consequently, is “unlawful.” 541
In Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, 542 a Nigerian nongovernmental organization, the Civil Liberties Organization, filed a
communication with the African Commission alleging that “the
military government of Nigeria [had] enacted various decrees in
violation of the African Charter, specifically the Constitution
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, which not
only suspends the Constitution but also specifies that no decree
promulgated after December 1983 can be examined in any Nigerian
Court; and the Political Parties (Dissolution) Decree No. 114 of
1993, which, in addition to dissolving political parties, ousts the
jurisdiction of the courts and specifically nullifies any domestic
effect of the African Charter.” 543
In its ruling, the Commission held that the Nigerian law was
incompatible with the country’s obligations under the African
Charter. 544 Specifically, the Commission stated that:
If Nigeria wished to withdraw its ratification, it would have
to undertake an international process involving notice,
which it has not done. Nigeria cannot negate the effects of
its ratification of the Charter through domestic action.
Nigeria remains under the obligation to guarantee the rights
of Article 7 to all of its citizens. 545
The African Commission also held that “the Decrees in
question constitute a breach of Article 7 of the Charter, the right to
be heard; [that] the ouster of the courts’ jurisdiction constitutes a
breach of Article 26, the obligation to establish and protect the

541

Id.
Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, Communication
129/1994, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R.], 17 Ordinary Session, (Mar. 22, 1995),
https://africanlii.org/afu/judgment/african-commission-human-andpeoples-rights/1995/4.
543
Id. at ¶ 1.
544
Id. at holding.
545
Id. at ¶ 13.
542
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courts; [and that] the act of the Nigerian Government to nullify the
domestic effect of the Charter constitutes a serious irregularity.” 546

4. Challenges to the Effectiveness of the African Court
For the African Court to succeed as an instrument for the
protection of human rights in Africa, it must be able to overcome
what have been referred to as “potential barriers” to its
effectiveness. 547 It has been noticed that during the last several
years, the African Commission has suffered from various “structural
and normative deficiencies that have plagued” 548 its ability to
effectively and fully carry out its functions. But, what have these
deficiencies been? These include “the non-binding nature of the
African Commission’s decisions,” “the lack of enforceable
remedies,” and “the lack of independence and creative vision of the
Commission.” 549
The African Court was established to adjudicate “all cases and
disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application
of the [African Court Protocol] and any other relevant Human
Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.” 550 The African
Court ensures the protection of human and peoples’ rights in the
continent. According to the African Court Protocol, the Court is
empowered to “complement [and reinforce] the protective mandate
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 551—the
two institutions, working together and with other organs of the
AU, 552 are expected to ensure the effective protection of human
rights in the continent.
Potential challenges to the Court’s effectiveness include, but are
not limited to: (i) ratification; (ii) access to the Court by individuals
and NGOs; (iii) funding of the Court’s operations and activities; (iv)
independence of the judiciary; (v) selection of competent and

546
547
548
549
550
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552

Id. at holding.
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 98.
Id.
Id.
AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3.
Id. at art. 2.
For example, the AU’s Peace and Security Council.
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independent judges (i.e., non-partisan judges); (vi) interpretation of
the Court’s mandate and jurisdiction; (vii) enforcement; and (viii)
others. 553

a. Ratification
According to Article 34(3) of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he
Protocol shall come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments
of ratification or accession have been deposited . . . with the
Secretary-General [of the OAU].” 554 As of 2018, twenty-four States
have signed and ratified the African Court Protocol; twenty-five
States have signed but have not ratified the African Court Protocol;
and five States have neither signed nor ratified the African Court
Protocol. 555 The African Court Protocol entered into force on
January 25, 2004. 556 Given the fact that enough States have signed
and ratified the Protocol for it to enter into force, ratification is no
longer a major constraint to the Court’s effectiveness. 557

b. Declarations by States Under Article 34(6)
and Direct Access to the Court by Individuals
and NGOs
Under Article 34(6), States must affirmatively “make a
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases

See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66–73.
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 34(3)–(7). The
AU, which was founded on May 26, 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and
launched on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, replaced and took over
the activities of the OAU. The Chairperson of the AU is now Depositary.
555
See Ratification Table: Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/ratification/
(last
visited on Dec. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Ratification Table].
556
See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (July 1, 2008),
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-humanrights.
557
See Ratification Table, supra note 555.
553
554
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under Article 5(3) 558 of [the] Protocol.” 559 Without such a
declaration or affirmative opt in, individuals and NGOs cannot have
direct access to the Court. There is fear that this requirement will
have significant negative impact on individuals and NGOs, the
parties that have the “greatest incentive and need to use human rights
institutions such as the Court.” 560 On the other hand, States Parties,
especially those pervaded by government impunity, are unlikely to
“readily support direct access [to the Court] by these parties.” 561
It has been suggested that although the provision in Article
34(6) was inserted in the African Court Protocol “to facilitate the
early ratification of the Protocol, it would perhaps have been more
effective to include a provision that permitted States Parties to opt
out of accepting the otherwise automatic jurisdiction of the Court
over individual and NGO petitions.” 562 It is argued further that under
the opt out option, “States Parties would have retained the power to
restrict direct access to the courts, but civil society would have had
a greater rallying point around which to pressure governments to
withdraw any such declaration.” 563
Another constraint on the ability of NGOs to have direct access
to the African Court is made possible by Article 5(3), which permits
direct access to the African Court only to “relevant [NGOs] with
observer status before the [African] Commission.” 564 This provision
places many human rights NGOs in the continent, especially those
with limited resources, in a situation in which they are not likely to
be able to successfully complete the expensive process necessary to
gain observer status before the African Commission. 565 Unlike the

Article 5(3) states that “[t]he Court may entitle relevant nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in
accordance with article 34(6) of this Protocol.” See AFRICAN COURT
PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 5(3).
559
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 34(6).
560
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 98.
561
Id.
562
Id. at 99.
563
Id. at 98.
564
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 5(3).
565
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 99–100.
558
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African human rights system, the Inter-American system provides a
more welcoming and less restrictive system for access to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. 566 According to Article
44, “Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity
legally recognized in one or more member states of the
Organization, may lodge petitions with the [American] Commission
containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this
Convention by a State Party.” 567 The American Convention’s more
open-door process provides the opportunity for many NGOs in the
Americas, including even small ones with limited resources, to gain
access to and place petitions before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. 568

c.

Financial Independence of the Court

Securing enough financial resources to fund the African Court’s
activities remains an important constraint to the Court’s
effectiveness. Article 32 of the African Court Protocol elaborates
how the Court’s budget is to be determined and who is responsible
for providing the necessary financial resources for the Court. 569
According to Article 32, “[e]xpenses of the Court, emoluments and
allowances for judges and the budget of the registry, shall be
determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with criteria laid
down by the OAU in consultation with the Court.” 570 This
responsibility, of course, has passed to the AU, the successor
organization to the OAU. 571

566
See Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, at
art. 64.
567
Id. at art. 44.
568
See id.
569
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 32.
570
Id.
571
According to art. 33(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union, “[t]his Act [i.e., Constitutive Act of the African Union] shall replace
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.” See Constitutive Act of
the African Union, supra note 26, at art. 33(1).
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Like any other court, the African Court must have “financial
security—security of salary or other remuneration, and, where
appropriate, security of pension.” 572 The Supreme Court of Canada
has noted that “[t]he essence of such security is that the right to
salary and pension should be established by law and not subject to
arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect
judicial independence.” 573 According to Article 9(1) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government is responsible for adopting the budget of the
Union, which includes the African Court’s budget. 574 The budget of
the AU is provided by contributions from Member States. 575 The
African Court cannot function effectively to protect human rights in
the continent unless it has financial independence, free of political
interference from the AU and its Member States. For example, some
scholars argue the African Commission, which complements the
activities of the African Court, has, on occasion, been unable to
fulfill its functions because of “lack of funds.” 576 Over the years, the
African Commission has had to depend on donations, most of them

572
Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 676 (Can.). This is
the Supreme Court of Canada case that set the standards for judicial
independence in Canada. See also Ian Greene, The Doctrine of Judicial
Independence Developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 26 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 177, 179 (1988).
573
Valente, 2 S.C.R. at 676. In the case of the African Court, the
“Executive” would be Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
AU.
574
See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26, at art.
9(1).
575
At the Twenty-Seventh African Union Summit in Kigali, Rwanda
in July 2016, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a
decision to impose a “0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the African
Union.” See What Is Financing of the Union, AFR. UNION,
https://au.int/web/en/what-financing-union (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
576
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 100.
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coming primarily from outside the continent, in order to maintain its
operations. 577
The recognition and protection of human rights must be
considered an integral part of the effort to promote peaceful
coexistence and human and economic development in Africa.
Hence, it must be an integral part of the mission of the AU and its
various organs, particularly, the African Court and the African
Commission. Nevertheless, in order for the African Court and
African Commission to perform their functions, they must be
provided the resources that they need. 578 This, of course, calls for all
Member States to ensure the financial independence of both the
African Court and the African Commission.

d. Independence of the Court
In order for the African Court to perform its functions, its
independence must be guaranteed. As argued by Udombana, “[t]he
Court must be insulated from all manner of political wrangling by
Member States, particularly in the appointment of and composition
of judges, and ensured absolute autonomy in its undertakings.” 579
He adds that “[j]udicial independence is necessary to give the Court
the honor, prestige, integrity, and unrestrained liberty to do
justice.” 580

577

See Chapter Nine Ninth Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. &
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (1995–1996), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/
123456789/2082/9e%20Rapport%20Annuel_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllow
ed=y (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). As detailed in the Ninth Annual Activity
Report, the Commission had to suspend several projects because of OAU’s
financial problems. See id. at XI(b)(i)(31). In addition, the Commission
received financial subventions from the United Nations Center for Human
Rights and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute. See id. at XI(b)(iii)(32)–(33).
578
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66.
579
Id. at 101.
580
Id.
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In order for a trial to be fair, “the judge or judges on the case
must be independent.” 581 In fact, “[a]ll international human rights
instruments refer to a fair trial by ‘an independent and impartial
tribunal.’” 582 The International Commission of Jurists argues that
judicial “independence refers both to the individual judge as well as
the judiciary as a whole.” 583 According to the UN Basic Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary, “[t]he independence of the
judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all
governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the
independence of the judiciary.” 584
The International Commission of Jurists also notes that
judiciary independence has been specifically recognized in various
regional contexts, namely, “Africa and Asia-Pacific.” 585 The
African Commission, at its Nineteenth Ordinary Session held from
March 26, 1996 to April 4, 1996, at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
adopted a resolution to respect and strengthen the independence of
the judiciary. 586 In this resolution, the African Commission
specifically calls upon Member States of the AU to:
•

Repeal all their legislation which are inconsistent
with the principles of respect of the independence

581
International Principles on the Independence and Accountability
of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors: Practitioners Guide No. 1, INT’L
COMM’N OF JURISTS (2007), at 17, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837
af2.pdf [hereinafter INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS].
582
Id.
583
Id.
584
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, UN HUM.
RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, art. 1, https://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/independencejudiciary.aspx.
585
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 581, at 17.
586
See 21: Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening on the
Independence of the Judiciary, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/African-CommissionResolution-on-the-Respect-and-the-Strengthening-on-the-Independenceof-the-Judiciary.pdf.
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of the judiciary, especially with regard to the
appointment and posting of judges;
•

Provide, with the assistance of the international
community, the judiciary with sufficient
resources in order to enable the legal system fulfil
its function;

•

Provide judges with decent living and working
conditions to enable them maintain their
independence and realize their full potential;

•

Incorporate in their legal systems, universal
principles establishing the independence of the
judiciary, especially with regard to security of
tenure;

•

Refrain from taking any action which may
threaten directly or indirectly the independence
and the security of judges and magistrates. 587

In order for the African Court to succeed in enforcing the
provisions of the Banjul Charter, as well as advance the protection
of human rights in the continent, its judges must be granted “security
of tenure,” “financial security” free from “arbitrary interference by
the [AU and its Member States] in a manner that could affect judicial
independence,” and “institutional independence of the tribunal with
respect to matters of administration bearing directly on the exercise
of its judicial function.” 588
It is suggested that the independence of the judges of the
African Court is structurally protected by the African Court

587
588

Id. at 1.
See Valente, 2 S.C.R., at 676.
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Protocol’s removal 589 and salary provisions. 590 Article 17 of the
Protocol also speaks to the independence of the judges. It states:
1. The independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in
accordance with international law.
2. No judge may hear any case in which the same judge has
previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one
of the parties or as a member of a national or international
court or a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity.
Any doubt on this point shall be settled by decision of the
Court.
3. The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of
their election and throughout their term of office, the
immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance
with international law.
4. At no time shall the judges of the Court be held liable for
any decision or opinion issued in the exercise of their
functions. 591
Despite these assurances, it is still feared that the independence
of the African Court and its judges can still be threatened by the
failure of Member States to pay their dues to the AU. 592 In addition
to making certain that judges and other court staff are paid regularly,

589
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 19. Article
19 states that “[a] judge shall not be suspended or removed from office
unless, by the unanimous decision of the other judges of the Court, the judge
concerned has been found to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions
to be a judge of the Court.”
590
Id. at art. 32.
591
Id. at art. 17.
592
See, e.g., African Union Strengthens Its Sanction Regime for NonPayment of Dues, AFR. UNION (Nov. 27, 2018), https://au.int/en/press
releases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-nonpayment-dues (noting, inter alia, the pervasive non-payment of dues by
Member States of the AU, a process that hampers the ability of the AU’s
organs to perform their functions).
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promptly, and in full, the African Court must be provided with other
necessary resources; these resources include, but are not limited to,
a well-equipped law library (including access to necessary law
reviews and journals, and the decisions of other international human
rights tribunals), computers, other office materials (e.g., paper,
writing pens, etc.), and other supplies needed for the effective
functioning of an international human rights tribunal. 593 Hence,
Member States of the AU must not subject the African Court’s
funding to political blackmail or manipulations, for, if they do so,
the Court will be unable to function effectively as a defender of
human rights in the continent. 594

e.

Selection of Judges

According to Article 14 of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he
judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly
from the list referred to in Article 13(2) of the present Protocol.” 595
Article 13 empowers each Member State to nominate individuals for
“the office of the judge of the Court.” 596 Since the effectiveness of
the Court depends, to a significant extent, on the extent to which its
judges are skilled in international law generally and international
human rights law in particular, it is important that the process of
nomination of judicial candidates by national governments is not
politicized—national governments must select and send to the
African Union Commission only individuals who are qualified to

593
See, e.g., Udombana, supra note 494, at 101 (noting, inter alia,
with reference to the African Court, that a “court lacking a library, paper,
computers, printers, and translators may, by necessity, succumb to political
pressures in order to receive additional funding necessary for its continued
function”).
594
Michael Fleshman, Human Rights Move Up on Africa’s Agenda:
New African Court to Promote Rule of Law, End Impunity for Rights
Violators, AFR. RENEWAL (July 2004) (noting, inter alia, the “emergence of
an independent, effective and adequately financed court” could “bring an
end to official impunity and ‘stimulate positive changes throughout
Africa’”).
595
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 14.
596
Id. at art. 13.

2019

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

109

serve as judges on the African Court. 597 To make sure that only
qualified individuals are selected to serve as judges on the African
Court, each Member State’s government should work with its
national bar associations/law societies to source qualified candidates
for the Court. 598
Perhaps more important is the fact that those who are
successfully elected to serve as judges must function as officers of a
continental tribunal and not as representatives of their country of
origin. 599 If, in deciding cases, judges favor or give deference to the
interests of their country of origin, justice can be corrupted and the
system of protecting human rights in the continent rendered totally
dysfunctional. 600

f.

Interpreting the Court’s Jurisdiction and
Mandate

How well the judges of the African Court interpret “the
[Court’s] mandate and jurisdiction,” 601 it is argued, will have a
significant impact on the effectiveness of the Court in protecting
human and peoples’ rights in Africa. 602 If, for example, the Court
adopts an innovative approach to the interpretation of its mandate
and jurisdiction that takes cognizance of recent developments in
international law, especially international human rights law, it could
emerge as a leader among the various regional and international
institutions that are dedicated to the protection of human rights. 603
Perhaps, more importantly, the African Court could use its
interpretive powers to help African States bring their national laws,
particularly those dealing with or affecting human and peoples’
rights, into conformity with the provisions of international human

597
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 82–84 (noting, inter alia, the
process through which judges must be elected to serve on the African
Court).
598
Id.
599
Id.
600
Id.
601
Id. at 102.
602
Id. at 86–95
603
See generally id. at 101.
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rights instruments. 604 Along these lines, the work of the African
Court could significantly enrich national constitutional and other
laws and improve human rights on the continent. 605
How the Court interprets, for example, Articles 34(6) and 5(3)
of the African Court Protocol could determine the extent to which
members of civil society (i.e., individuals) and their organizations
(e.g., NGOs) could have effective access to the Court. 606 The
Court’s most important objective should be to work with all relevant
stakeholders to enhance the protection of human rights on the
continent. It should not allow itself to be distracted by unnecessary
formalities and technicalities that can significantly impair and/or
paralyze its effectiveness as the protector of human rights on the
continent. In the end, it is critical that a court whose raison d’être is
to advance the protection of human rights in Africa cannot perform
that job effectively if it is not accessible to the people it is supposed
to serve and protect. 607

g. Enforcing the Court’s Judgments
Article 30 of the African Court Protocol states that “[t]he States
Parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the
judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time
stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution.” 608 But, will
African governments enforce the Court’s judgments, especially if
they believe that doing so would not be in their best interest?
Udombana has argued that “[h]istorically, there has been an open
resistance by African States to complying with binding orders of
international courts.” 609 As evidenced by the African backlash

See generally id. at 102, 106–107.
Id.
606
Id.
607
See generally id. at 108–109.
608
See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 30.
609
In 2016, South Africa and Burundi announced their intention to
withdraw from the ICC. In making the announcement, South Africa said
that its decision was based on its belief that the country was “hindered” by
604
605
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against the International Criminal Court (ICC), African
governments have usually been quite guarded about international
courts, particularly those that they feel are dominated by the West.
For example, when The Gambia, under the leadership of President
Yahya Jammeh, announced its decision to withdraw from the ICC,
Sheriff Bojang, the country’s information minister stated as follows:
“The ICC, despite being called international criminal court, is in fact
an international Caucasian court for the prosecution and humiliation
of people of [color], especially Africans.” 610 In fact, some observers
in the continent have gone as far as calling the ICC a tool of Western

various parts of the Rome Statute, including especially the part that
“compels South Africa to arrest persons who may enjoy diplomatic
immunity under customary international law, who are wanted by the ICC
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, to surrender such
persons to the International Criminal Court.” See Milena Veselinovic &
Madison Park, South Africa Announces Its Withdrawal from ICC, CNN
WORLD (Oct. 21, 2016, 8:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/21
/africa/south-africa-withdraws-icc/index.html. See also Press Release by
the GCB: South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC, DEREBUS
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.derebus.org.za/press-release-gcb-south-africaswithdrawal-icc/ (examining the implications, on the protection of human
rights in Africa, of South Africa’s decision to withdraw from the ICC).
“GCB” stands for the General Council of the Bar of South Africa. The GCB
originally issued the press release on October 28, 2016. Nevertheless, after
a South African court ruled that the decision of the government to withdraw
from the ICC was unconstitutional because the executive had not first
obtained the approval of Parliament, the government reversed course and
revoked the decision to withdraw from the ICC. See Norimitsu Onishi,
South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa
/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html.
610
See Simon Allison, African Revolt Threatens International
Criminal Court’s Legitimacy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2016, 10:32 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revoltinternational-criminal-court-gambia (noting, inter alia, that many Africans
believe that the ICC is targeting Africans; also mentioning the decision by
The Gambia, Burundi, and South Africa to withdraw from the Rome
Statute).
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imperialism, designed to oppress Africans and subvert governance
in the continent. 611
Some of this guarded approach to international tribunals, of
course, can be traced directly to the concerns of opportunistic
African political elites about being held accountable for their
misdeeds, which include the massive abuse of human rights. 612 For
example, when Burundi officially withdrew from the ICC, human
rights NGOs and individuals in the country argued that “[t]he
decision to withdraw Burundi from the Rome Statute comes at a
time when the machine continues to kill with impunity in
Burundi.” 613 The machine was a reference to the government of
President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose decision to change the
constitution to secure a third term in office unleashed a bloody
uprising that “claimed between 500 and 2,000 lives” 614 and forced
“more than 400,000 Burundians” 615 to flee abroad, creating fears

611
See Habeeb Kolabe, Is the ICC a Western Imperialist Tool
Against Africa?, SWALIAFR (Dec. 29, 2016), http://blog.swaliafrica.com/isthe-icc-a-western-imperialist-tool-against-africa/;
see
also
Matt
Killingsworth, International Criminal Court Is Not Just for Hunting
Africans, CONVERSATION (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:43 AM), https://the
conversation.com/international-criminal-court-is-not-just-for-huntingafricans-18072.
612
Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court,
THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court/
(noting,
inter alia, that “African leaders, many of whom have their own reasons to
dislike a precedent of holding heads of state to account for their crimes,
have been particularly receptive to [the view that the ICC’s] “exclusive
focus on African crimes is unfair, a modern form of colonialism.”
613
See Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International
Criminal Court, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-internationalcriminal-court.
614
Id.
615
Id.
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that the ICC would launch an investigation and possibly hold several
politicians, including Nkurunziza, accountable for the violence. 616
Since the UDHR in 1948, international law, particularly,
international human rights law, has assumed a very important place
in the struggle to protect human rights around the world, including
in African countries. 617 Despite the skepticism expressed by some
African political elites regarding the role of international courts in
the protection of human and peoples’ rights, as well as the resolution
of interstate conflicts, in the continent, international courts, such as
the ICJ, have, during the last several decades, adjudicated important
cases involving African States as parties. 618 In doing so,
international courts have contributed significantly to the
development of “far reaching norms and principles of international
law.” 619 In fact, many African countries have looked up to the ICJ
as a court of last resort to resolve various conflicts and provide them
with advisory opinions. 620 Through these adjudications, the ICJ has
contributed significantly to the development of international law and
has helped many African countries develop an appreciation for the

616

See International Criminal Court Probes Burundi “Crimes
Against Humanity,” BBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-41932291 (noting that Burundi officially withdrew from
the ICC after “accusing the international court of deliberating targeting
Africans for prosecution”).
617
See Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International
Law, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 287, 313 (1995) (noting, inter alia, that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the foundation of modern
international law, particularly international human rights law).
618
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 104.
619
Id.
620
The following African countries have all resorted to the ICJ’s
jurisdiction to seek resolution of disputes involving them and one or more
other African States: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad,
Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mail,
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and
Western Sahara. See Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1946–
2018, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/decisions/
all/2015/2018/asc (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). See also T. O. ELIAS, AFRICA
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (Richard Akinjide, 2d
ed. 1988) (detailing, inter alia, judgments, opinions and orders of the
International Court of Justice between April 1, 1946 and March 31, 1971).

114

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 16.1

critical role played by international law in the resolution of interstate
conflicts. 621
As many of them have done with the ICJ decisions, it is hoped
that African States will “act in good faith with respect to the
decisions of the African Human Rights Court.” 622 The effective
protection of human rights in Africa requires that (1) African States
voluntarily accept and respect the authority of the African Court; (2)
Africans, regardless of their country of citizenship, have confidence
in the ability of the African Court to deliver justice to victims of
human rights violations; (3) the authority of the African Court be
accepted and respected by all Member States and their citizens; and
(4) Member States use the rulings of the African Court to improve
their national laws and enhance the protection of human rights.

VI. THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The African Commission was created by the Banjul Charter 623
and empowered “to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure
their protection in Africa.” 624 Specifically, the African Commission
was supposed to “collect documents,” carry out research “on
African problems in the field of human and peoples’ rights, organize
seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information,
encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and

621
See J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law
and the Role of the World Court, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (1989)
(examining, inter alia, the International Court of Justice (also called the
World Court) in the development of international law); A. Peter Mutharika,
The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African
Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1706, 1713–1714 (1994) (examining,
inter alia, the influence of the ICJ in Africa).
622
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 104.
623
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter),
AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on October 21, 1986,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018).
624
See id. at art. 30.
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peoples’ rights,” as well as “[i]nterpret all the provisions of the
present Charter at the request of a State [P]arty, an institution of the
OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU.” 625
The African Commission was inaugurated on November 2,
1987 626 and consists of “eleven members from amongst African
personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high
morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human
and peoples’ rights; particular consideration being given to persons
having legal experience.” 627 Each member of the African
Commission is elected to serve a term of six years and is “eligible
for re-election.” 628 Nevertheless, “the term of office of four of the
members elected at the first election shall terminate after two years
and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years.” 629
All members of the African Commission are selected by “secret
ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 630 from
a list of persons nominated by the States Parties to the present
Charter.” 631 Individuals nominated to serve on the African
Commission must be “African personalities of the highest

See id. at art. 45.
The African Commission’s Rules of Procedure were adopted in
1988 during its second Ordinary Session, which was held in Dakar, Senegal,
from February 2 to 13, 1988. The Rules were subsequently amended during
the African Commission’s eighteenth Ordinary Session, which was held in
Praia, Cabo Verde, from October 2 to 11, 1995. When the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights was established, the African Commission
developed and adopted new Rules of Procedure—these were approved by
the African Commission during its 47th Ordinary Session, which was held
in Banjul, The Gambia, from May 12 to 26, 2010. These new Rules entered
into force on August 18, 2010.
627
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 31.
628
Id. at art. 36.
629
Id.
630
That is, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Since the demise of the OAU and its replacement by the AU, the job of
electing Commissioners has passed on to the AU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government. See generally Christof Heyns, The African Regional
Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 681
(2004).
631
See id. Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 33.
625
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reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and
competence in matters of human and peoples’ rights.” 632 In
nominating individuals to serve on the African Commission, States
Parties are to grant “particular consideration . . . to persons having
legal experience.” 633 Each Commissioner is expected and required
to “serve in their personal capacity.” 634 The African Commission is
not allowed to have within its ranks at any one time, “more than one
national of the same [African State].” 635
The African Commission’s functions can be grouped into three
important categories: (1) to promote human and peoples’ rights; 636
(2) to protect human and peoples’ rights; 637 and to interpret all the
provisions of the Banjul Charter. 638 With respect to promotion, the
African Commission is empowered to “collect documents,
undertake studies” and carryout research on “African problems in
the field of human and peoples’ rights, organize seminars, symposia
and conferences, disseminate information, [and] encourage national
and local institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights.” 639
In addition to performing the role of promoting human and peoples’
rights, the Banjul Charter is also required “[t]o formulate and lay
down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating
to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon which
African Governments may base their legislations.” 640 Finally, the
African Commission is required to “[c]o-operate with other African
and international institutions concerned with the promotion and
protection of human and peoples’ rights.” 641
During the last several years, the African Commission, in
accordance with Article 45(1), has undertaken missions to several
African countries to “monitor and assess the situation of refugees,

632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641

Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 31(1).
Id.
See id. at art. 31(2).
See id. at art. 32.
See id. at art. 45(1).
See id. at art. 45(2).
See id. at art. 45(3).
See id. at art. 45(1)(a).
See id. at art. 45(1)(b).
See id. at art. 45(1)(c).
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returnees, and displaced persons.” 642 The African Commission also
cooperated with several international organizations, including
UNESCO, the International Commission of Jurists, the Raoul
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and
the International Observatory of Prisons to cosponsor a number of
seminars and international conferences. 643 For example, the African
Commission cosponsored conferences/workshops in Lisbon,
Portugal, November 17–18, 1997 (workshop on the improvement of
the regional human rights systems); Kadoma, Zimbabwe, November
24–28, 1997 (International Conference on Community Work)—
with Penal Reform International; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December
8–12, 1997 (meeting of government experts on the establishment of
an African Human and Peoples’ Rights Court); Harare, Zimbabwe,
January 12–14, 1998 (the African contexts of the rights of the
child)—with CODESRIA, Redd Barna-Zimbabwe and the Center
for Family Research of the University of Cambridge; Banjul, The
Gambia, January 26–28, 1998 (Working Group on additional
protocol to the African Charter on Women’s Rights)—with the
African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies and the
International Commission of Jurists; Dakar, Senegal, February 16–
18, 1998 (International Conference on HIV/AIDS in African
Prisons)—with the International Observatory of Prisons (OIP); and
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, March 9–12, 1998 (Regional Seminar on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 644
The second major function of the African Commission is to
“[i]nterpret all the provisions of the [Banjul Charter]” anytime a

642
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 6; see also O.A.U. Mission to
Angola, DR Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia, OAU (Apr. 28, 1999),
https://m.reliefweb.int/report/47578 (detailing the objective of the OAU
mission to several African countries, which was to “assess the situation on
the ground and determine to what extent the Organization of African Unity
can assist these countries, which are affected by [the] exodus of thousands
of refugees as a result of the on-going war in D.R.C.).
643
See, e.g., Fatsah Ouguergouz, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 521 (2003) (examining, inter
alia, some of the conferences sponsored by the African Commission to
examine ways to improve the human rights situation in Africa).
644
Id.
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request is made to the African Commission to do so by “a State
[P]arty, an institution of the OAU, or an African Organization
recognized by the OAU.” 645 The Banjul Charter provides the
African Commission specific advice on how to carry out its
interpretive duties. According to Article 60, “[t]he Commission
shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African
instruments on human and peoples’ rights” 646 and other relevant
international human rights instruments. 647 In addition to performing
its interpretive duties, “in light of international human rights law,” 648
the African Commission must also:
[T]ake into consideration, as subsidiary measures to
determine the principles of law, other general or
specialized international conventions, laying down rules
expressly recognized by member states of the Organization
of African Unity, African practices consistent with
international norms on human and peoples’ rights, customs
generally accepted as law, general principles of law
recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and
doctrine. 649
It is important to note that while the African Commission may
take into consideration African customary law, it must do so only if
such law is “consistent with international norms on human and
peoples’ rights.” 650 If the African Commission takes this role
seriously, it could significantly improve the legal and institutional

See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(3).
See id. at art. 60.
647
These other international human rights instruments include the
Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the OAU, the UDHR, as well
as “other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African
countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the
provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are
members.” See id.
648
Udombana, supra note 494, at 65–66.
649
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 61.
650
Id.
645
646

2019

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

119

environment for the recognition and protection of human rights on
the continent by making certain that international law, particularly
international human rights law, serves as an important interpretive
tool for human rights laws on the continent.
Finally, the African Commission is empowered with a
protective mandate to “[e]nsure the protection of human and
peoples’ rights under the conditions laid down by the [Banjul]
Charter.” 651 The performance of the protective mandate is based on
communications (i.e., complaints) received from Member States, as
well as those from other parties, as long as the latter relate “to human
and peoples’ rights.” 652 These other parties that can submit
communications to the Banjul Charter include individuals and
NGOs. 653 After the African Commission has received a
communication from a State Party or other source, the Commission
is required to prepare “a report stating the facts and its findings” 654
and this report is to be transmitted to the “States concerned and
communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government.” 655 At this point, the fate of the report is left entirely
in the hands and caprices of the Heads of State and Government.

B. CONSTRAINTS TO THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION’S EFFECTIVENESS
Although the Banjul Charter is endowed with broad powers to
promote and protect human rights, as well as interpret the provisions
of the Banjul Charter, 656 the Commission suffers from several
structural problems that constrain its ability to perform its functions
effectively. In addition to the fact that it does not have “any
enforcement power or remedial authority,” 657 the African

See id. at art. 45(2).
See id. at art. 56.
653
See id. at arts. 47–51. See also Communications, AFR. COMM’N
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/communications/ (last
visited Feb. 18, 2021).
654
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 52.
655
See id.
656
See id. at art. 45(1)–(3).
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See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66.
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Commission is “handicapped by confidentiality clauses that restrict
public access to, and awareness of, the Commission’s work.” 658
It has been argued that at the time that the African Commission
was created, many political elites did not believe that the continent
was ready for a continental or “supranational judicial institution” 659
and, as a consequence, the African Commission was established, not
as a full-fledged court but a “quasi-judicial supervisory body.” 660
Kéba Mbaye, who prepared the background notes that were used by
the experts chosen to work on the draft of the African Charter, stated
that “[t]he establishment of a Human Rights Court to redress cases
of violation of human rights [was] not included in the Draft Charter”
because it was “thought premature to do so at this stage.” 661 He went
on to state that “the idea [was] a good and useful one which could
be introduced in [the] future by means of an additional protocol to
the Charter.” 662 Hence, the African Commission was never expected
to function as a judicial body capable of rendering or issuing legallybinding findings or decisions. 663
There are other issues—the African Commission is unable to
function independently and perform its functions without political

658

Id.
See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2007).
660
See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 2. See also the
introductory notes to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
made by Kéba Mbaye. The notes were prepared by Mbaye for the Meeting
of Experts in Dakar, Senegal, which took place from November 28 to
December 8, 1979. The experts were appointed under a decision of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the sixteenth session in
Monrovia, Liberia. Mbaye’s comments formed part of the background notes
(“travaux préparatoires”) for the African Charter. The comments are
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999, at 65 (Christof Heyns ed.,
2002).
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999, supra note 660, at 65.
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influence because of its chronic lack of resources. 664 And, of course,
there is the problem of access—that communications must meet
onerous requirements before they are considered by the African
Commission makes it extremely difficult for many individuals to
bring communications before it.

1. Constraints to Access to the African Commission by
Individuals
One of the most important functions of the African Commission
is to protect “human and peoples’ rights” on the continent and to do
so “under conditions laid down by the [Banjul] Charter.” 665 But,
what are these “conditions laid down by the [Banjul] Charter”? 666
For example, in order for the African Commission to accept and
examine communications from private individuals, they (i.e., the
communications) must fulfill the requirements listed in Article
56. 667 Communications, other than those emanating from States
Parties, that are sent to the African Commission, will only be
entertained if (1) the names of the authors are clearly indicated, even
if the authors “request” or seek “anonymity”; 668 (2) the
communications “[a]re compatible with the Charter of the [OAU] or
the Banjul [Charter]”; 669 (3) the complaints or communications
“[a]re not written in disparaging or insulting language directed
against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization
of African Unity”; 670 (4) the communications are not based
exclusively on media reports; 671 (5) the communications are
transmitted to the African Commission only after local remedies
have been fully exhausted; 672 (6) the communications are submitted

664
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66 (noting, inter alia, that the
lack of resources is contributing to a loss of independence by the African
Commission).
665
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(2).
666
Id.
667
See id. at art. 56(1)–(7).
668
See id. at art. 56(1).
669
See id. at art. 56(2).
670
See id. at art. 56(3).
671
See id. at art. 56(4).
672
See id. at art. 56(5).
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to the African Commission “within a reasonable period from the
time local remedies are exhausted”; 673 and (7) the communications
“[d]o not deal with cases which have been settled by these States
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, or the Charter of the [OAU] or the provisions of the
[Banjul] Charter.” 674
These requirements, coupled with the fact that the African
Commission can exclude a communication by a “simple
majority” 675 vote, provide the African Commission with significant
discretion to determine which communications to accept and
consider. 676 Given the fact that the African Commission is not
adequately shielded from political manipulation or influence,
granting it such wide discretion must be considered a major problem
for the protection of human rights in the continent.

2. The African Commission Lacks Independent
Enforcement Power
It has been argued that the OAU Heads of State and
Government, afraid that the African Commission could later
challenge their authority in their respective States, were not eager to
set up a continental judicial institution that was adequately
empowered to issue rulings and decisions that could infringe on the
sovereignty of African States or the ability of national political
leaders to control what happens within their territorial boundaries.
Instead, African Heads of State and Government “envisaged” an
institution whose exclusive function was to promote and not protect
human rights. 677 As argued by Claude E. Welch, Jr., “the OAU
heads of state were reluctant to grant the [African Commission] a
significant role in protecting (rather than promoting) human

See id. at art. 56(6).
See id. at art. 56(7).
675
See id. at art. 55(2).
676
See id.
677
See Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43,
49 (1992).
673
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rights.” 678 In fact, the Banjul Charter “does not challenge the basic
powers of heads of state: governments are only to ‘allow the
establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions
entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the [Banjul] Charter.’” 679
In order to ensure that the Banjul Charter was signed and
ratified by enough States for it to enter into force, only minimal
obligations were imposed on States Parties. 680 For example, the
Banjul Charter does not explicitly require that each State Party
submit reports that show the extent to which it is making efforts to
give effect to the Charter. 681 Instead, the Charter merely requires
that “[e]ach [S]tate [P]arty shall undertake to submit every two
years, . . . a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and
guaranteed by the [Banjul] Charter.” 682 In addition, nowhere in the
Charter is it indicated who or what body or institution is to receive
the reports, analyze them and take action. 683 It has been argued that
while the Charter “leaves obscure what the African Commission
should do with petitions [sent to it] and how it should enforce its
findings,” 684 the “vagueness [has] offered the Commission an
opportunity to define itself.” 685 Nevertheless, such vagueness has
also “placed profound limitations on the range of possible action” 686
that the African Commission can take.
In addition to the fact that the African Commission’s findings
“are not legally binding, and the [African] Commission issues
‘recommendations’ to [S]tate [P]arties rather than ‘orders,’” 687 it is
not empowered to “award damages, restitution or reparations.” 688

678
679
680
681
682
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684
685
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Also, the African Commission does not have the power to
“condemn” or punish a recalcitrant government or “offending
State”—it can only “give its views or make recommendations to
Governments.” 689 The African Commission, in its present state, has
very limited powers and, as a result, there has been a tendency for
Member States to ignore or totally disregard the African
Commission’s “recommendations, orders, and pronouncements.” 690
In fact, in its Eleventh Annual Activity Report, the Commission
noted that the “non-compliance by some States [P]arties with the
Commission’s recommendations affects its credibility and may
partly explain that fewer complaints are submitted to it.” 691
It has been argued that after the African Commission has made
a finding on a communication or complaint, the “African Charter
and the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission do not deal
with the fate of [such a communication].” 692 As argued by Viljoen
and Louw, the African Commission “also does not have any followup mechanism or policy in place to monitor state compliance with
its recommendations.” 693 As argued by Eno:
Unlike other regional and global human rights bodies, the
[African] Commission has not developed any follow-up
mechanism to ensure implementation of its
recommendations. When the OAU(sic) Assembly adopts
the Commission’s Annual Report, the Commission
publishes the report and makes no effort to see that the
recommendations contained therein are implemented. This
has been very frustrating, especially for the victims who
have to pursue the execution of the decisions on their own.
Because there is no pressure from the Commission, states

See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(1)(a).
Udombana, supra note 494, at 67.
691
Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1997–1998, 22nd–23rd Ordinary Session, AFR.
COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, OAU Doc. DOC/OS/43 (XXIII),
¶ 38, https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2048.
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have tended to turn a blind eye to the recommendations and
a deaf ear to the victims’ pleas for compliance. 694
In a 2007 law review article, Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw
studied compliance by States Parties to the recommendations of the
African Commission and concluded that “the most important factors
predictive of compliance are political, rather than legal” and that
“[t]he only factor relating to the treaty body itself that shows a
significant link to improved compliance is its follow-up
activities.” 695 Viljoen and Louw added that the results of their
investigation provided supporting evidence to “arguments for a fully
developed and effectively functional follow-up mechanism in the
secretariat of the Commission, the consistent integration of followup activities into the Commission’s mandate, and the appointment
of a special rapporteur on follow-up.” 696
On November 29, 2006, at its 40th Ordinary Session in Banjul,
The Gambia, the African Commission adopted a resolution on the
importance of the implementation of its recommendations by States
Parties. 697 In that resolution, the African Commission called on all
States Parties “to respect without delay the recommendations of the
[African] Commission” 698 and to inform the African Commission of
the “measures taken and/or the obstacles in implementing the
recommendations of the African Commission within a maximum
period of ninety (90) days starting from the date of notification of
the recommendations.” 699
No case better illustrates the fragrant disregard of the
jurisdiction and recommendations of the African Commission than
that of the Nigerian environmental and human rights activist and

See Robert Eno, The Place of the African Commission in the New
African Dispensation, 11 AFR. SEC. STUD. 63, 67 (2002).
695
Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 32.
696
Id.
697
Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation of the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights by States Parties, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
ACHPR Res. 97 (XXXX) 06 (Nov. 29, 2006).
698
Id. ¶ 2.
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leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples
(MOSOP), Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his fellow Ogonis. 700 SaroWiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists were sentenced
to death by a Special Tribunal for Civil Disturbances, established
under the Sani Abacha-led military government. 701 With regard to
the case of Saro-Wiwa and his fellow human rights activists, the
African Commission received communications from several NGOs,
including International Pen, the Nigerian Constitutional Rights
Project (CRP), 702 Civil Liberties Organization, and Interights. 703

700
See, e.g., Charles Hoff, Nigeria Executes 9 Activists; World
Outraged, CNN WORLD NEWS (Nov. 10, 1995), http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/9511/nigeria/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting the execution,
by Nigeria’s military government, of environmental activist and playwright
Ken Saro-Wiwa, and other Ogoni human rights campaigners, despite
appeals from various international actors for clemency).
701
Sani Abacha overthrew the transitional government of Chief
Ernest Shonekan on November 17, 1993, and ruled Nigeria until his death
in office in June 1998. See also OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, NIGERIAN
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY RULE 1966–1999 145 (Praeger
Publishers 2003) (examining, inter alia, international reactions to the
hanging, by the Nigerian military government, of human rights activist, Ken
Saro-Wiwa, and his Ogoni compatriots). The tribunal that sentenced SaroWiwa and his fellow Ogoni activists to death was established by the
September 1994 Special Edit titled “Instrument Constituting the Tribunal
for the Trial of Offences under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal)
Decree 1987.” See MARY KATE SIMMONS, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND
PEOPLES ORGANIZATION: YEARBOOK 1995 513 (1996).
702
The Constitutional Rights Project (Nigeria) is a nongovernmental organization, established in Nigeria to “promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law in Nigeria.” See Constitutional Rights
Project Nigeria, SOURCEWATCH, https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.
php/Constitutional_Rights_Project_Nigeria (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
703
See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on
Behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria,
Comm. Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998),
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ACHPR,3ae6b6123.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2021) [hereinafter International Pen]. The communications (137/94,
139/94, 154/96, and 161/97) were subsequently joined because they all
concerned the same subject matter—the arrest, detention, trial, and
subsequent sentence of Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots to death by a Special
Tribunal for Civil Disturbances.
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Communications 137/94 and 139/94 were submitted to the
African Commission in 1994 before the trial of Saro-Wiwa and the
other Ogonis began. 704 The two communications “alleged that Mr.
Saro-Wiwa had been detained because of his political work in
relation to MOSOP.” 705 In February 1995, the trial of Saro-Wiwa
and his fellow Ogoni human rights activists began “before a tribunal
established under the Civil Disturbances Act” 706 and, in June 1995,
the Constitutional Rights Project sent the African Commission “a
supplement to its communication, alleging irregularities in the
conduct of the trial itself: harassment of defense counsel, a military
officer’s presence at what should have been confidential meetings
between defendants and their counsel, bribery of witnesses, and
evidence of bias on the part of the tribunal members themselves.” 707
On October 30 and 31, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of the
codefendants were sentenced to death by the Special Tribunal for
Civil Disturbances. 708 Shortly after the death sentences were handed
down, the Constitutional Rights Project sent the African
Commission “an emergency supplement to its communication on
2nd November 1995, asking the African Commission to adopt
provisional measures to prevent the executions.” 709 Subsequently,
the Secretariat of the African Commission “faxed a Note
Verbale” 710 to the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “invoking

The communications were sent by the International Pen and the
Constitutional Rights Project. See International Pen, supra note 703.
705
See International Pen, supra note 703, ¶ 3.
706
See id. ¶ 5. The defendants were accused of inciting “members of
MOSOP to murder four rival Ogoni leaders.” See also id. ¶ 4.
707
See id. ¶ 6.
708
See id. ¶ 7. Codefendants Saturday Dobee, Felix Nuate, Nordu
Eawo, Paul Levura, Daniel Gbokoo, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpunien, and
Baribor Bera were sentenced to death. The others were acquitted. See id.
709
See id.
710
The “note verbale” is “a written official communication used in
correspondence among States or between States and international
organizations.” The note verbale is usually “kept in the third person singular
(‘The Foreign Ministry of . . . presents its compliments to the Embassy
of . . .”) and is not signed.” The note verbale is used in diplomatic circles to
704
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interim measures under revised Rule 111 of the Commission’s Rules
and Procedures.” 711
In the Note Verbale, the African Commission “pointed out that
as the case of Mr. Saro-Wiwa and the others was already before the
Commission, and the government of Nigeria had invited the
Commission to undertake a mission to the country, during which
mission the communication would be discussed, the executions
should be delayed until the Commission had discussed the case with
the Nigerian authorities.” 712 The Government of Nigeria, however,
did not respond to the African Commission’s correspondences
before proceeding with the executions. 713
On November 7, 1995, Nigeria’s Provisional Ruling Council
confirmed the death sentences handed out to Saro-Wiwa and his
fellow defendants and three days later, on November 10, 1995, all
the accused persons were executed in secret at a prison in Port
Harcourt. 714 In carrying out the executions, the Nigerian
government had ignored or disregarded all the correspondences sent
by the African Commission and the latter’s jurisdiction over this
important human rights case. 715
On October 31, 1998, the African Commission issued its final
decision in the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his codefendants. 716 The
African Commission held that there had (1) “been a violation of
Articles 5 and 6 in relation Ken Saro-Wiwa’s detention in 1993 and

“raise or field questions or to communicate notification or reply to the note
verbale sent from the other party.” See Hyun-jin Park, Sovereignty over
Dokdo as Interpreted and Evaluated from the Korean-Japanese Exchanges
of Notes Verbales (1952–1965), in CHINESE (TAIWAN) YEARBOOK OF INT’L
L. & AFFS. 47, 51 (2017).
711
See International Pen, supra note 703, ¶ 8. The note verbale was
also sent to the Secretary-General of the OAU, the Special Advisor (Legal)
to the Head of State, in the Nigerian Ministry of Justice, and the Nigerian
High Commission in The Gambia, where the African Commission is
located.
712
See id.
713
See id. ¶ 9.
714
See id. ¶ 10.
715
See generally id.
716
See id.
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his treatment in detention in 1994 and 1995”; (2) “been a violation
of Article 6 in relation to the detention of all the victims under the
State Security (Detention of Persons) Act of 1984 and State Security
(Detention of Persons) Amended Decree No. 14 (1994).” 717 The
African Commission imposed an obligation on the government of
Nigeria to annul these decrees. 718 The African Commission also
reiterated “its decision on communication 87/93 719 that there [had]
been a violation of Article 7(1)(d) 720 and with regard to the
establishment of the Civil Disturbances Tribunal” 721 and that “in
ignoring this decision, Nigeria [had violated] Article 1 722 of the
[Banjul] Charter.” 723 Finally, the African Commission held that the
Nigerian government had violated Articles 4 and 7(1)(a), (b), (c),
and (d) in relation to the conduct of the trial and execution of the
victims”; that there was “a violation of Articles 9(2), 10(1) and 11,
26, 16” 724 and that “ignoring its obligations to institute provisional
measures, Nigeria [had] violated Article 1” of the Banjul Charter. 725
Another indication of the extent to which African States are
disregarding their obligations under the Banjul Charter and hence,
are ignoring the African Commission’s jurisdiction, is their
lackluster approach to filing the reports required of them under

See id. at holding.
Id.
719
87/93 Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lakwot
and 6 Others) v. Nigeria, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Mar.
22, 1995), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/comcases/Comm87-93.pdf.
720
International Pen, supra note 703, at holding; see Banjul Charter,
supra note 93, at art. 7(1) (article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter states as
follows: “Every individual has a right to have his cause heard” and this
includes “(d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial
court or tribunal.”).
721
See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding.
722
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 1 (article 1 of the Banjul
Charter states that “[t]he Member States of the Organization of African
Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislation
or other measures to give effect to them.”).
723
See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding.
724
See id.
725
See id.
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Article 62. 726 The reporting system is supposed to keep the African
Commission informed of the efforts that States Parties are making
to give effect to the “rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed
by the [Banjul] Charter.” 727 In other words, the reporting system
under Article 62, if adhered to, can actually enhance the recognition
and protection of human and peoples’ rights in the continent.
Unfortunately, over the years, many States Parties have failed to
provide the African Commission with the necessary reports. 728 As
of 2018, for example, while 12 States “have submitted all their
Reports (and presented or will present at [the] next Ordinary
Session),” 729 as many as “[twenty] States” are late by at least one
Report, sixteen States by three or more Reports, and six States have
not submitted any Reports at all.

3. The African Commission Lacks Openness and
Transparency in Its Operations
Openness and transparency are very important for any
institution that serves the public. For a continental institution, such
as the African Commission, openness and transparency in the
conduct of its business can help (i) minimize actual political
interference, or the appearance of it, in its activities; (ii) reduce
corruption and other forms of political manipulation; (iii) help
stakeholders throughout the continent understand and appreciate
how the African Commission arrives at its decisions and why; and
(iv) minimize the distrust that some stakeholders, especially those
who are likely to get an unfavorable decision from the African
Commission. Transparency will help these individuals understand

726
According to Article 62 of the Banjul Charter, “[e]ach [S]tate
[P]arty shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present
Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken
with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and
guaranteed by the present Charter.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at
art. 62.
727
See id.
728
See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding.
729
See State Reports and Concluding Observations, AFR. COMM’N
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://www.achpr.org/statereportsand
concludingobservations (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
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how the decisions were made. Free and voluntary acceptance, by the
people, of the African Commission as part of the collection of
institutions that safeguards human and peoples’ rights on the
continent is very important if this institution is to make a significant
impact on the protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa.
While such voluntary acceptance is critical, it is unlikely to take
place if the African Commission continues to maintain secrecy in its
operations.
Openness and transparency, as they relate to the African
Commission should be understood as “the availability and
accessibility of relevant information about the functioning of the
[African Commission].” 730 It has been argued that “transparency is
said to require that ‘holders of public office should be as open as
possible about all decisions and actions they take.’” 731 Regardless
of how transparency is defined, it is generally agreed that
“transparent decisions must be clear, integrated into a broader
context, logical and rational, accessible, truthful and accurate, open
(involve stakeholders), and accountable.” 732 In addition, especially
for an institution such as the African Commission, “[a] transparent
decision record should provide enough information to allow an
interested person to ‘verify claims made’ or otherwise reconstruct
both the process and rationale for the decision.” 733
Governmental and other national institutions that serve the
public in African countries are notorious for having extremely high
levels of corruption, as well as their inability or unwillingness to

John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and
Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 295, 316 (2004).
731
Deidre Curtin & Albert Jacob Meijer, Does Transparency
Strengthen Legitimacy?, 11 INFO. POLITY 109 (2006) (quoting N. LORD,
FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, cm 2850,
HMSO (1995)).
732
See Christina H. Drew & Timothy L. Nyerges, Transparency of
Environmental Decision Making: A Case Study of Soil Cleanup Inside the
Hanford 100 Area, 7 J. RISK RES. 33, 36 (2004).
733
Id. at 36 (citing LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE
COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2000)).
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serve the public. 734 In fact, in many African countries, civil servants
are known “to act arbitrarily and capriciously” 735 when it comes to
the distribution or allocation of public services, “favoring those who
pay them bribes.” 736 In these African economies, openness and
transparency in government communication, for example, can serve
at the minimum, two important purposes. The first purpose is “to
ensure that public service providers respect both the positive and
negative rights of individuals.” 737 In addition, “[t]his instrumental
justification for transparency of public services comes close to
Bentham’s principle for good governance: ‘The more strictly we are
watched, the better we behave.’” 738 The second purpose “relates
more directly to democracy theory, which values participation by
individuals in the decisions that affect them.” 739
Of course, “[t]ransparency is the literal value of accountability,
the idea that an accountable bureaucrat and organization must
explain or account for his actions.” 740 Perhaps, more importantly,
especially for the African Commission, “[t]ransparency is most
important as an instrument for assessing organizational
performance, a key requirement for all other dimensions of
accountability.” 741
As mentioned briefly earlier, transparency and openness
represent an important and critical element of a trustworthy
government or public institution. Where a public institution
undertakes its activities in an open and transparent manner, “such an

734
See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS 37–80 (2010) (examining, inter alia, the
pervasiveness of corruption in the African countries).
735
John Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth
Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 1017 (2013).
736
Id.
737
See Lindsay Stirton & Martin Lodge, Transparency Mechanisms:
Building Publicness into Public Services, 28 J. L. & SOC’Y 471, 476 (2001).
738
Id.
739
Id.
740
See Jonathan G. S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability:
ICCAN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 94, 96 (2005).
741
Id.
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approach is likely to garner significant support for [the
institution].” 742 More specifically, benefits from open and
transparent communication practices by a public institution include
“increased public support, increased understanding by the public of
[the institution’s] actions, increased trust, increased compliance
with [the institution’s] rules and regulations, an increased ability for
the [institution] to accomplish its [sic] purpose and stronger
democracy.” 743
In order for the African Commission to achieve transparency
and openness in its operations, it “must adopt practices that promote
open information sharing.” 744 Such practices should include, at the
very minimum, efforts to improve and enhance the Commission’s
relationships with the publics that it serves “through responding to
public needs, seeking and incorporating feedback and getting
information out to the public through a variety of channels.” 745 Of
great significance for the African Commission is that openness and
transparency can minimize the fear that its decisions are the outcome
of or result from “undue political . . . influence because the [African
Commission’s decision-making] process is open to the public.” 746
As argued by Fairbanks, Plowman, and Rawlins, openness and
transparency in communication, especially by public institutions
and governmental agencies, produces in citizens and other
stakeholders, “a feeling of trust in [one’s] government [or public
institution] and the ability to realize a comfort in understanding that
[one is] being treated equally with others and that the government
[or public institution] is working in [one’s] best interest.” 747 Such
increased trust in the African Commission can significantly improve
the chances that victims of human rights violations will seek justice
at the hands of the African Commission.

See Mbaku, supra note 735, at 1018.
Jenille Fairbanks et al., Transparency in Government
Communication, 7 J. PUB. AFF. 23, 33 (2007).
744
See id. at 33.
745
See id. Some of these channels include regularly scheduled press
conferences and press releases, a website on which it provides the public
with critical and timely information about its operations, etc.
746
See id. at 28.
747
See id. at 28–29.
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743
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For African countries, improving the trust that individuals have
for their public institutions is very important, especially given the
fact that since independence, governance in many countries
throughout the continent has been pervaded by political
opportunism, opacity in government communication, high levels of
corruption, and impunity. 748 As a consequence, many Africans have
come to view public institutions, including even those at the regional
or continental level, as designed primarily to exploit them and
maximize the interests of politically dominant elites and groups. 749
For the African Commission, then, more openness and transparency
will enhance the ability of its stakeholders to understand how it
functions, including how it makes its decisions and why, as well as
show how relevant the institution is to the protection of their rights.
That should significantly improve the people’s trust in the institution
and perhaps, more importantly, enhance the African Commission’s
legitimacy.
If the African Commission is interested in significantly
improving its legitimacy and making itself relevant to the struggle
against impunity and the protection of human rights in the continent,
it must consider the following: First, in all its operations, it should
adopt a policy that values “open, honest and timely” communication
with all of its relevant stakeholders. The African Commission must
“avoid the manipulation of information, a process that has become
part of the survival strategy of many authoritarian regimes
[including their various agencies] in the continent.” 750 Second, all
persons who communicate or interact with the public on behalf of
the African Commission must adopt “practices that promote open
information sharing.” 751 Third, the African Commission, while
taking note of issues of privacy, especially with respect to victims
of human rights violations, should work closely with its
commissioners, as well as other staff members, to “create an

See generally MBAKU, supra note 734 (noting, inter alia, the
pervasiveness of corruption in post-independence African countries).
749
See id.
750
See Fairbanks et al., supra note 743, at 33.
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organizational structure that supports [and enhances openness] and
transparency.” 752
Finally, all individuals who communicate on behalf of the
African Commission should be provided with enough resources
(e.g., access to time, staff, and financial resources) so that they can
perform their functions and carry out their responsibilities fully and
effectively. 753 Of course, it is important to take note of the fact that
while openness and transparency are important and desirable traits
of an effective, viable and democratic public institution, the
organization (here, the African Commission) must be careful not to
violate the privacy rights of citizens. While it is important that the
African Commission be empowered and its communicators
provided with necessary tools to enhance openness and transparency
in their activities or operations, these individuals should be legally
constrained in order to make certain that they or their activities do
not violate the privacy rights of Africans—that is, the people they
are supposed to serve.
Unfortunately, the opacity imposed on the African Commission
by the Banjul Charter has contributed significantly to the
Commission’s impotence—according to Article 59(1) of the Banjul
Charter, “[a]ll measures taken within the provisions of the present
[Chapter] shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide.” 754 In
addition to the fact that the Banjul Charter imposes opacity on the
African Commission’s activities and operations, it also grants a
highly political and historically opportunistic group—the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government—the discretion to determine
“whether to publicize a human rights violation on the part of an
African State.” 755 In other words, the Banjul Charter is trusting
people, who themselves, are most likely to be violators of human
rights (i.e., African Heads of State and Government), to be the
guardians of human rights in the continent.

752
753
754
755

Id. at 34.
See id. at 32.
Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 59(1) (emphasis added).
Udombana, supra note 494, at 69.
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Claude E. Welch, Jr., argues, for example, that “[w]idespread
abuses of human rights have occurred, and continue to occur” in
Africa and many presidents have been found complicit in these
human rights violations. 756 Historically, slavery, in particular, and
the atrocities of colonialism, in general, have been two of the most
important forms of assault on human and peoples’ rights in
Africa. 757 Nevertheless, the abuse of “individual and collective
rights” in the continent continue to this day; and, as argued by
Welch, the “[h]armful effects of the periods of slavery, partition, and
colonial rule have yet to be totally overcome.” 758 In addition to the
fact that post-colonial governments in Africa, “unchecked by civil
society,” 759 have become major threats to human rights, some of
them (e.g., the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda in 1994;
Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan) have waged war “on groups of
their citizens, based on ethnic or ideological differences, or on
simple lusts for power.” 760 In fact, throughout the continent,
“[c]orrupt, power-hungry leaders remain intransigently in office,
having hijacked or ignored popular pressures for free, competitive,
and democratic elections.” 761 Unfortunately, it is these
opportunistic, corrupt, and recalcitrant heads of state that the Banjul

See WELCH, supra note 123, at 3.
See id. For a discussion on slavery in African, see PAUL E.
LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN
AFRICA 1 (examining, inter alia, the role of Islam in slavery in Africa from
the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries). See also SLAVERY IN AFRICA:
HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Suzanne Miers & Igor
Kopytoff eds., 1977) (presenting a series of essays that examine slavery in
Africa as instrument of marginalization and the degradation of the welfare
of Africans). For a discussion on atrocities of colonialism, see ADAM
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998) (examining King Leopold’s atrocities
against Congolese peoples during the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth
Centuries).
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Charter has entrusted with the job of promoting and enhancing the
protection of human rights on the continent. 762
According to Article 58(1) of the Banjul Charter, the African
Commission need not consult the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government unless it has determined that the complaint in
question has revealed “the existence of a series of serious or massive
violations of human and peoples’ rights.” 763 If Articles 59(1) and
58(1) are read together, the extremely restrictive nature of these
provisions becomes quite evident. In fact, according to Article
58(1), it is only after the Commission has determined that there is
“a serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ rights” that
the Commission “may then request the [African] Commission to
undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report,
accompanied by its findings and recommendations.” 764
Since its inauguration on November 2, 1987 in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, the African Commission has interpreted Article 59 of the
Banjul Charter in an extremely restrictive manner and, as a result, it
has conducted most of its business “in secret, insulated from public
scrutiny and awareness.” 765 In fact, it was not until 1994 that the
African Commission first made public its communications and
decisions. 766 As argued by Odinkalu and Christensen, “[t]he
decision of the [African] Commission in 1994 to [finally] publicize
the outcome of its consideration of non-state communications,
including its views and recommendations following such
consideration, was a watershed in its development.” 767 It was only

762
These individuals are expected to supervise the institutions, such
as the African Commission, charged with protecting human and peoples’
rights on the continent through their membership in the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government. In addition to the fact that all members of the
African Commission are to be elected by the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government, the Commission must perform any task “entrusted to it by
the Assembly.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93.
763
Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 58(1).
764
Id. at art. 58(2).
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Udombana, supra note 494, at 70.
766
See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of Its NonState Communication Procedures, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 235, 238 (1998).
767
Id. at 278.
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at this time that scholars and other interested parties were able to
examine and critique the “quality of the [African] Commission’s
reasoning and decision making” with respect to substantive and
procedural issues. 768
The inability of the African Commission to carry out its
operations in an open and transparent manner did not go unnoticed
by stakeholders, including NGOs, human rights activists, and other
Africans. For example, during her campaign for President of the
Republic of Liberia in 1997, candidate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “spoke
the minds of countless Africans” 769 when she declared as follows:
[The Commission] is generally unknown and invisible; it
is regarded with suspicion by those who do not know of it;
and ‘as seen from the eyes of a casual observer,’ it is not
performing. I don’t know of any cases that you [the
Commission] have resolved related to any of the major
human rights problems recently affecting our continent. 770
Then candidate for President of Liberia, Sirleaf’s proclamation
speaks to the failure of the African Commission to maintain an open
and transparent approach to its activities and to keep the public fully
informed of its proceedings. It has been argued that “[p]ublicity and
freedom of information play an important role in the effective
promotion and protection of human rights.” 771 In order to improve
the political environment for the protection of human rights in the
continent, “[i]ndividuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and inter-governmental organizations need reliable information to

768
Id. See also Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission, 1993–1994, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, 13th-15th June, 1994
Tunis, Tunisia, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/
africa/ACHPR2.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
769
See Udombana, supra note 494, at 70.
770
See FUND FOR PEACE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, JUNE 24–26, 1991,
27 (1991).
771
Magnus Killander, Confidentiality Versus Publicity: Interpreting
Article 59 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 6 AFR.
HUM. RIGHTS L.J. 572, 572 (2006).
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put pressures on [their] governments,” 772 as well as inform
international human rights activists of the state of human rights in
the continent. With respect to the African Commission, publicity,
which can be enhanced significantly by openness and transparency
in the African Commission’s operations, can help significantly
improve the visibility of the Commission and its activities.
According to Article 45(1)(a) of the Banjul Charter, one of the
functions of the African Commission is to “disseminate
information” through organizing “seminars, symposia and
conferences,” 773 as well as provide the public with the results of its
activities, especially those involving the violation of human rights.
Nevertheless, since Sirleaf, who went on to become President of the
Republic of Liberia, made that statement about opacity in the
African Commission, the latter has made significant efforts to make
the results of its proceedings more accessible to the public. 774
For example, in the African Commission’s Second Activity
Report, the African Commission indicated that it had so far settled
ten cases but went on to state that “[t]he decisions for the time being,
remain confidential in conformity with Article 59 of the Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.” 775 In the African Commission’s Sixth
Annual Activity Report, which was adopted by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government in 1993, the African Commission
mentioned that “[i]n accordance with [A]rticle 59 of the African
[Banjul] Charter, the details of . . . communications [on Protective
Activities] are contained in a confidential Annex.” 776 Nevertheless,
after several NGOs that had been meeting prior to the Commission’s
14th session in December 1993, made a request to the African
Commission regarding the “confidential Annex,” copies of the latter
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Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(1)(a).
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See Killander, supra note 771, at 578.
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Second Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, June 13–14,
1989, ¶ J(b)(31), http://www.achpr.org/activity-reports/2/ (last visited on
Dec. 26, 2018).
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Chapter Six: Sixth Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission 1992–1993, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, ¶ 29,
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were given to the NGOs. 777 Henceforth, and starting with the
African Commission’s Seventh Annual Report, which was adopted
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1994, 778 the
African Commission has included, in all its annual reports, the
decisions that it has taken with regard to communications, a process
that has significantly improved its outreach to the publics that it
serves. 779
Nevertheless, when the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government adopted the Twentieth Report of the African
Commission in June 2006, the Executive Council authorized
publication of the Report and the Annexes, however, with the
exception of the Commission’s decision on Zimbabwe. Specifically,
the Executive Council declared as follows:
1. ADOPTS and, in conformity with Article 59 [of] the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Charter), AUTHORIZES the publication of the 20th
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Annexes with the
exception of decision 245 on Zimbabwe;
2. INVITES Zimbabwe to communicate to the ACHPR,
within two (2) months following the adoption of this
decision, its observations on the said decision, and ACHPR
to submit a report thereon at the next Ordinary Session of
the Executive Council;
3. ALSO INVITES Member States to communicate within
two (2) months following the reception of ACHPR
notification, their observations on the decisions that

See Killander, supra note 771, at 578.
Chapter Seven: Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission 1993–1994, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=7.
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ACHPR is to submit to the Executive Council and /or the
Assembly . . . . 780
At least one scholar questions why the Executive Council of the
AU is talking of a right to respond, given the fact that States “are
encouraged to participate [with the African Commission] in the
process leading up to a decision and their position on admissibility
and merits are recorded in the decision taken by the
Commission.” 781
In adopting the 19th Activity Report of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government authorized the publication of the Report and its
annexes, but exempted the publication of “Resolutions on Eritrea,
Ethiopia, the Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.” 782 The Assembly also
called upon the African Commission “to ensure that in the future it
enlists the responses of all States to its Resolutions and Decisions
before submitting them to the Executive Council and/or the
Assembly for consideration.” 783
As a consequence of the decision taken by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government on the African Commission’s
Nineteenth Activity Report, the Commission included, in its next
activity report (i.e., the Twentieth Activity Report), “resolutions on

DECISION ON THE ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (ACHPR), AFR. UNION, 2006, Doc.
EX.CL/Dec. 310(IX), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/
4885/EX%20CL%20Dec%20310%20(IX)%20_E.PDF?sequence=1.
781
See Killander, supra note 771, at 579.
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Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the 19th Activity
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jan. 24,
2006 ¶ 1. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe,
No. 245/02, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (May 15, 2006).
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Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe together with . . . lengthy
responses from these states.” 784
In Annex II, titled “Report of the Brainstorming Meeting on the
African Commission,” 785 a report was made of discussions on “the
status, the mandate and independence of the [African
Commission].” 786 The discussions produced the following
challenges:
a) incompatibility of Members of the [African
Commission] in the context of Articles 31 and 38 of the
African Charter;
b) Some current Members of the [African Commission]
hold official positions in their respective State, thereby
creating a perception of lack of independence.
c) The effect of Assembly/AU/Decision 101(VI) on the
preparation and publication of the Annual Activity reports
under [A]rticles 59 (1) and (3) in relation to the mandate of
the [African Commission] under Article 45. 787
The discussions also produced the following additional
challenges to the functioning of the African Commission:
•

Constraints arising out of the insufficiency of
resources that the African Union provides to the
[African Commission] for the discharging of its
mandate under Article 41 of the Charter.

784
Killander, supra note 771, at 580. See also EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
OF THE AFRICAN UNION, NINTH ORDINARY SESSION, JUNE 25–29, 2006,
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA, REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN

AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, AFR. UNION, Doc. EX.CL/279(IX),
https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=20.
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Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, supra note 782, at 23 (Annex II).
786
Id. at 26 (Item 1).
787
Id. at 26 (Item 1(13)(a)–(c)).
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•

Some State[s] Parties have accused the [African
Commission] of being too dependent on donor
funds thereby affecting its independence and
credibility.

•

The [African Commission] considers that the
decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the AU during the
Khartoum Summit needs to be revisited, bearing
in mind its impact on the publication of its
decisions and resolutions under the terms of
Article 59(1) of the Charter, and the independence
of the [African Commission].

•

The current number of Members of the [African
Commission] is insufficient to adequately
implement its mandate. 788

143

The Report then went on to make recommendations on how to
improve and “safeguard the independence and impartiality of [the]
[African Commission].” 789 The following recommendations were
made:
a) In order to safeguard the independence and impartiality
of ACHPR [African Commission], State Parties should
comply strictly to the AU Eligibility criteria on the
nomination of candidates and election of members of the
ACHPR, and not elect candidates holding portfolios and
positions that might impede their independence as
Members of the ACHPR.
b) The AU criteria shall apply to members of the ACHPR,
whose status shall change after their election.

788
789

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
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c) The AU should provide adequate funding to the ACHPR
for it to successfully discharge its mandate.
d) Extra budgetary resources allocated to the ACHPR for
its activities should be channeled through the African
Union Commission.
e) The number of members of the ACHPR should be
increased from 11 to between 15 or 18 in order to enable
the institution efficiently discharge its mandate.
f) The ACHPR should attend the budgetary meetings of the
AU in order to present and defend its budget.
g) The AU Commission should ensure that the ACHPR
takes part effectively in the meetings of the policy organs
of the AU bearing in mind the AHG/AU 2003 decision in
Maputo recognized its status as an organ of the AU.
h) The ACHPR should submit to the AU Commission its
opinion on the interpretation of Article 59(1) of the Charter
concerning the publications of its reports.
i) The ACHPR requests that the Executive Council of
Ministers recommends the AHG/AU to revisit its decision
adopted in Khartoum as far as it concerns activities of the
ACHPR that do not fall within the scope of protection
mandate of the ACHPR. 790
In the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in
Africa (Declaration of Principles), adopted by the African
Commission at its 32nd Session, in October 2002, in Banjul, The
Gambia, 791 it was stated that “[p]ublic bodies hold information not

Id. at 27 (Annex II).
See Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in
Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 32nd Session,
October 17–23, 2002: Banjul, The Gambia, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS
LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.html.
790
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for themselves but as custodians of the public good and everyone
has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly defined
rules established by law.” 792 Although the expression “public
bodies” is not defined, it is apparent from the way the expression is
used throughout the text of the Declaration of Principles that it refers
to entities that serve the public. Under such a definition, both the
African Commission and States Parties to the Banjul Charters can
be considered public bodies and hence, are “custodians of the public
good” 793—the public has the right to access the information that is
in the possession of these public bodies, subject, of course, “to
clearly defined rules established by law.” 794 The public will need
that information for at least two important and interrelated reasons:
first, to check on the activities of those who serve in these public
institutions, and second, to determine the services that are provided
by these institutions and the quality of those services—that is, to
determine the extent to which these institutions are performing their
functions. The ability of citizens to check on the exercise of
government and/or public power is “critical for the maintenance of
the rule of law.” 795
Unfortunately, some States have been trying to weaken the
African Commission, “curtail its powers,” 796 and reduce its capacity
to interpret the Banjul Charter, as well as promote and protect
human and peoples’ rights in the continent. Since transitions toward
democratic governance re-emerged in Africa in the early 1990s,
many African countries have introduced new “freedom-of-

Id. ¶ IV.
Id.
794
Id.
795
John Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth
Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 995 (2013). As argued by Pina, Torres and Royo,
“[m]ore information delivered in a more timely fashion to citizens is
expected to increase the transparency of government and to empower
citizens to monitor government performance more closely.” Vincente Pina,
Lourdes Torres & Sonia Royo, Are ICTs Improving Transparency and
Accountability in the EU Regional and Local Government? An Empirical
Study, 85 PUB. ADMIN. 449, 450 (2007).
796
See Killander, supra note 771, at 580.
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information” laws. 797 During the last several decades, as many
countries in the continent have made efforts to transition to
democratic governance systems, armed with separation of powers
and an independent judiciary, it has become evident that the
deepening and institutionalization of democracy in these countries
requires openness and transparency in government communication.
As mentioned earlier, openness and transparency in government
communication implies that citizens are able to have effective
access to government information, subject, of course, to necessary
protections for the individual’s rights of privacy.
As more African countries transition to democratic governance
systems and adopt transparent and more open approaches to
communication, Africans are not likely to expect any less from
continental public institutions, such as the African Commission. In
The Mauritius Plan of Action, 1996, the African Commission stated
that “[t]he lack of informative documentation on the work of the
African Commission is a problem which needs to be solved
urgently.” 798 Unfortunately, as of 2018, the situation has not

797
For example, Nigeria enacted a Freedom of Information Act May
28, 2011, which was signed as an expansion of Nigeria’s constitution. See
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 39(1) (providing every person the right
of freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart ideas and information without interference). See also
Access to Information Act, 2005, GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (July
19, 2005). It is important to take cognizance of transitions to democratic
governance that began in Africa during the colonial period when indigenous
groups launched what, in some colonies, were violent demonstrations for
the departure of the European colonizers and subsequently, the
independence of their territories. As argued by Mbaku and Ihonvbere, “the
popular agitations that began in the continent in the late 1980s and resulted
in the collapse of many authoritarian regimes, were actually a continuation
of the struggle started during the colonial period.” See John Mukum Mbaku
& Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s Political Adjustment
in the “New” Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 8 (John Mukum
Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds. 2003).
798
The Mauritius Plan of Action 1996, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS
LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/mauritius-plan.html.
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significantly improved. 799 Hence, it is important that as Africans
engage in efforts to fight impunity and improve the environment for
the protection of human rights, all public agencies and institutions,
including those at the continental level, be fully clothed with
openness and transparency, especially as relates to their activities on
behalf of the public.

VII. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: HAS IT
IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA?
Since the early 1990s, there have been many developments in
Africa that have significantly improved the environment for the
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights. First, was
the demise of the racially-based apartheid system in South Africa
and the subsequent introduction of a non-racial dispensation in the
country, undergirded by a progressive constitution. 800 Second, many
of the continent’s dictatorships were dismantled in favor of more

799
See The Big Question: What Is the Biggest Impediment to
Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa?, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR
DEMOCRACY (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.ned.org/big-question-biggestimpediment-democratic-governance-sub-saharan-africa/ (noting, inter alia,
the demand, by Africans, for more transparency in their institutions).
800
In addition to the fact that post-apartheid South Africa created, in
1996, what “is considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the
world,” the country also has a strong governing process, which is
undergirded by separation of powers with checks and balances, including
an independent judiciary and a very robust and politically active civil
society. See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH
55 (2018). See also HENDRICK J. KOTZÉ, THE WORKING DRAFT OF SOUTH
AFRICA’S 1996 CONSTITUTION: ELITE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE
“OPTIONS” (1996) (providing, inter alia, an overview of the South Africa
post-apartheid constitution). Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996, contains the Bill of Rights. See S. AFR. CONST., First
Amendment Act of 1997, ch. 2.
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democratic political dispensations. 801 Third, many countries
adopted constitutions that either acknowledge or incorporate
provisions of international human rights instruments. 802 Fourth,
when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”) was adopted on July 17, 1998 at Rome, Italy, a significant
number of its supporters were African States. 803 It has been argued
that the impetus to the overwhelming support of the Rome Statute
by African countries was the pervasiveness of impunity in the
continent generally and the Rwandan Genocide, in particular. 804

801
For example, there were transitions from military dictatorships to
electoral democracies in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, and Bénin Republic. Note,
however, the collapse of some authoritarian regimes was not accompanied
by a transition to democracy. See Michael Bratton, Deciphering Africa’s
Divergent Transitions, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 67, 69–93 (1997). For example, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the collapse of Mobutu Sesse Seko’s
authoritarian regime did not lead to a transition to a stable democratic
system. In fact, since 1997, when Mobutu was ousted by Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, the country has not been able to provide itself with a stable and fully
functioning democratic system. See William Reno, Congo: From State
Collapse to ‘Absolutism,’ to State Failure, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 43, 48–52
(2006).
802
For example, the Constitution of the Bénin Republic reaffirms the
country’s “attachment to the principles of democracy and human rights as
they have been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 . . . .” CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2, 1990, pmbl.
803
Kurt Mills, “Bashir Is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International
Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 405 (2012) (noting, inter alia, that
the first country to sign the Rome Statute was Senegal and that shortly after
that, many African countries also signed the Rome Statute).
804
The genocide in Rwanda, which took place in the Spring of 1994,
was orchestrated and carried out by the Hutu-dominated government and
resulted in the deaths of nearly one million Tutsi and their Hutu
sympathizers. See generally LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER:
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006) (examining, inter alia, the events leading
to the Rwandan Genocide and the genocide itself).
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Fifth, the successful trial and conviction of former dictators
Charles Taylor 805 and Hissène Habré 806 have given hope to victims
of human rights violations that they too may one day be able to get
justice and that those African leaders who commit atrocities against
their fellow citizens will no longer be able to escape accountability.
Finally, African States, working through the OAU, adopted the
Banjul Charter at the OAU’s 18th Assembly in June 1981 in
Nairobi, Kenya. 807 The Banjul Charter came into effect on October
21, 1986. 808 The job of oversight and interpretation of the Banjul
Charter was given to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. 809 Below, we take a look at how effective the
Banjul Charter has been in creating a culture of respect for, and
promotion and protection of human rights in Africa.
The Banjul Charter, according to its Preamble, was designed
“to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms
taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these
rights and freedoms in Africa.” 810 It has been argued, however, that
the Banjul Charter has some “normative flaws” that make it difficult
for the Charter to function effectively as a legal instrument for the
protection of human rights in the continent. 811 Patrick-Patel argues
that while the Banjul Charter has a “strong emphasis on social,

See THE LAW REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE:
VOL. III: PROSECUTOR V. CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR (THE TAYLOR CASE)
(Charles Chernor Jalloh & Simon Meisenberg eds. 2015) (examining, inter
alia, the trial and conviction of former Liberian dictator Charles Taylor by
the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
806
See generally CELESTE HICKS, THE TRIAL OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ:
HOW THE PEOPLE OF CHAD BROUGHT A TYRANT TO JUSTICE (2018) (detailing
the trial and conviction of former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré by
Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal).
807
See Banjul Charter, supra note 93.
808
See id.
809
See id.
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Id. at pmbl.
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Lucinda Patrick-Patel, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights: How Effective Is This Legal Instrument in Shaping a
Continental Human Rights Culture in Africa?, LE PETIT JURISTE (Dec. 21,
2014) https://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/droit-compare/the-african-charter-onhuman-and-peoples-rights-how-effective-is-this-legal-instrument-inshaping-a-continental-human-rights-culture-in-africa/.
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economic and cultural rights,” its coverage of “civil and political
rights” is “inadequate.” 812 Heyns states that “[t]he civil and political
rights recognized in the African [Banjul] Charter are in many ways
similar to those recognized in other international [human rights]
instruments, and these rights have in practical terms received most
of the attention of the African Commission.” 813
The Banjul Charter recognizes a series of rights as “individual
rights” and these are: equality before the law and equal protection
of the law; 814 freedom from discrimination; 815 inviolability of the
human person and the right to life; 816 dignity of the human being
and prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment; 817 right to liberty and to the security of his person; 818
the right to a fair trial; 819 freedom of conscience; 820 right to receive
information and to express and disseminate one’s opinion; 821
freedom of association; 822 right to assemble freely with others; 823
freedom of movement; 824 right to freely participate in the political
system; 825 and right to property. 826
Heyns notes that the Banjul Charter makes “no explicit
reference in the Charter to a right to privacy; the right against forced
labor is not mentioned by name; and the right to a fair trial and the
right of political participation are given scant protection in
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comparison to international standards.” 827 The Banjul Charter’s
coverage of gender issues has also come under attack as wholly
inadequate and not likely to contribute significantly, especially to
the protection of women and children. 828 For example, no article is
devoted entirely to the protection of women or children. 829 Instead,
the protection of the rights of women and children is inserted into
an article that deals with the family. 830 According to Article 18(3),
“[t]he State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination
against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the
woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and
conventions.” 831
Lumping together the protection of the rights of women and
children “in an article that deals with the family,” argues Heyns, “reenforces outdated stereotypes about the proper place and role of
women in society and has been partially responsible for the drive to
adopt the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women
in Africa.” 832 In addition, the Banjul Charter does not provide
“general guidelines on how Charter rights should be limited” 833 and
this is a serious shortcoming because “[a] society in which rights
cannot be limited will be ungovernable, but it is essential that
appropriate human rights norms be set for the limitations.” 834
Finally, there is the problem with so-called “claw-back
clauses.” 835 As argued by Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, “[a] claw-back

827
Heyns, supra note 630, at 687. Heyns notes that the Banjul
Charter does not make explicit reference to “the right to a public hearing,
the right to interpretation, the right against self-incrimination, and the right
against double jeopardy.” The African Commission, nevertheless, has
interpreted the Banjul Charter “protection to encompass some of these
rights.” Id. at n.45.
828
See generally id.
829
Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 18(1)–(4).
830
Id. at art. 18(3).
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Id.
832
Heyns, supra note 630, at 687–88.
833
Id. at 688.
834
Id. Heyns does note that some articles of the Banjul Charter,
which set out “specific and political rights do contain limiting provisions
applicable to those particular rights.” Id. at 688.
835
Id.
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clause is one which permits a state, in its almost unbounded
discretion, to restrict its treaty obligations or rights guaranteed by
[the] African Charter.” 836 Claw-back clauses, argues BondzieSimpson, must be distinguished from “derogation clauses which
also permit the temporary suspension of treaty obligations.” 837
While derogation clauses are temporary and are usually invoked
only in situations of public emergencies, “claw-back clauses may be
applied even in normal [or non-emergency] situations, so long as
national law is passed to that effect.” 838 It is also important to note
that while derogation clauses provide for the suspension of “only
certain—but not all—obligations and rights,” 839 claw-back clauses
are not subjected to such limitations.
Today, many African countries have not yet incorporated the
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in various international
human rights instruments into their constitutions and made them
part of national law. As a consequence, the various international
human rights instruments “do not automatically confer justiciable
rights in national courts.” 840 In these countries, national law
continues to have primacy, even in situations that deal with the
violation of human rights. 841 Thus, it is possible for rights protected
by international human rights instruments (including the African
[Banjul] Charter) to be violated in an African country with impunity.
As argued by Makau Matua, “the most serious flaw in the African
Charter concerns its ‘clawback’ clauses, which permeate the African
Charter and permit African states to restrict basic human rights to

836
Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 31 HOW. L. J. 643, 660 (1988).
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Id.
838
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Id. at 660–61.
840
Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights
Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 103, 108 (2002).
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the maximum extent allowed by domestic law.” 842 In addition,
argues Mutua,
[t]hese clauses are especially significant because domestic
laws in Africa date from the colonial period and are
therefore highly repressive and draconian. The
postcolonial state, like its predecessor, impermissibly and
contrary to international human rights standards, restricts
most civil and political rights, particularly those pertaining
to political participation, free expression, association and
assembly, movement, and conscience. 843
Consider, for example, the Banjul Charter’s Article 9(2), which
states as follows: “Every individual shall have the right to express
and disseminate his opinions within the law.” 844 This is an example
of a claw-back clause—the right in question is only recognized to
the extent that “such a right is not infringed upon by national
law.” 845 Heyns has argued that if this interpretation is correct, then
“the claw-back clauses would obviously undermine the whole idea
of international supervision of domestic law and practices and
render the [Banjul] Charter meaningless in respect to the rights
involved.” 846 In addition, argues Heyns, “[d]omestic law will, in
those cases, have to be measured according to domestic standards—
a senseless exercise.” 847
The African Commission has held, in the context of claw-back
clauses, that “provisions in articles that allow rights to be limited ‘in
accordance with law,’ should be understood to require such
limitations to be done in terms of domestic legal provisions, which
comply with international human rights standards.” 848 In

Makau Mutua, The Construction of the African Human Rights
System: Prospects and Pitfalls, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING
FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 143, 146 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison
eds., 2000).
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Communications 105/93–128/94–130/94–152/96: Media Rights
Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, the African Commission
held that
[t]o allow national law to have precedent over the
international law of the Charter would defeat the purpose
of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.
International human rights standards must always prevail
over contradictory national law. Any limitation on the
rights of the Charter must be in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter. 849
It is argued that “[t]hrough this innovative interpretation, the
Commission has gone a long way towards curing one of the most
troublesome inherent deficiencies in the [Banjul] Charter.” 850
Nevertheless, to most of the Banjul Charter’s stakeholders,
particularly those who have not had the opportunity to be exposed
to the African Commission’s interpretive approach, the Charter
“will continue to appear to condone infringements of human rights
norms as long as it is done through domestic law.” 851
A lot still has to be done to improve the effectiveness of the
system for the recognition and protection of human rights in Africa.
First, the key to significantly improving the environment for the
protection of human rights in Africa lies in making certain that
“international human rights standards must always prevail over
contradictory national law.” 852 With respect to the African [Banjul]
Charter, “[a]ny limitation on the rights of the Charter must be in

849
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Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional
Rights Project v. Nigeria, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Oct.
31, 1998) http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/105.93-128.94130.94-152.96/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2018), at ¶ 66.
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conformity with the provisions of the Charter.” 853 Second, the
majority of countries in the continent must voluntarily accept and
respect international human rights instruments and the role that they
play in advancing the creation of a domestic institutional
environment that respects and protects human rights. Third, a
significant number of African countries must make certain that there
exists, within their jurisdictions, “[a]n adequate level of compliance
with human rights norms.” 854
Fourth, while a regional human rights system, such as the
Banjul Charter, is very important and critical to the protection of
human rights in Africa, the building blocks of an effective regional
human rights system are actually “[w]orking national human rights
systems.” 855 Without a culture of respect for human rights norms
within the majority of African countries, the national or domestic
courts “are not effective in implementing these norms,” 856 and it is
unlikely that any regional or continental human rights system would
succeed in protecting the rights of Africans. As has been argued by
some human rights scholars, there must be political will within each
African country to establish and maintain an effective domestic
human rights system in order for the regional system to work. 857
Fifth, the regional human rights system as embodied in the
African Charter, must be seen as the “primary body through which
peer pressure” 858 can be put on States Parties to live up to the ideals
of the African Charter; especially regarding the protection of human
rights. States Parties are responsible for selecting Commissioners to
serve on the African Commission and judges to serve on the African
Court. 859 Thus, African countries must take this job seriously and
make sure that the process is not politicized and that only individuals
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who possess the necessary skills 860 to perform the job of a
commissioner or judge are selected.
Sixth, availability of adequate financial resources is often a
source of insecurity for many human rights organizations. Without
financial independence, the entities—in the case of the African
Commission, States Parties—that provide the necessary financial
resources for the human rights organization can have significant
influence on the organization and manipulate its activities and the
outcome of its deliberations.
Seventh, openness and transparency in the organization’s
communication is very important for its effectiveness. For the
African Commission, it is important that its “decisions and
resolutions” be made available to all stakeholders. 861 Although
“[p]eer pressure can change behavior by inducing shame, or if that
does not work, by mobilizing stronger forms of sanctions against
states,” 862 this is only possible when and if “there is sufficient
publicity.” 863 The responsibility to make certain that the African
Commission operates in an open and transparent manner lies, not
just with the Commission alone, but also with civil society and their
organizations in all States Parties, as well as the governments of the
States Parties. 864
Eighth, there must be an effective mechanism through which
recalcitrant and non-performing States Parties—that is, those that do
not adhere to the provisions of the Banjul Charter—can be
disciplined. For example, in order for “shame or peer pressure” to
be mobilized effectively against recalcitrant States Parties, there
must exist proper links—for example, trade, travel, as well as
cultural and educational exchanges, and diplomatic contacts and
communication—between States Parties; otherwise, it would not be

860
See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
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Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, at art. 11(1), (June 10,
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possible to effectively and fully impose sanctions to force change in
the behavior of States Parties. 865
Finally, “[t]he independence, creativity, and wisdom of those
who run the [human rights] system are absolutely crucial” 866 to the
process of enhancing the protection of human rights on the
continent. With respect to the African Commission, these
individuals include the “Commissioners (and judges) and the staff
of the Commission (and Court), as well as the officials of the
regional organization.” 867
Heyns has argued that rather than continue to create additional
organizations and mechanisms for the protection of human rights in
the continent, efforts should be directed at “getting the mechanism
created by the African Charter, the African Commission, to function
properly.” 868 Heyns states further that while “[i]n themselves all of
these mechanisms could be a viable starting point [for bringing
about an effective mechanism for the protection of human rights in
the continent], . . . the current proliferation of mechanisms means
that there is a lack of focus of resources and effort, with the result
that none of them might be in a position to make any difference.” 869
Along these lines, those who are genuinely interested in promoting
and protecting human rights in Africa should devote their efforts,
not into creating new mechanisms, but into strengthening the
African Charter, the African Commission, and the African Court, so
that they can serve effectively as mechanisms for the promotion and
protection of human rights on the continent.
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IMMUNITY FOR AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE CONTINENT
A. INTRODUCTION

An important and “fundamental tenet of modern
constitutionalism and an offshoot of its core principle of
constitutional supremacy is that nobody, regardless of his [or her]
status, is above the law.” 870 Fombad and Nwauche argue that the
very concept of “constitutionalism proceeds from an assumption of
human fallibility, the corrupting influence of power and the need to
limit it.” 871 This is the element of the rule of law generally referred
to as the “supremacy of law.” 872 Within such a legal and judicial
system, “the law is superior, applies equally, is known and
predictable, and is administered through a separation of powers.” 873
Most importantly, “[t]he law is superior to all members of society,
including government officials vested with either executive,
legislative, or judicial power.” 874 Thus, the law treats all citizens,
regardless of their political and economic standing as beings “who
are bound to obey and act in accordance with the law.” 875
Due to the fact that the decolonization project in many colonies
in Africa was “undertaken reluctantly and opportunistically,” 876
there was a failure to “fully and effectively transform the critical
domains—that is, the political, administrative, and judicial
foundations of the state” 877 and produce more effective institutional

870
Charles Manga Fombad & Enyinna Nwauche, Africa’s Imperial
Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Accountability, 5 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD.
91, 93 (2012).
871
Id. at 93.
872
Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 293, 296 (2009).
873
Id. at 301.
874
Id. at 302.
875
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93.
876
JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH
8 (2018).
877
Id.
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arrangements for post-independence governance. As a consequence,
many of the new countries that emerged from European colonialism
in the 1950s and 1960s in Africa failed to “design [and adopt]
constitutions that promote constitutionalism by incorporating most
of the core elements of modern constitutionalism such as separation
of powers, judicial independence and Bill of Rights.” 878 Since the
early 1990s, many African countries have either revised their
constitutions or adopted new ones in an effort to promote
constitutionalism and constitutional government. 879
On December 17, 2010, Tunisian street vendor Tarek el-Tayeb
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest his humiliation by
government regulators. 880 His self-immolation provided the impetus
for the Tunisian Revolution that led to the ousting of dictator Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. 881 Bouazizi’s death also
inspired the wider Arab Spring, which resulted in the ouster of many
autocratic regimes in various countries in North Africa and the

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93.
New or revised constitutions were produced in Nigeria (1999, to
introduce a new post-military government); Cameroon (1996, to introduce
the separation of powers); Republic of South Africa (1996, to bring to an
end the racially-based apartheid system and introduce a non-racial
democratic system); Zambia (1991, to bring to an end one-party rule and
introduce multi-party politics); Ghana (1992, to bring to an end military rule
and introduce democratic governance); and Kenya (2010, to introduce
separation of powers, with an independent judiciary, as well devolve powers
to the regions); and Côte d’Ivoire (2016, to introduce a new citizenship law).
880
See Mohamed Bouazizi, Tunisian Street Vendor and Protestor,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Mohamed-Bouazizi.
881
See id.
878
879
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Middle East. 882 By the end of 2011, autocratic leaders in Egypt, 883
Libya, 884 and Tunisia 885 had been ousted.
During the last three decades, African countries have made
efforts to improve their national governance systems. These
institutional reforms have included the provision of new or revised
constitutions. Unfortunately, many of these new or updated
instruments, like Cameroon’s 1996 constitution, 886 pay only “lip
service to separation of powers.” 887 As argued by Fombad and
Nwauche, many of these new constitutions, especially in the
Francophone African countries, have not been able to effectively
constrain political elites, allowing them to continue to act above the

882
See Thessa Lageman, Mohamed Bouazizi: Was the Arab Spring
Worth Dying For?, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2015/12/mohamed-bouazizi-arab-spring-worth-dying-15122809374
3375.html.
883
See generally WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION 2.0: THE POWER OF
THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER: A MEMOIR (2012)
(examining, inter alia, the revolution that ousted Egyptian dictator Hosni
Mubarak in 2011).
884
See generally ALISON PARGETER, LIBYA: THE RISE AND FALL OF
QADAFFI (2012) (examining, inter alia, Qadaffi’s rise to power and his
violent fall in 2011).
885
See generally THE MAKING OF THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION:
CONTEXTS, ARCHITECTS, PROSPECTS (Nouri Gana ed. 2013) (presenting a
series of essays that examines the Tunisian Revolution and the demise of
the regime of dictator Ben Ali).
886
The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1996 is officially
known as “Law No. 96–06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution
of 2 June 1972.” Although this constitution made allowance for the
separation of powers, with an independent judiciary, Article 37(3) grants
the President of the Republic the power to guarantee the independence of
the judiciary. See id. at art. 37(3). Fombad argues that the reality in
Cameroon is that the President of the Republic continues to “appoint,
transfer, dismiss, suspend and can interfere with the so-called judicial power
with no constitutional provisions to control and ensure that this is done in a
fair, rational, objective and predictable manner.” Charles Manga Fombad,
Judicial Power in Cameroon’s Amended Constitution of 18 January 1996,
9 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
887
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93.
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law. 888 In addition to the fact that many African countries still have
“overbearing and ‘imperial’ presidents [that] continue to reign and
dominate the legislature as well as to control the judiciary,” 889
governance systems in these countries also do not have “traditional
checks and balances,” 890 such as strong, robust, and politically
active civil societies, a free press, and truly independent
judiciaries. 891
Despite the significant constitutional reforms that have taken
place in many countries on the continent, “[t]he imbalance in power
among the three branches of government” 892 has emerged as a major
challenge to governance, especially since it has a significant
negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. Given the fact
that the judiciary in these countries is often called upon to adjudicate
disputes emanating from elections, as well as situations involving
political and bureaucratic corruption, and various forms of abuse of
power, it is very important that the judiciary be independent from
the other branches of government. Fombad and Nwauche argue that
“[e]xecutive lawlessness has become very common in countries
such as Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria[,] and
Zimbabwe.” 893 In these countries human rights are routinely
violated with impunity. 894

888

Id.
Id.
890
Id.
891
See generally Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 181
(arguing, inter alia, that “a robust civil society is critical for the maintenance
of a fully functioning democratic system”).
892
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93.
893
Id.
894
For example, in Cameroon in late 2016, teachers and lawyers in
the Anglophone Regions engaged in peaceful demonstrations against the
Francophone-dominated central government because of the latter’s efforts
to destroy Anglo-Saxon institutions, and then impose the French language
and institutions (including French Civil law) on the Anglophones. The
central government responded with extreme violence by killing
Anglophones and burning down their villages. In fact, the international
press has referred to the activities of government security forces in the
Anglophone Regions as genocide. See, e.g., Zongo, supra note 279.
889
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What has been the source of this executive political dominance
and abuse of power? First, there is the “hegemonic influence of . . .
dominant [political] parties, which are often effectively controlled
by the president and a small inner circle of cohorts.” 895 Second,
throughout many countries in the continent national constitutions
have not been able to effectively constrain political elites, including
executives, making it possible for presidents to commit atrocities
against citizens with impunity. 896 Third, several African presidents
have been granted immunity from prosecution for crimes committed
while in office, allowing them to escape being held accountable for
their crimes. 897 For example, in 2008, Cameroon amended its
constitution to allow incumbent President of the Republic, Paul
Biya, to run for another term in office, and to grant him immunity
from prosecution for crimes committed while in office. 898 The
relevant section of the constitution is Article 53(3) which states as
follows: “Les actes accomplis par le président de la République . . .

895
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94. For example, in
Cameroon, the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement
(CPDM), which came into being in 1966 as the Cameroon National Union
(CNU) and changed its name to the CPDM in 1985, has dominated
governance in Cameroon since 1966. Even after multiparty politics returned
to the country in 1990 and many opposition parties emerged to challenge
the CPDM’s hegemonic control of the political system, the CPDM, which
is headed by President of the Republic, Paul Biya, has remained in firm
control of the National Assembly. After the 2013 legislative elections, the
distribution of seats in the 180-seat lower chamber of the Parliament of
Cameroon—the National Assembly (l’Assemblée nationale) are as follows:
CPDM (142); eight opposition parties (34); and 4 seats are vacant. The next
legislative election is scheduled for 2019. See Republic of Cameroon,
Election for Assemblée [n]ationale (Cameroonian National Assembly),
ELECTION GUIDE: DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE & ELECTIONS NEWS (Sept. 30,
2013), http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/557/.
896
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94.
897
Id.; see also H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in
Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency
in Post-authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 761 (2008).
898
Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 157.
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sont couverts par l’immunité et ne sauraient engager sa
responsabilité à l’issue de son mandat.” 899
Finally, the constitutions of many African countries,
particularly those of the Francophone countries, have conferred
“extensive powers” 900 on presidents, and in “the absence of effective
checks on the exercise of these powers,” 901 it has become extremely
difficult for these countries to deepen their democracies and
entrench a “culture of constitutionalism.” 902 As a consequence, the
violation of human rights remains a major governance challenge in
many countries throughout the continent.
Except for a few countries, such as South Africa and Ghana, 903
many of the constitutions that African countries adopted in the post-

899

Loi no 2008–1 du 14 avril 2008 modifiant et complétant certaines
dispositions de la loi no 96–6 du 18 janvier 1996 portant révision de la
Constitution du 2 juin 1972 (Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008 to amend
and supplement some provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to
amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972), art. 53(3) (Apr. 21, 2008)
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/--ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_202302.pdf. The article says that
“Acts committed by the President of the Republic . . . shall be covered by
immunity and he shall not be held accountable for them after the end of his
mandate.” Id.
900
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94.
901
Id.
902
Id.
903
Both the South African and Ghanaian governance systems have
shown a significant level of resilience. With respect to South Africa, the
courts have shown a significant level of independence, ruling against the
government in several cases. For example, when the government of
President Jacob Zuma withdrew the country from the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the North Gauteng High Court ruled
that the withdrawal had been unconstitutional since it was undertaken
without prior parliamentary approval. See South Africa Court Rules Against
ICC Pullout Plan, FRANCE 24 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.france24.
com/en/20170222-south-africa-court-rules-against-icc-pullout-plan. After
the ruling, the government complied with the court decision and revoked
their withdrawal from the ICC. See Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses

164

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 16.1

1990s period have not been able to fully constrain national leaders,
especially Presidents. As a consequence, many Presidents in these
countries “still consider themselves above the law” 904 and act
accordingly. Unless Africans can get rid of these presidential
immunities and provide themselves with institutional arrangements
that adequately constrain civil servants and political elites, impunity,
and consequently the abuse of human rights, will remain a major
problem for the continent.

B. THE UNCONSTRAINED PRESIDENT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
In the early years of the American Republic, the founders
considered the legislature as the most “dangerous branch” of
government and the one most likely to trample on the rights of
citizens. 905 As a consequence, the founding fathers introduced
bicameralism as one of the most important ways to check on the
exercise of government power. 906 At independence, many African

Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-iccwithdrawal.html. With respect to Ghana, the country has enjoyed peaceful
and constitutional regime changes since the end of military rule and the
transition to democracy in 1993. For example, in the country’s presidential
election in December 2016, incumbent President John Dramani Mahama
lost to opposition candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo. Unlike presidential
candidates in countries, such as Kenya and The Gambia, President Mahama
accepted his loss and allowed the transition to proceed. Perhaps, more
important is the fact that President Mahama asked his supporters not to
engage in violent protest but to accept the loss and allow the transition to
proceed smoothly and peacefully. See John Mukum Mbaku, The Ghanaian
Elections: 2016, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/12/15/the-ghanaian-elections-2016/.
Of
course, the governance situation in both Ghana and South Africa is not
ideal—corruption remains a problem in both countries. Perhaps, more
important is the fact that the abuse of human rights remains a major
governance problem for both countries.
904
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94.
905
Judith A. Best, Fundamental Rights and the Structure of
Government, in THE FRAMERS & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 37, 48 (1992).
906
MBAKU, supra note 800, at 139.
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countries adopted constitutions that created imperial
presidencies. 907 As argued by Mbaku, “these were executive
branches with relatively unchecked power, which effectively turned
the presidency into a monarchy—with relatively weak legislative
assemblies.” 908 Thus, in many African countries “the dangerous
branch of government was the executive because it had absolute
control over the legislature and the judiciary—some scholars call
these presidencies ‘reinforced’ and they are characterized by
extraordinary abuses of power.” 909
Since the early 1990s, many African countries have engaged in
institutional reforms to improve their governance systems. These
reforms have included revising or amending their constitutions or
creating new ones. Many of these countries now have constitutions
that provide for the separation of powers with three separate
branches of government—executive, legislative and judicial.
Nevertheless, as argued by Mbaku, “in many of these countries, the
separation of powers is simply an abstract constitutional construct
that does not have any practical application.” 910 The reality in many
of these countries is that “the executive dominates and controls the
other two branches” 911 of government. The institutional reforms that
have taken place in the African countries since the early 1990s were
supposed to deal with the continent’s extremely “powerful,
domineering[,] and overbearing” presidencies. 912
In developed and advanced democracies, 913 the constitution
grants the president “the sole repository of executive power to
ensure that there is no confusion as to who bears ultimate
responsibility for executive decisions.” 914 In these countries, there
exist “strong checks and balances,” which are reinforced by “a
history, culture, custom and tradition of constitutionalism[,] and

907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914

See, e.g., Prempeh, supra note 897.
MBAKU, supra note 800, at 139.
Id.; see also LeVine, supra note 179.
MBAKU, supra note 800, at 137.
Id.
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95.
For example, the United States and France.
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95.
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respect for the rule of law.” 915 Such an institutional setup ensures
that the executive branch “does not overshadow and dominate other
branches of government.” 916 These advanced democracies
developed checks and balances, as well as a culture of adherence to
the rule of law, over many years. 917 In addition to the fact that many
African countries do not have “a history or long practice of
constitutionalism to back the Constitution, the written text remains
the basis for any form of control that needs to be exercised to check
the abuse of the enormous powers that these constitutions confer on
presidents.” 918
These extremely powerful African presidents “rule and reign
supreme directly or indirectly through other members of the
executive branch and the ruling party which they control, and
sometimes, even express disdain for the Constitution.” 919 As argued
by LeVine, in many African countries a constitution “became
simply another instrument of rule if not discarded altogether” 920 and
that “[m]any a replacement was simply octroyé, ‘handed down from
on high,’ or cobbled together by a compliant constitution-making
conference or convention, and then adopted by a ‘controlled
plebiscite.’” 921
Although many of Africa’s constitutions currently provide
some form of separation of powers, which, as in the Constitution of

Id. Some of these checks include an independent judiciary, a
bicameral legislature. In the United States, for example, the national
legislature is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with
each chamber exercising an absolute veto over legislation enacted by the
other. See Best, supra note 905.
916
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95.
917
Id.
918
Id.
919
Id.
920
LeVine, supra note 179, at 188.
921
Id. Fombad and Nwauche note that, in 2006, Jacob Zuma, who
later became President of the Republic of South Africa (May 9, 2009 to Feb.
14, 2018), declared that “the ANC [the ruling party] is more important than
even the Constitution of the country.” See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note
870, at 5 n.9. See also DA: Zille: The Retreat of Constitutionalism, POLITY
(July 22, 2008), http://www.polity.org.za/article/da-zille-the-retreat-ofconstitutionalism-22072008-2008-07-22.
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the Republic of Kenya 922 and the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 923 allows for some level of check over executive abuse
of power, most of the continent’s Francophone countries remain
saddled with de Gaulle’s constitutional model—that of the French
Fifth Republic. 924 The Gaullist constitutional model, adopted by all
former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, except Guinea,
provides for “an overbearing president who dominates the
legislature and controls the judiciary.” 925
An example of this executive control of the other branches of
government can be found in the Constitution of the Republic of
Cameroon, which states in Article 37(2) that “[j]udicial power shall
be independent of the executive and legislative powers.” 926
Nevertheless, in paragraph 3 of the same Article, the President of
the Republic is granted the power to guarantee the independence of
the judiciary—“[t]he President of the Republic shall guarantee the
independence of judicial power.” 927 This indicates, without
question, that the judiciary and the executive are not co-equal
branches of government. Although the Francophone African
countries also participated in the institutional and constitutional
reform exercises that pervaded African countries in the aftermath of
the Cold War and made efforts to reform their Gaullist constitutional
model, the imperial presidency remains a critical part of the
governance architecture of these countries. These imperial
presidencies remain a threat to governance generally and to the
protection of human rights in particular.

See Hanibal Goitom, National Parliaments: Kenya, L. LIBR. OF
CONG. 1 (Feb. 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments
/pdf/kenya.pdf.
923
See Who We Are, PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR.,
https://www.parliament.gov.za/who-we-are (last visited Mar. 2, 2021);
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95.
924
See Who We Are, supra note 923; see also Fombad & Nwauche,
supra note 870, at 95.
925
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 96.
926
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Jan. 18, 1996, art.
37(2) (amended 2008).
927
Id. at art. 37(3).
922
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1. Presidential Immunities and Human Rights Protection in
Africa
In modern Africa, the functions and powers of the president are
defined and delineated by the constitution. As in other sovereign
states, the African president is empowered by the constitution as the
“sole repository of executive power.” 928 It is argued that given the
“huge and exacting nature of [presidential] responsibilities, most
[African] constitutions have granted [the president] immunity in
absolute or qualified form to enable him to discharge his duties with
as much freedom as possible.” 929 First, if a president is subject to
being sued while he or she is in office, it is argued, the adjudication
process can emerge as “a serious distraction of the president’s
attention to his public duties.” 930 Second, the “fear of attracting
liability,” 931 argue some legal and constitutional scholars, may force
the president to shy away from fully exercising his or her discretion,
and hence, he or she may not be able to perform his or her public
duties fully and effectively. 932
Third, immunity is expected or intended to protect not just the
president personally but also the “dignity of the office.” 933 Fourth,
given the fact that the president makes decisions “on matters that are
far-reaching, sensitive and sometimes likely to arouse intense
feelings,” 934 it is “in the public interest” 935 and to the benefit of the
country as a whole that the president can act in “a confident, skillful
and decisive manner without the fear that a disgruntled citizen may
sue him.” 936 But, can immunity allow the president to perform his
official duties without being distracted by the fear of being sued and
dragged to court and do so without placing the same president above
the law? For, if the president considers himself or herself above the

928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
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Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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law, he or she may engage in activities that violate the rights of
citizens. In the following section, we shall examine some
presidential immunities in African constitutions and see the extent
to which these may be contributing to human rights violations in the
continent.

2. Absolute Immunity Provisions in African Constitutions
and Human Rights
The “absolute immunity clauses” in African constitutions grant
the president or the country’s executive “absolute immunity from
both civil and criminal proceedings.” 937 Consider, for example,
§50(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho:
Whilst any person holds the office of King, he shall be
entitled to immunity from suit and legal process in any civil
cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by
him in his private capacity and to immunity from criminal
proceedings in respect of all things done or omitted to be
done by him either in his official capacity or in his private
capacity. 938
Under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the king
cannot be held legally accountable for his acts or omissions, whether
undertaken in his private or public capacity. 939 The Constitution of
the Kingdom of Swaziland also provides another example of
absolute immunity. 940 According to Article 11, “The King and
iNgwenyama shall be immune from (a) suit or legal process in any
cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by him; and

Id. at 11.
CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO (1993), art. 50(1) (amended 2004).
939
Id. at art. 50(1)–(5).
940
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005), art. 11. In
2018, King Mswati III renamed the country “the Kingdom of eSwatini.” See
BBC, Swaziland King Renames Country the Kingdom of eSwatini, BBC
NEWS, April 19, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43821512.
937
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(b) being summoned to appear as a witness in any civil or criminal
proceeding.” 941
Fombad has argued that despite the constitutional reforms that
took place in the Kingdom of Swaziland in 2005, which produced a
new constitution that “contains many progressive ideas,” 942 the
same constitution has retained “many of the features that have drawn
international attention to the excesses of the absolute and
authoritarian powers of the Swazi King.” 943 Thus, “[d]espite [the
new constitution’s] veneer of constitutionalism and constitutional
legitimacy, the new Constitution does little to protect the Swazis
against the excesses of the authoritarian tendencies and practices of
[the] King and his officials.” 944 Contrary to popular expectations,
the 2005 Constitution of Swaziland did not bring about a democratic
order to the country, nor did it establish a “functioning constitutional
monarchy;” 945 instead, the kingdom remains saddled with a
governance system in which the king retains absolute and
unchecked power. Also, the Swazi constitution provides what
appears to be a separation of powers. 946 In reality, however, the king
wields enormous powers and “clearly controls and dominates the
executive, the legislature[,] and the judiciary.” 947 For example, the
constitution allows the king to appoint the prime minister and

941
Id. The “iNgwenyama” is the title of the male ruler or King of
Eswatini. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT:
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 45
(1996).
942
Charles Manga Fombad, The Swaziland Constitution of 2005:
Can Absolutism Be Reconciled with Modern Constitutionalism?, 23 S. AFR.
J. HUM. RIGHTS 93, 93 (2007).
943
Id.
944
Id.
945
Id.
946
Chapter VI (§§ 64–78) of the Swazi Constitution deals with
executive powers; Chapter VII (§§ 79–131) deals with the legislature; and
Chapter VIII (§§ 138–161) deals with judiciary power. See CONSTITUTION
OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005).
947
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 105.
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cabinet ministers, 948 many of the members of parliament, 949 officers
of the judiciary, 950 and other senior members of the bureaucracy. 951
Although the constitution requires that the king consult his
advisory council before he appoints the prime minister, the
constitution does not state his absolute power in clear and
unambiguous terms. Instead, it states in § 65(4) that, “where the
King is required by the Constitution to exercise any function after
consultation with any person or authority, the King may or may not
exercise that function following that consultation.” 952 The king is,
in reality, not under any obligation either to consult anybody or
authority or, if he consults, to act on any advice received. 953
Unlike the Swazi Kingdom, the Kingdom of Lesotho is a
constitutional monarchy. According to § 44(1) of the Kingdom of
Lesotho constitution, “there shall be a King of Lesotho who shall be
a constitutional monarch and Head of State.” 954 As explained by
Fombad and Nwauche, the King of Lesotho, as a constitutional
monarch, is less likely than the Swazi King “to engage in any
activities that could incur liability.” 955 According to Human Rights
Watch:
Swaziland, ruled by absolute monarch King Mswati III
since 1986, continued to repress political dissent and
disregard human rights and rule of law principles in 2016.
Political parties remain banned, as they have been since
1973; the independence of the judiciary is severely
compromised; and repressive laws continued to be used to

CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005), art. 11.
Id. at art. 4(3), 95(1)(b).
950
Id. at art. 153(1).
951
See id. (§ 188(2) for the appointment of ambassadors; § 191(5)
for the appointment of the army commander and other commanders;
§ 190(4) for the appointment of the commissioner of correctional services;
§ 161(2) for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and
§ 207(2) for the appointment of the Auditor-General).
952
Id. at art. 65(4).
953
Id.
954
CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO (1993), § 44(1).
955
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 102.
948
949
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target critics of the government and the king despite the
2005 Swaziland Constitution guaranteeing basic rights. 956

3. Qualified Presidential Immunities
Several African constitutions, particularly those of the
continent’s Anglophone countries, contain clauses that provide
qualified presidential immunities for criminal liability. An example
can be found in the Constitution of Botswana:
Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the
office of President[,] no criminal proceedings shall be
instituted or continued against him or her in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done by him or her[,] either
in his or her official capacity or in his or her private
capacity. 957
Legal and constitutional scholars have argued that this
provision is so broad that it could allow a sitting president “to get
away with serious crimes committed whilst in office,” 958 including
“crimes committed in order to prolong his stay in power.” 959 This is
a very important point, especially when one considers the fact that
throughout the continent, in countries such as Algeria, 960

Swaziland: Events of 2016, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/swaziland (last
visited on Jan. 2, 2018).
957
CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, § 41(1) (amended
2006).
958
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103.
959
Id.
960
In 2008, the Algerian parliament approved a constitutional
amendment, which abolished presidential term limits and allowed President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third term in office. See Algeria Deputies
Scrap Term Limit, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2008, 3:07 PM), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7724635.stm.
956
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Burundi, 961 Cameroon, 962 Democratic Republic of Congo, 963
Republic of Congo, 964 The Gambia, 965 Rwanda, 966 and Uganda, 967

961
In 2018, Burundians approved a new constitution that ushered in
changes allowing President Pierre Nkurunziza to remain in office until
2034. See Burundi Approves New Constitution Extending Presidential Term
Limit, REUTERS (May 21, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-burundi-politics/burundi-approves-new-constitution-extendingpresidential-term-limit-idUSKCN1IM1QG.
962
In 2008, Cameroon’s National Assembly approved a
constitutional amendment clearing the way for President Paul Biya to run
for a third term in office. See Cameroon Assembly Clears Way for Biya
Third Term, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2008, 1:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSL10840480.
963
The president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph
Kabila, was supposed to leave office at the end of his second term in
December of 2016. However, he managed to postpone the elections that
were supposed to choose a replacement for him. The elections were
supposed to be held on November 27, 2016, but Kabila managed to
postpone them until December 2018, allowing him to serve an
unconstitutional term of two years. See generally John Mukum Mbaku, The
Postponed DRC elections: Behind the Tumultuous Politics, BROOKINGS
INST. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/
2016/11/18/the-postponed-drc-elections-behind-the-tumultuous-politics/;
John Mukum Mbaku, What Is at Stake in the DRC Presidential Election?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africain-focus/2018/08/29/what-is-at-stake-for-the-drc-presidential-election/.
The postponed elections were finally held on December 30, 2018 without
the participation of Kabila as a candidate for the presidency. See William
Clowes & Ignatius Ssuuna, Congo Votes for Successor to Kabila in LongDelayed Election, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 30, 2018, 2:09 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-30/congo-votes-forsuccessor-to-kabila-in-long-delayed-election.
964
In 2015, Congolese voters approved a constitutional amendment
that cleared the way for President Denis Sassou Nguesso to run for a third
consecutive term in office. See Philon Bondenga, Congo Votes by Landslide
to Allow Third Presidential Term, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2015, 3:13 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKCN0SL0JW2015
1027.
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incumbent presidents have gone to extraordinary lengths to prolong
their stay in power.
In some African constitutions, presidents are constitutionally
shielded from criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, these
immunities are usually not broad-based, but qualified to exempt
certain criminal activities. For example, Article 127(1) of the
Constitution of Angola states that “[t]he President of the Republic
shall not be liable for actions [taken] in the exercise of his functions,
except in the event of subordination, treason, and the crimes defined
in this Constitution as imprescriptible and ineligible for amnesty.” 968
Thus, while the president is granted immunity for crimes committed
while in office, that immunity does not extend to impeachable
offenses. 969 Similarly, Chapter Nine of Kenya’s 2010

After he lost the presidential election in December of 2016,
incumbent President Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office. See Alpha
Kamara, Gambian President Creates Crisis of Democracy by Refusing to
Step Down After Election Defeat, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/13/yahya-jammehgambia-president-refuses-to-leave-aft/. He was eventually chased out by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). See Kevin
Seiff, Gambia’s President Agrees to Step Down, Following Threat of
Military Intervention, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/africa/gambias-president-refuses-to-step-downdefying-regional-military-intervention/2017/01/20/098a0782-de94-11e68902610fe486791c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6bd15e73be5c.
966
In 2015, the people of Rwanda approved a constitutional
amendment allowing incumbent president, Paul Kagame, to run for a third
term; he will most likely remain in office until 2034. See Rwandan
President Paul Kagame to Run for Third Term in 2017, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1,
2016, 4:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwandapaul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes.
967
In 2017, the Ugandan Parliament passed a law changing the
constitution, allowing President Yoweri Museveni to extend his rule. See
Elias Biryabarema, Ugandan Parliament Passes Law Allowing Museveni to
Seek Reelection, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:47 AM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-uganda-politics/ugandan-parliament-passes-law-allowingmuseveni-to-seek-re-election-idUSKBN1EE17D.
968
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, art.
127 (1).
969
See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103.
965
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constitution, 970 which deals with “The Executive,” provides
protections for the president from legal proceedings. However,
§143(4) of Chapter Nine states: “The immunity of the President
under this Article shall not extend to a crime for which the President
may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and
which prohibits such immunity.” 971
Kenya’s qualified presidential immunity is important,
especially for understanding the extent to which a Kenyan president
can shield himself or herself from criminal prosecution for
violations of rights protected under international human rights
treaties, such as the ICCPR 972 and the ICESCR. 973 Within the
qualified presidential immunities provided by the Kenyan
constitution, a Kenyan president who violates a right protected by
an international human rights instrument, such as the ICCPR or the
ICESCR, can still be prosecuted and brought to justice for those
crimes. 974 Thus, in the case of Kenya’s presidential immunities, the
key to ensuring the protection of human rights is to make sure that
the country accedes to and becomes a State Party to the various
international human rights instruments.
While the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia grants the
President immunity from criminal prosecution for any crimes
committed while in office, it also grants the National Assembly the
authority to lift that immunity if it determines that it is in the
“interests of the State” to do so. 975 Although the Zambian Parliament

CONSTITUTION art.129–58, 4 (2010) (Kenya).
Id.at art. 143(4).
972
Kenya ratified the ICCPR on May 1, 1972. See UN TREATY BODY
DATABASE, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/
Treaty.aspx?CountryID=90&Lang=EN.
973
Kenya ratified the ICESPR on May 1, 1972. Id.
974
CONSTITUTION art. 143(4) (2010) (Kenya).
975
CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 43(2)–(3). On July 16, 2002, the
Zambian Parliament voted to lift the presidential immunity granted to
former president Frederick Chiluba so that he could be prosecuted for
corruption. A Zambian court later ruled that Parliament had acted within its
powers when it voted to strip Chiluba of the presidential immunity, which
he had enjoyed during his ten years in office. See Chiluba Stripped of
Presidential Immunity, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2002), https://mg.co.za/
article/2002-01-01-chiluba-stripped-of-presidential-immunity.
970
971
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was able to lift the immunity of their ex-president, Frederick
Chiluba, so that he could be prosecuted for corruption, the problem
with these types of qualified immunities is that in countries, such as
Cameroon, where the president’s party controls parliament, such
immunity may not be lifted to allow the prosecution of either a
sitting or ex-president. 976 Of course, a president who is afraid that
his immunity would be lifted after he leaves office might do
everything in his power to remain in power. 977
Although the Constitution of Angola grants qualified immunity
to presidents and ex-presidents, that immunity does not apply to
former presidents “who have been removed from office for reasons
of criminal liability.” 978 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana
only allows an ex-president to be subjected to criminal or civil
proceedings for crimes committed while in office within three years
after the person ceases to be President of the country. 979

976
In Cameroon, President Paul Biya’s party, the Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement (CPDM), has controlled the National Assembly
since it came into existence in 1966. See Ibrahim Mouiche, Multipartyism
and ‘Big Man’ Democracy in Cameroon, 1990–2011, in FRACTURES AND
RECONNECTIONS: CIVIC ACTION AND THE REDEFINITION OF AFRICAN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPACES: STUDIES IN HONOR OF PIET J. J. KONINGS
217, 221 (J. Abbink ed., 2012).
977
It has been argued that incumbent African presidents, such as Paul
Biya of Cameroon, are afraid to leave office for fear of being prosecuted for
their past criminal activities. See Is There Life after the Presidency?, BBC
NEWS (June 3, 2005, 3:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4607269.stm.
978
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010,
§ 133(3). The conditions under which a president can be removed from
office are listed and elaborated in § 129.
979
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended
1996), § 57(6). This limited window ignores the fact that many African
countries may not have the necessary resources and the capacity to fully
investigate and uncover the full range of the former president’s criminal
activities. In fact, many former presidents may still continue to have
significant impact on the political system. Hence, many victims of the
president’s crimes may be afraid to come forward and report his criminal
activities for fear of retribution.
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Although many African constitutions clearly elaborate the
terms under which a president may be prosecuted for crimes
committed while in office, these terms are still subject to
interpretation by the courts. Such judicial interpretation, illustrated
by the Nigerian case of Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of
Police, 980 can create or provoke significant levels of controversy. In
Fawehinmi, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the immunity
provided by § 308(1)(a) of the Constitution of Nigeria to the
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other specified
officials did not prevent or preclude the investigation made against
the president or any other official. 981 The Supreme Court made
clear, however, that in investigating such a complaint, individuals
who are protected by the constitution’s immunity provisions could
not be questioned until they had left office. 982

4. Presidential Immunities and Human Rights
Although one can argue that it is reasonable to shield a sitting
president from the vexations of politically motivated legal actions,
all of which may interfere with his or her ability to perform
constitutionally mandated or assigned functions, there may be
serious problems with presidential immunities, especially when they
relate to violations of human rights. First, it is argued that an
individual who is directly involved or complicit in the commission
of atrocities against his own people should not be allowed to remain
in office; furthermore, if the individual left office, the individual
should not be allowed to escape prosecution for his criminal
activities. 983 After all, supremacy of law should be the defining
characteristic of the legal architecture of a civilized society. Within
such a system, no one, not even the president, the head of state and
government, or other high-ranking officials should be above the law.
Without such an approach to presidential immunity, there is a very
high likelihood that many African presidents, granted immunity by
their national constitutions, will commit atrocities against their
citizens and escape being held accountable for these crimes. Within

980
981
982
983

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 102.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
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such a legal architecture, the violations of human rights will
continue unabated.
Second, a president who was a criminal before he came to office
is likely to continue his criminal activities; especially if the
constitution grants him immunity from prosecution. In addition, he
may not be interested in using his time in office to deepen,
strengthen, and institutionalize the country’s democracy. In fact,
such an immunized president may seek ways 984 to remain in office
indefinitely so that he could either continue to benefit from the
immunity granted by the constitution or effectively change the law
to escape all liability from prosecution.
For example, in 2008, Paul Biya, who has been the President of
the Republic of Cameroon since 1982 and whose party—the
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM)—controls the
National Assembly, had the constitution changed to immunize
himself from all crimes committed by himself while in office. 985

984
For example, he may change the constitution in order to prolong
his tenure in office. See id. at 103.
985
See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996,
§ 53. This section states that “[a]cts committed by the President of the
Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable
for them after the exercise of his functions.” Thus, as far as the national law
in Cameroon is concerned, Biya will never be held accountable for the
atrocities that he and his security forces committed against the people of the
country’s Anglophone Regions, especially given the Amended African
Court of Justice and Human Rights Statute’s immunity clause, which states
that “[n]o charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court
against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their
functions, during their tenure of office.” Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
AFR. UNION (June 27, 2014), at art. 46(A) (bis Immunities), https://au.int/
en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justiceand-human-rights. According to Article 11 of the Amended African Court
of Justice and Human Rights Statute, the “[p]rotocol and the [s]tatute
annexed to it shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) [m]ember [s]tates.” See id. at art.
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Then, there is Jacob Zuma, former president of South Africa who
was elected in May 2009. Before he became president, there were
allegations of corruption labelled against him; however, those
charges were “withdrawn by the National Prosecuting Authority
under dubious circumstances.” 986 As president, Zuma was
embroiled in corruption scandals involving the Nkandla 987 and
Gupta affairs. 988 Ultimately, Zuma was forced out of power on
February 14, 2018. 989 His regime was pervaded by high levels of
corruption and is said to have cost the South African economy an

11(1). As of January 3, 2019, only eleven states had signed the Protocol but
none had yet ratified and deposited their instruments; hence, the Protocol
has not yet entered into force. Thus, a president like Paul Biya, whose
national constitution has granted him immunity from criminal prosecution
for crimes committed during his tenure in office and who is not likely to be
prosecuted by the African Court of Justice and Human Rights because the
Article 46A immunity clause, would have to be prosecuted by the
International Criminal Court or a specially constituted court, as was the case
with Chad’s former president, Hissène Habré.
986
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103.
987
The Nkandla case involved allegations that then President Zuma
had corruptly used state funds to refurbish his private home outside the
municipality of Nkandla. See Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the
National Assembly and Others, CCT 143/15, Judgment (Constitutional
Court of South Africa, 2016); Democratic Alliance v. Speaker of the
National Assembly and Others, CCT 171/15, Judgment (Constitutional
Court of South Africa, 2016).
988
The Gupta Affair involved accusations that the South African
state, under President Zuma, had been captured by the powerful Gupta
family business empire. The allegations of state capture were investigated
by South Africa’s Public Protector, Thuli Madonseli. Her report was
released in 2016. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, STATE OF CAPTURE
(Rep. No. 6 of 2016/17, 2016); See also John Mukum Mbaku, Rule of Law,
State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
771 (2018).
989
South Africa's Jacob Zuma Resigns After Pressure from Party,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa43066443.
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estimated one trillion South African Rand (about U.S. $83
billion). 990
Finally, a president who considers himself above the law
because of the immunities granted to him by the constitution may
use his time in office and the absolute power granted to him to make
it extremely difficult for him to be prosecuted after he leaves office.
For example, he may bribe, intimidate, or use security forces to kill
potential witnesses against them. In addition, the president may use
the power granted him to change the constitution and remain in
power indefinitely. This action would effectively foreclose any
chance that he would be held accountable for his criminal activities.
Even if a president does not die in office and eventually retires, it
might be impossible to effectively prosecute him for his crimes. 991
In addition to the fact that many of the people who could possibly
testify against him may have died or left the jurisdiction, either
through voluntary or involuntary exile, they may no longer have an
accurate and reliable account of the events as they unfolded many
years ago. While records, especially those accumulated by NGOs
and private citizens during the president’s tenure, may help
prosecutors reconstruct events as they occurred when the crimes
were committed, they would not be enough to fully eliminate the
doubts created by the lack of accurate and reliable eye-witness
testimony; memory lapses, which are bound to occur in the case of
crimes committed during a tenure of many decades in power, are
likely to complicate or even frustrate post-tenure prosecutions.

See Lisa Steyn, Budget 2018 Is Zuma’s Costly Legacy, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2018), https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-23-budget2018-is-zumas-costly-legacy.
991
Paul Biya of Cameroon has been in power since 1982 and just
recently secured another seven-year term in office. Cameroon held another
presidential election on October 7, 2018, despite the fact that the
international community declared that the elections were neither free nor
fair, the country’s Constitutional Council declared incumbent Paul Biya as
the winner. That “win” extended his 36-year rule over Cameroon by seven
years. See Neil Munshi, Paul Biya Declared Winner of Cameroon’s
Disputed Presidential Poll, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/81903ce8-d5d6-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8.
990
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Presidential immunities limit the scope of accountability of
presidents and frustrate the promotion and protection of human
rights in Africa; but, can the courts intervene and minimize or curb
presidential impunity? In most African countries, it is often the case
that “finding presidents liable for wrongful acts or omissions
committed in office is not something that African judges will easily
do.” 992 Evidence shows that this problem exists, even in countries
such as Botswana, that are considered to have fully effective
democratic systems undergirded by independent judiciaries. 993
Take, for example, the case Motswaledi v. Botswana
Democratic Party and Others. 994 A split in the ruling–Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP) led to Ian Khama, the President of the BDP
and President of Botswana, suspending the membership of the
BDP’s Secretary-General. 995 The President’s decision to suspend
the party’s Secretary-General effectively prevented the latter from
running for a position in Parliament; a process that “tilted the
balance between competing factions within the party in favor of the
President’s faction.” 996 When the Secretary-General challenged the
legality of the action taken by the President to suspend the SecretaryGeneral of the BDP, the President successfully relied on § 41(1) of
the Constitution of Botswana, which states that:
Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the
office of President no criminal proceedings shall be
instituted or continued against him or her in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done by him or her either in
his or her official capacity or in his or her private capacity
and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in
respect of which relief is claimed against him or her in

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103.
See id.
994
See Motswaledi v. Botswana Democratic Party and Others,
(2009) 2 BLR 284 (CA).
995
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 13.
996
Id.
992
993
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respect of anything done or omitted to be done in his or her
private capacity. 997
In this case, the President of Botswana was using the immunity
granted him by the constitution to “unfairly neutrali[z]e political
opponents and violate the spirit of the Constitution which all
presidents take an oath to defend and protect.” 998 Fombad and
Nwauche argue that this practice is quite common in the
continent. 999 As indicated by the Botswana case, once the conduct
of a president “comes within the scope of the immunity, whether it
be absolute or qualified immunity, the president’s motive is
irrelevant; the immunity operates as a complete bar to the
action.” 1000 These presidential immunities effectively “override the
president’s permanent and fundamental duty as a citizen to act
within the law” 1001—that is, immunities place some officials above
the law and allow them to act with impunity.
In many countries, including those in Africa, the president is the
chief law enforcer and the individual responsible for protecting and
upholding the constitution. To successfully carry out this function,
the president must lead by example; hence, he cannot and should not
place himself above or outside the law. While it can be argued that
the president should be forgiven in the case where he acted outside
the law in an effort to protect national interests, he must bear the full
force of the law if he acted in his personal capacity and was doing
so to generate benefits for himself. Unfortunately, such an approach
is not likely to be useful, especially given the fact that it may be
difficult to determine with a significant level of certainty when the
president is acting on behalf of the country and when he is acting in
his personal capacity and for his own benefit.
But, could the problem of presidential abuse of power be
resolved through impeachment? The impeachment option is only
available if it is made possible by the national constitution. First,
many African constitutions, like that of Botswana, do not have

997
998
999
1000
1001

CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, § 41(1).
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 104.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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impeachment provisions. 1002 Second, even if the national
constitution has impeachment provisions, it is not likely that the
legislature would carry through with impeaching the president,
especially considering the fact that in many of these countries, the
president and his party control the legislature. Finally, the ground
for impeaching the president as provided for in the constitution may
be extremely narrow; for example, Article 53(1) of the Constitution
of the Republic of Cameroon limits the impeachment of the
president to treason. 1003

5. Impeachment Proceedings Against African Heads of
State as a Way to Deal with Presidential Abuse of Power
It has been suggested that in the African countries in which
national constitutions grant presidents immunity from criminal and
civil prosecution for crimes they commit while in office,
impeachment proceedings can be used to prevent such officials from
abusing their powers. As argued by Fombad and Nwauche,
“[i]mpeachment proceedings potentially provide the most potent
method of punishing abuse of office under modern African
constitutions.” 1004 In most of the Francophone African constitutions,
impeachment is the only way through which presidents can be held
accountable for crimes they commit while in office. Nevertheless,
in most of these constitutions a president can only be impeached for
treason, and impeachment proceedings are usually undertaken by a
special court of impeachment. Some of these countries refer to this
special court as the High Court of Justice. 1005

1002
1003

§ 53(1).

See generally CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, at

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 106.
According to Article 53(1) of the Cameroonian Constitution,
“[t]he Court of Impeachment shall have jurisdiction, in respect of acts
committed in the exercise of their functions, to try the President of the
Republic for high treason. . . .” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, art. 53(1) (amended 2008). In Chad, the Court of
1004
1005
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Unlike the constitutions of Gabon and Cameroon, those of other
Francophone countries provide more elaborate provisions. For
example, the Constitution of Burkina Faso provides that, in addition
to treason, the president can also be removed from office for any
violations of the constitution that involve misappropriating public
funds. 1006 The Constitution of the Republic of Chad also provides
for the removal from office of the President of the Republic for
treason. 1007 Specifically, the constitution states that “The President
is only responsible for acts accomplished in the exercise of his
functions in case of high treason.” 1008 The constitution then goes on
to define those crimes that fall within the single crime of “high
treason.” 1009 These include acts “infringing the republican form, the
uniqueness and secularity of the State, the sovereignty, the
independence and the integrity of the national territory. . .”; the
preceding acts are considered the crimes which collectively form the
single crime of “treason.” 1010 In addition, a president can be
removed from office for “grave and blatant violations of the rights
of Man, the misappropriation of public funds, bribery, extortion,
drug trafficking and the introduction of toxic or dangerous wastes,

Impeachment is called the High Court of Justice and consists of ten
Deputies, two members of the Constitutional Council, and three members
of the Supreme Court. See CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Apr.
4, 1996, art. 171–72 (Chad). See also CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE
GABONAISE Mar. 26, 1991, art. 78 (GABON).
1006 According to Article 138 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso,
“The High Court of Justice is competent to take cognizance of the acts
committed by the President of Faso in the exercise of his functions and
constituting high treason, of infringing the Constitution or of
misappropriation of public funds.” The High Court of Justice is a specially
constituted court to judge public officials and, according to Article 137, is
“composed of Deputies that the National Assembly elects after each general
renewal, as well as the magistrates designated by the President of the Court
of Cassation.” See CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO June 11, 1991, art.
137–38.
1007 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Apr. 4, 1996, art.
173 (Chad).
1008 Id.
1009 Id.
1010 Id.
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for their transit, deposit or storage on the national territory”—these
crimes are also associated with high treason. 1011
Impeachment proceedings in Anglophone and other nonFrancophone constitutions are usually more elaborate than those in
Francophone constitutions. Acts for which a president can be
impeached include: (1) “crimes of treason and espionage”; 1012 (2)
“crimes of subordination, fraudulent conversion of public money,
and corruption”; 1013 (3) abuse of office, willful violation of the oath
of allegiance or the President’s oath of office, or willful violation of
any provision of the constitution; (4) any conduct that “brings or is
likely to bring the office of the President into contempt or
disrepute”; 1014 (5) the president conducts himself in a manner
“prejudicial or inimical to the economy or the security of the
State”; 1015 (6) “where there are serious reasons for believing that the
President has committed a crime under national or international
law”; 1016 and (7) “gross misconduct.” 1017
Note that the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, which was
ratified in 2010, provides more generous grounds for impeaching
and removing the president from office. First, the president can be
impeached “where there are serious reasons for believing that” the
president has committed a crime under national or international
law. 1018 Including acts that are crimes under international law is very
important because a Kenyan president can be held accountable for
human rights violations that may not qualify as crimes under

1011
1012

129.

1013
1014

art. 67.

Id.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, art.
Id.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA Jan. 16, 1997,

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended
1996), art. 69(1)(b)(ii).
1016 CONSTITUTION art. 145(1)(b) (2010) (Kenya).
1017 Id. at art. 145(1)(c); see also S. AFR. CONST., First Amendment
Act of 1997, art. 89(1)(b).
1018 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, Aug. 27, 2010, art.
145(1)(b).
1015
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Kenyan law but are violations of provisions of international human
rights instruments.
Under the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, it is
an impeachable crime for the President of the United Republic to
commit “acts which generally violate [the] Constitution or [the] law
concerning the ethics of public leaders” or “acts which contravene
the conditions concerning the registration of political parties
specified in Article 20(2) of [the] Constitution.” 1019 Once the
National Assembly of the United Republic of Tanzania “passes the
motion to constitute a Special Committee of Inquiry” to investigate
“charges brought” against the President, “the President shall be
deemed to be out of office.” 1020 The Constitution of the Republic of
Chad also requires that any president under impeachment
proceedings should be temporarily suspended from performing his
official functions. It states, at Article 175, that “The President of the
Republic and the members of the Government are suspended from
their functions in case of impeachment.” 1021 In Tanzania, as is the
case in several other Anglophone African countries, a supermajority
of two thirds of all the members of Parliament is required for the
impeachment of the President. 1022
Article 107 of the Ugandan constitution lists most of the crimes
mentioned above as impeachable offenses which could result in the
removal of a president from office. 1023 In the last several years,
Uganda’s president has been accused of a number of crimes covered
under Article 107, such as embezzlement and frequent violations of
the Constitution of Uganda. Some of these constitutional violations
include changing the constitution to prolong his presidential term,
regularly harassing opposition party members, and election rigging.

1019 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Apr.
1977, art. 46A(2)(a)–(b).
1020 Id. at art. 46A(5).
1021 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Apr. 4, 1996,
175 (Chad).
1022 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Apr.
1977, art. 46A(3)(b).
1023 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Oct. 8, 1995,
107.

26,
art.
26,
art.
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Despite all this, the president has yet to be impeached for any of the
above offenses. 1024
Scholars of law and economics have identified several factors
to explain why countries with elaborate impeachment provisions in
their constitutions, such as Uganda, have failed to utilize them to
remove from office recalcitrant and ineffective presidents. This
includes those presidents who have clearly committed impeachable
offenses. First, as is the case in other countries around the world,
impeachment is a political process rather than a legal process. In
Africa, where most political systems are poorly developed and are
still in their embryonic stages, these countries are yet to provide
themselves with the type of democratic institutions that can
undertake a credible and effective impeachment process. Without
legislatures that are fully independent of the executive and which
are supported by a robust and politically active civil society, it is not
likely that the impeachment provisions made possible by the
constitution can be utilized to remove a president who has
committed impeachable offenses from office.
Fombad and Nwauche argue that “the progressive
institutionalization of dominant parties” 1025 make impeachment of
presidents either very difficult or virtually impossible. Many of
these constitutions previously imposed term limits as a way to

1024 See, e.g., Emmanuel Mutaizibwa Uganda: Temples of Injustice,
ALJAZEERA (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:42 AM), https://www.aljazeera.com/
programmes/africainvestigates/2014/12/uganda-temples-injustice-2014129
13517224628.html; Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, Corruption Endemic in
Uganda, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2009, 8:48 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/katine/2009/mar/13/corruption-endemic-in-uganda; Uganda:
Undermined, Global Witness, Briefing Paper (June 5, 2017) https://www.
globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined
/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-6677Lbc3wIVxh6tBh1Z6whiEAMYASAAEg
LWlPD_BwE; Uganda Is the Worst Place in East Africa for Bribery,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2012), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=
1579517542&Country=Uganda&topic.
1025 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
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provide for the regular “alternation of power.” 1026 However, most
have since removed these limits and opened the way “for life
presidents and impunity.” 1027
Second, even where countries have not removed term limits
through opportunistic constitutional amendments, a country’s
political domination by a single, highly entrenched political party
and its inability to provide viable opposition political parties means
that the outgoing imperial president is likely to be replaced by
another one. 1028 Under such conditions, impunity will continue and
there is no likelihood that impeachment proceedings will be used to
remove a president who commits impeachable offenses. Nor will
any effort be made to prosecute a former president for crimes
committed while in office even if the constitution allows for such
prosecutions to take place. 1029
Zambia and Malawi present rare exceptions—in these
countries, incoming presidents from the same political party as the
outgoing presidents have attempted “to hold their predecessor

Id. During the last few years, presidents have successfully carried
out constitutional amendments to eliminate term limits, ignored term limits,
or have simply not held elections. Some countries, such as The Gambia,
Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Morocco have never introduced presidential term
limits. See Cheryl Hendricks & Gabriel Ngah Kiven, Presidential Term
Limits: Slippery Slope Back to Authoritarianism in Africa, THE
CONVERSATION (May 17, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://theconversation.com/
presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa96796.
1027 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
1028 Id. Consider the fact that in Cameroon, for example, the ruling
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) has dominated politics
in the country since 1966; in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement
has dominated politics in the country since 1986; in Rwanda, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front has dominated national politics since 1994, just to name a
few.
1029 See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
1026
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accountable for their misdeeds in power.” 1030 However, the
continent has tended towards incoming presidents not holding their
predecessors accountable for their crimes in office out of fear that
they too might have to be dragged into court under similar
circumstances when they eventually leave office. Some scholars
have termed this a culture of “scratch my back, I scratch your back,”
which they believe will ensure that “present and future African
strong men can continue to be as tyrannical, corrupt, repressive[,]
and incompetent as ever and can expect to get away with it.” 1031 Two
important developments make this gloomy assessment not as
gloomy as it appears: The first one is the expanding reach of
international law, as embodied in the ICC’s efforts to prosecute
individuals, including African officials, who commit international
crimes; the embrace by the international community, including the
AU of the R2P doctrine; and the successful efforts by many African
States to either incorporate provisions of international human rights
instruments directly into their constitutions or require that domestic
courts must recognize or consider international law (including
international human rights law) when interpreting the domestic
constitution. 1032 In fact, the successful prosecution of the former

1030 Id.; see also David Smith, Former Zambian President Faces Jail
in Unprecedented Corruption Trial, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2009, 10:24 AM)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/13/zambia-frederickchiluba-corruption-trial (stating that Frederick Chiluba is believed to be the
first African leader prosecuted in his own country for embezzling public
funds); Malawi Ex-President, Joyce Banda, Wanted by Police over $250m
Corruption Case, AFRICANEWS (July 31, 2017) http://www.africanews.com/
2017/07/31/malawi-ex-president-joyce-banda-wanted-by-police-over250m-corruption/ (indicating the investigation of former president, Joyce
Banda, for alleged involvement in corruption schemes while in office).
1031 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
1032 Id. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, states that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum—(b) must consider international law.” S. AFR. CONST., First
Amendment Act of 1997, art. 39(1)(b). In the Constitution of Bénin
Republic, it is stated as follows: “WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE Reaffirm
our attachment to the principles of democracy and human rights as they
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presidents of Liberia 1033 and Chad 1034 proved to Africans that it is
possible to overcome various institutional impediments and bring

have been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization of African
Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986 and whose provisions make
up an integral part of this present Constitution and of Bénisese law and have
a value superior to the internal law . . . .” Bénin, hence, has created, from
various international human rights instruments, rights that are justiciable in
Béninese courts. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2,
1990, pmbl.
1033 Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, was tried before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and convicted on eleven charges arising from
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law, committed from November 30, 1998, to
January 18, 2002, during the course of the civil war in Sierra Leone. See
Owen Bowcott & Monica Mark, Charles Taylor Found Guilty of Abetting
Sierra Leone War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2012/apr/26/charles-taylor-guilty-war-crimes.
The
Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002 as the result of a
request to the UN in 2000 by the Government of Sierra Leone, which was
seeking a special court to address the atrocities and serious crimes against
civilians and UN peacekeepers committed during the country’s civil war,
which lasted from 1991 to 2002. See The Residual Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the SCSL Public Archives, Freetown and the Hague, RESIDUAL
SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited on Feb.
21, 2021). See also Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, U.N. DOC. S/2002/246 (Jan. 16, 2002).
1034 The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegal Court
System tried and convicted Hissène Habré, former president of the Republic
of Chad, for international crimes committed between June 7, 1982, and
December 1, 1990, the period during which he was in office as president of
Chad. Habré was found guilty of crimes against humanity, summary
execution, torture, and rape. Ruth Maclean, Chad’s Hissène Habré Found
Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016, 1:22 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/chad-hissene-habreguilty-crimes-against-humanity-senegal. Habré’s trial started on July 20,
2015, and a verdict was delivered on May 30, 2016. The Extraordinary
African Chambers was a tribunal established under an agreement between
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presidents and other public officials who abuse their powers to
justice.
The second development is that robust and politically active
civil societies are emerging in many countries throughout the
continent and functioning as important checks on the exercise of
government power. In countries such as Burkina Faso and South
Africa, civil societies and their organizations have become
important constraints to government impunity. For example, it was
protests by civil society groups that prevented former Burkinabè
president, Blaise Compaoré, from unconstitutionally extending his
tenure. 1035 With respect to post-apartheid South Africa, when the
government of President Jacob Zuma took unilateral action without
parliamentary approval—as required by the constitution—to
withdraw from the ICC, it was a civil society organization 1036 that

the AU and Senegal to adjudicate international crimes that were committed
in Chad from June 7, 1982, to December 1, 1990. Id. This is the period
during which Hissène Habré was president of the Republic of Chad. The
court was authorized by the Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers.
See Relatif au Statut des Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires pour la
Poursuite des Crimes Internationaux Commis au Tchad durant la Periode
du 7 Juin 1982 au 1er décembre 1990 [Statute of the Extraordinary African
Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system for the prosecution of
international crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Chad
during the period from 7 June 1982 to 1 December 1990], http://www.
chambresafricaines.org/pdf/Avenant-Statut%20CAE-Habre.pdf.
1035 See John Mukum Mbaku, Burkina Faso Protests Extending
Presidential Term Limits, BROOKINGS INST., (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/30/burkina-faso-protestsextending-presidential-term-limits/.
1036 The legal action was initiated in 2016 by the Democratic Alliance
(DA), an opposition political party, after the African National Congress
(ANC)-led government under Zuma moved to withdraw the country from
the Rome Statute. The DA argued that the action to withdraw the country
from the Rome Statute was not constitutional because the South African
Parliament was not consulted as required by the country’s constitution. See
Christopher Torchia, South African Court Blocks Government’s
International Criminal Court Withdrawal Bid, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 22,
2017, 7:45 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa
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brought legal action which eventually forced the government to
abandon the effort to take the country out of the Rome Statute. 1037

C. ENDING IMPUNITY FOR THE ABUSE AND
MISUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS IN AFRICA
In virtually all the African colonies, the people and their leaders
approached decolonization and independence “without taking
cognizance of the dangers posed by unconstrained government.” 1038
Two particular areas of the decolonization process not given
appropriate consideration were constitution making and the
transformation of the critical domains—specifically, the political,
administrative, and judicial foundations of the state. Constitution
making was top-down, elite driven, and nonparticipatory. Hence, it
produced institutional arrangements that failed to fully and
effectively constrain civil servants and political elites and prevent
them from acting with impunity. 1039 Among the political elites not
adequately constrained by the laws and institutions that African
countries adopted upon independence was the president. In fact, in
the Francophone countries, independence and post-independence
laws and institutions established imperial presidencies with
significant powers. These presidencies would eventually come to
dominate the other branches of government and allow those who
served in them to commit atrocities against their fellow citizens with
impunity. 1040
Without effective mechanisms to check the exercise of
presidential power, the individuals who captured the presidency in
these countries were able to engage in various activities (e.g.,

/international-criminal-court-icc-withdrawal-south-africa-racist-jacobzuma-president-a7594346.html. See Democratic All. v. Minister of Int’l
Rels. & Cooperation, 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP), (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.
org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.html.
1037 Robbie Gramer, South African Court Tells Government It Can’t
Withdraw from the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/22/south-african-court-tells-government-itcant-withdraw-from-the-icc/.
1038 MBAKU, supra note 41, at 9.
1039 See, e.g., id. at 8–14.
1040 See, e.g., id. at 9–14; see also Prempeh, supra note 897.
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corruption) to enrich themselves, their families, and their
benefactors. 1041 They proceeded to strengthen their political
positions by destroying their opposition and manipulating the
constitution and electoral laws to remain in power indefinitely. 1042
There was fear that, if they lost their political positions, the political
elite would not only lose the wealth they had illegally accumulated
over the years, but could also lose their lives. Thus, in countries such

See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 734 (examining, inter alia, the
pervasiveness of corruption in African countries).
1042 For example, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of Côte
d’Ivoire, remained in office from independence in 1960 until his death on
December 7, 1993. See, e.g., FRÉDÉRIC GRAH MEL, FÉLIX HOUPHOUËTBOIGNY: LA FIN ET LA SUITE (2010). Mobutu Sese Seko seized control of the
government of the then Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1965
and established a totalitarian regime until he was forced out of office in May
1997 by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des Forces démocratiques pour la
Libération du Congo-Zaire). See, e.g., JEAN-LOUIS PETA IKAMBANA,
MOBUTU’S TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS
(2007). Paul Biya took over as President of the Republic of Cameroon from
Ahmadou Ahidjo, the country’s first president, in November 1982, and
remains the country’s executive to this day. See, e.g., POST-COLONIAL
CAMEROON: POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY (Joseph Takougang &
Julius A. Amin eds., 2018).
1041
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as Cameroon, 1043 Uganda, 1044 and Burundi, 1045 these imperial
presidents not only became increasingly “paranoid and

In Cameroon, incumbent President of the Republic, Paul Biya,
who has been in power since 1982, has used extreme violence to deal with
anyone who has attempted to change the status quo, including even
individuals who have used peaceful means to challenge his hegemonic
control of the political system. Julius Agbor & John Mukum Mbaku, The
Problem of Political Transitions in Africa: The Cameroon Question,
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/theproblem-of-political-transitions-in-africa-the-cameroon-question/. In fact,
in late 2016, when Anglophone teachers and lawyers took to the streets to
peacefully protest the marginalization of the Anglophones by the
Francophone-dominated central government, Biya responded with extreme
violence—his security forces invaded the Anglophone Regions and killed
many protesters and burned their villages. See Siobhán O’Grady, Cameroon
Is Spiraling Further into Violence, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018, 12:59 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/26/cameroon-isspiraling-further-into-violence/?utm_term=.694ff7332d7b.
1044 In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power
since 1986, has used violence, intimidation and oppression of opposition
politicians, corruption, and manipulation of constitutional amendment
processes, to remain in power indefinitely. See Justin Willis, Gabrielle
Lynch, & Nic Cheeseman, After Mugabe, All Eyes Are on Uganda’s
Museveni: How Long Can He Cling to Power?, QUARTZ AFR. (Nov. 23,
2017),
https://qz.com/africa/1136979/after-mugabe-all-eyes-are-onugandas-museveni-how-long-can-he-cling-to-power/.
1045 In Burundi in 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza, who had been
president since 2005, was nominated by his political party, the National
Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of
Democracy (CNDD-FDD), for a third term in office. There was wide
agreement throughout Burundi that President Nkurunziza had served his
mandate and was constitutionally barred from standing for another term in
office. Protests followed the announcement of his intention to run for
president again. Many people were killed by government forces and amidst
a boycott of the election by the opposition; Nkurunziza won the July 2015
presidential election. Burundi Elections: Pierre Nkurunziza Wins Third
Term, BBC NEWS (July 24, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-33658796. On May 21, 2018, a new constitution was approved,
effectively allowing Nkurunziza to remain in office until 2034. Eric Oteng,
1043
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oppressive,” 1046 but they also began to devote virtually all of their
time and their countries’ national resources to regime survival while
neglecting critical issues (e.g., poverty alleviation and economic
development). 1047
In order to deal with presidential impunity and greatly enhance
the protection of human rights, each African country must provide
itself with institutional arrangements undergirded by the rule of law.
These are institutional mechanisms that can adequately constrain
civil servants and political elites, prevent the elites from committing
crimes with impunity, and further make it much more difficult for
elites to entrench themselves once they are in power. First, each
country must establish a governing process characterized by “a
separation of powers, with effective checks and balances.” 1048

Burundi’s Controversial Referendum Set for May 17, AFR. NEWS (Mar. 18,
2018), https://www.africanews.com/2018/03/18/burundi-s-controversialreferendum-to-take-place-on-may-17/.
Nevertheless,
Nkurunziza
announced on June 7, 2018 that he will leave office after the 2020 election.
Desire Nimubona, Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza Pledges to Step
Down in 2020, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2018, 8:44 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/burundi-presidentpierre-nkurunziza-pledges-to-step-down-in-2020. It is possible, of course,
that he might follow Joseph Kabila’s example and postpone the elections
indefinitely to allow him to remain in power. Kabila was supposed to leave
office as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo after presidential
elections at the end of 2016. Joseph Kabila Says He Will Not Run Again in
Congo, ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.economist.com/middleeast-and-africa/2018/08/09/joseph-kabila-says-he-will-not-run-again-incongo. However, he postponed the elections for two years and was able to
unconstitutionally remain in office for that period of time. Id.
1046 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
1047 As argued by John Mukum Mbaku, “[p]re-occupation with crisis
management and political survival at all cost has made it very difficult for
many post-independence governments in Africa to place appropriate
emphasis on economic and human development, the elimination of poverty
and deprivation, protection of the environment and the nation’s
environmental resources, and the improvement of the quality of life for
historically marginalized groups and communities, especially women and
children, as well as rural peasants.” JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 96–97 (2004).
1048 See MBAKU, supra note 800, at 60.
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Within such a governing process, the structure of government must
reflect that division of labor. For example, there should be “a strong
bicameral legislature to counter the powers of the presidency” 1049—
this should prevent the eventual emergence of an imperial
presidency, which could become a significant threat to peace and
security. Specifically, the people should use the national constitution
to create separate branches of government—executive, legislative,
and judicial—define each branch’s powers, and impose limits on the
exercise of those powers. 1050
Given the tendency of many African presidents to use the
judiciary as a tool to undermine their political opponents and
enhance their ability to remain in power indefinitely, it is critical that
the judiciary be truly independent of the other branches of the
government. The judiciary must be independent enough to be able
to “confront other branches of the federal government or the
states” 1051 and adjudicate cases without undue political influence. At
the very minimum, the judiciary must have “security of tenure,”
financial security free from “arbitrary interference by the Executive
in a manner that could affect judicial independence,” “institutional
independence with respect to the judicial function . . . ,” and
“judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly
and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function.” 1052
Second, there must be a robust civil society—one that is
politically active and capable of effectively checking the exercise of
presidential power. For example, a politically active civil society
that works with the country’s independent judiciary can frustrate

1049

See id.
See id. at 61.
1051 Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France
and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21, 44 (1997).
1052 Valente v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 675–76, 712 (Can.).
This is the Canadian Supreme Court case that set the minimum requirements
for judicial independence in Canada. South Africa’s highest court, the
Constitutional Court, in its ruling in De Lange v. Smuts, adopted the
Canadian Supreme Court’s standard for judicial independence. See De
Lange v. Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Van Rooyen v.
The State 2002 (5) SA 24 (CC), at ¶ 18 (S. Afr.) (emphasizing the
independence of the courts).
1050
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efforts by a president to entrench himself or engage in activities that
violate human and peoples’ rights. 1053 In South Africa, for example,
the media was very important in making possible the investigation
of the Zuma government for the possibility that it had been corruptly
captured by business interests. 1054
Fourth, the scope of presidential powers and presidential
immunities must be severely limited constitutionally. Legal scholars
have argued that in order to effectively “curb the pervasive abuse of
[presidential] powers that has continued under the post 1990
constitutional dispensations,” 1055 each African country needs to
reexamine at least three aspects of presidential powers. The first one
is to regulate the power of presidential appointments. 1056 As argued
by Fombad and Nwauche, “[s]pecific criteria must be laid down to
ensure that all presidential appointments, especially for senior
positions in the military, the public service and the judiciary are
informed by clearly defined objective criteria based on experience,
expertise and qualifications . . . .” 1057 In addition to the fact that such
constraints will limit the ability of the president to entrench himself,
they will also minimize the ability of the president to bring into
government individuals who are likely to help him violate the rights
of citizens with impunity. Along these lines, public or semi-public
commissions, whose job it is to recommend candidates for

1053 For example, it was civil society and one of its organizations—
the political party called the Democratic Alliance (DA)—that brought legal
action against the Jacob Zuma government when the latter acted
unconstitutionally to withdraw the country from the Rome Statute. Through
this process, the DA was able to stop efforts by Zuma and his government
to act outside the law. See, e.g., Merrit Kennedy, Court Blocks South
Africa’s Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, NPR (Feb. 22,
2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/
516620190/court-blocks-south-africas-withdrawal-from-internationalcriminal-court.
1054 See, e.g., Tshidi Madia, State Capture Inquiry: How We Got
Here, NEWS24 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.news24.com/Analysis/statecapture-inquiry-how-we-got-to-this-point-20180820.
1055 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 106.
1056 Id.
1057 Id.
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appointment by the president to positions in the government, 1058
must be sufficiently independent to minimize manipulation by the
president. 1059 The president must be effectively prevented from
politicizing the appointment process and putting into office his
political supporters instead of individuals who are qualified to
perform the jobs or functions in question.
The second aspect of presidential power that must be curbed is
to rid the country of the imperial presidency. The excessive
concentration of power in the presidency is antithetical to the
practice of constitutionalism and constitutional government and
must not be allowed to continue. Each country must use the
constitutional design process to decentralize power away from the
center, and instead, favor sub-national units by establishing some
form of federalism. The latter form of government is very important,
especially in complex multiethnic countries, such as Cameroon,
Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Africa. 1060 In addition,
the Francophone countries, virtually all of which accepted de
Gaulle’s constitution, 1061 and hence, must overcome the Gallic
preoccupation with centralization of political powers and establish
sub-national governments that provide local communities with the
opportunity and wherewithal to choose their own leaders and
manage their own affairs.
The third issue that these countries must deal with is to prevent
presidents from manipulating the constitution to extend their
constitutional mandates. In the post-1990 period, many countries in
Africa adopted new constitutions that imposed term limits on the
presidency. 1062 This constitutional innovation was supposed to help

1058 Id. For example, Higher Council of Magistracy in and the
Francophone countries and the Judicial Service Commission in the
Anglophone countries.
1059 Id.
1060 See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 800; see also MWANGI S. KIMENYI,
ETHNIC DIVERSITY, LIBERTY AND THE STATE: THE AFRICAN DILEMMA
(1997) (arguing, inter alia, that federalism can more effectively manage and
accommodate ethnocultural diversity in the African countries).
1061 That is, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic or French
Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958.
1062 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 107.
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these countries deepen and institutionalize their democracies.
Unfortunately, because of relatively weak amendment procedures in
the constitutions of many of these countries, their presidents were
able to easily amend national constitutions to eliminate term limits
and prolong their mandates. 1063 The problem in many African
countries today is that the mechanism provided for amending the
constitution is one which can easily be manipulated by the president
to eliminate any constraints on him, including term limits. As argued
by constitutional scholar, Jon Elster, there needs to be a balance
struck between “rigidity and flexibility.” 1064 This can be achieved
through many ways—the constitutional drafters can impose on the
people the condition that the constitution can only be changed by a
given qualified majority. 1065 For example, South Africa’s postapartheid constitution mandates that any bill put forth to amend the
constitution must be supported by at least 75% of the National
Assembly and at least six of the country’s nine provinces. 1066 In
Cameroon, on the other hand, the constitution can be amended by

For example, presidents in Algeria, Cameroon, Burundi, Republic
of Congo, Tunisia, Uganda, and several other countries were able to change
their constitutions to get rid of term limits and continue to remain in power.
See generally Takudzwa Hillary Chiwanza, African Presidents and Their
Love for Changing the Constitutions, AFR. EXPONENT (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8604-african-presdidents-arealways-chaging-their-constitutions; Isaac Mufumba, Presidents Who
Amended Constitution to Stay in Power, DAILY MONITOR (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Presidents-whoamended-constitution-to-stay-in-power/689844-4099104-qj5n58z/
index.html; Tonny Onyulo, How these African Leaders Subvert Democracy
to Cling to Power for Life, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2017, 9:17 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/10/23/haging-africanleaders-cling-power-through-corruption-constitutional-changes-andfraudulent-election/771984001/.
1064 Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 470 (1991).
1065 Id.
1066 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74(a)–(b).
1063
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Parliament alone. 1067 This is why Paul Biya, the country’s president,
was able to easily convince a National Assembly controlled by his
political party—the CPDM—to amend the constitution in 2008 and
grant him a third term in office, as well as immunity for any crimes
that he might commit while in office. 1068
Constitutional drafters could impose what Elster refers to as a
“cooling device” or period, which would require that two successive
legislatures or parliaments approve any amendments to the
constitution. 1069 According to Elster, “delays [in the amendment
process] protect society against itself, by forcing passionate
majorities, whether simple or qualified, to cool down and
reconsider.” 1070 In addition, as provided in the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, all bills put forth to amend the constitution
can only be considered successful if they have been approved by the
Parliament and also by the assemblies of the states or provinces. 1071
Drafters may also choose to place the responsibility to amend the
constitution in the hands of specially constituted or convened
assemblies, such as the Sovereign National Conference that was
common in West Africa during the prodemocracy uprisings of the
late-to-mid-1990s. 1072
With respect to presidential immunity, one can argue that this
is a necessary constitutional tool to enhance the ability of the
president to perform his or her public functions without fear of being
dragged to court, either while they are in office or afterwards.
Supporters of immunity for presidents in Africa argue that

See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996,
art. 63(1)–(2) (amended 2008). According to Article 63(1), “[a]mendments
to the Constitution may be proposed either by the President of the Republic
or by Parliament” and according to Article 63(2), “[t]he amendment shall
be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of Parliament.”
1068 See id. at art. 6(2) & 53(3).
1069 Elster, supra note 1064, at 470.
1070 Id.
1071 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74.
1072 See generally Pearl T. Robinson, The National Conference
Phenomenon in Francophone Africa, 36 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST.
575, 575–610 (1994).
1067
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“[p]rosecuting sitting heads of state . . . undermines stability.” 1073
Nevertheless, those who argue that African presidents should be
granted immunity with respect to both civil and criminal
proceedings, also say that that immunity should not be allowed to
“become a license for abuse of powers” 1074 and engagement in
behaviors or acts that violate human rights. Supporters of
presidential immunities further add that certain exemptions should
be made and these include:
i) Crimes or wrongs committed before the president
assumed office. To reduce the risk of corrupt leadership,
the presidential office should be reserved [only] for those
who have a clean record and not those who want to use the
office to escape liability for their past misdeeds.
ii) Any private act that amounts to abuse of the official
position for private ends as well as any act that violates the
spirit of the Constitution.
iii) Immunity should be limited only to those acts, whether
private or official that are in bona fide exercise of the
presidential duties. Courts should have the discretion to
deny immunity where they come to the conclusion that the
action will not materially affect the president’s ability to
defend his interests, nor significantly harm national
interests or interfere with the proper discharge of his
duties. 1075

1073 Sofia Christensen, Should African Presidents Have Immunity
from Prosecution?, VOA NEWS (June 1, 2017, 11:30 PM), https://www.
voanews.com/a/african-president-immunity-from-prosecution/3883794.html.
1074 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 107.
1075 Id. at 18. Fombad and Nwauche argue that had these principles
been followed in Botswana, the country’s Court of Appeal would not have
ruled in favor of the President of Botswana and allowed him to use
presidential immunity to oust his political rivals. See Motswaledi v.
Botswana Democratic Party and Others, 2 BLR 284 CA (2009).
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It has also been suggested that “civil recovery action,” 1076 such
as that which was used to recover the public funds illegally
appropriated by former African presidents, such as Nigerian
dictator, Sani Abacha, and Zambian president, Frederick Chiluba,
could be a solution. 1077 In addition to the fact that this approach
allows the country to recover funds that have been looted by the
president and, hence, deprive him of the opportunity to enjoy the
fruits of his illegal activities, it can also serve to deter presidential
corruption. Given the fact that this is not a criminal process, the
burden of proof is lower and hence, may be much easier to
accomplish. Nevertheless, success will require the cooperation of
the international community, especially since most African
presidents who rob their state treasuries usually hide their ill-gotten
gains in foreign banks. 1078 Successful recovery of public funds
stolen by former African presidents should contribute, not just to
development in the continent, as these funds can be used to invest in
growth-supporting infrastructures, but can also help in the
continent’s fight against corruption. 1079
In the post-independence period, many African presidents have
used the “principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the
domestic affairs of states, enshrined in both the Charter of the United
Nations and that of the OAU,” 1080 to abuse the power of their public
positions with impunity. Nevertheless, beginning with the UDHR
on December 10, 1948, the international community has imposed
constraints on the ability of States and national governments to act

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108.
See John Hatchard, Strengthening Presidential Accountability:
Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai & Others, 5 J.
COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDU. 69 (2007).
1078 See John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight
Against Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
661, 750 (2016) (emphasizing, inter alia, the importance of international
cooperation to the fight against corruption in Africa).
1079 See id. (examining, inter alia, the importance of recovering of
Africa’s stolen assets to poverty alleviation efforts and development in the
continent).
1080 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 111.
1076
1077
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without regard to the rights of their citizens. 1081 What the UDHR
and subsequent international human rights instruments 1082 did was
to lay down minimum standards of human rights protection.
International human rights instruments have been supplemented by
regional instruments, which deal with human rights protection in
specific regions of the world. 1083 The Banjul Charter was adopted
on June 27, 1981 and entered into force on October 21, 1986. 1084
The Banjul Charter established the African Commission and
charged the commission with protecting and promoting human and
peoples’ rights in Africa, in addition to interpreting the Banjul
Charter.
Many African countries have voluntarily signed and ratified
various international human rights treaties. By doing so, they have
accepted certain obligations with respect to the protection and
promotion of human rights. In addition, during the last several
decades many regional and international frameworks have emerged
to pressure African political leaders to “conform to certain
constitutional standards of governance,” 1085 which include
“[d]emocracy, good governance, respect for the rule of law and
respect for human rights.” 1086
Unlike its predecessor, the OAU, the AU can intervene in
member states under Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act in respect
to “grave circumstances,” which include “war crimes, genocide[,]
and crimes against humanity.” 1087 In addition, Article 4(o) of the
Constitutive Act rejects “impunity and political assassination.” 1088
Article 4(p) also condemns and rejects “unconstitutional changes of
governments.” 1089 These provisions give the AU the legal authority
to prevent abuse of presidential power, for example, through

See G.A Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948).
1082 For example, the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
1083 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 109.
1084 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93.
1085 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 112.
1086 Id.
1087 AU Constitutive Act, art. 4(h).
1088 Id. at art. 4(o).
1089 Id. at art. 4(p).
1081
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attempts by presidents to use violence, including the commission of
atrocities against their fellow citizens, to prolong the president’s stay
in power. 1090 Unfortunately, in the past, the AU has not been as
eager to intervene or condemn powerful countries such as Egypt, as
it has smaller countries like The Gambia 1091 and Comoros, 1092 which
have inferior militaries. In 2008, the AU ordered intervention in the
Comoros to restore democracy after a coup d’état but refrained from
taking action in Egypt after the military overthrew the
democratically elected Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013. 1093
Although the AU suspended Egypt’s membership in the
organization and treated Morsi’s overthrow as an unconstitutional
change of government, no effort was made to ensure the return of
the country’s democratically elected president to power. 1094 In fact,
the AU-imposed suspension was lifted after general elections to

See Solomon Ayele Dersso, The AU on Egypt: Between a Rock
and a Hard Place?, INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (June 6, 2014),
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-au-on-egypt-between-a-rock-and-a-hardplace (examining, inter alia, the AU’s inability to pursue, in Egypt, a policy
consistent with its principles, as outlined in its Constitutive Act).
1091 When then President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh lost the Dec.
1, 2016, presidential election to opposition candidate, Adama Barrow.
Jammeh refused to leave office and allow for a peaceful transition. Local,
regional, and international organizations condemned President Jammeh’s
actions. The AU did not just condemn Jammeh’s decision not to relinquish
power but supported the decision of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) to use all means necessary, including military
force, to respect the will of the people of The Gambia. See Constitutional
Coups, supra note 72, at 167–74.
1092 See Simon Massey & Bruce Baker, Comoros: External
Involvement in a Small Island State, Chatham House, Programme Paper
AFP 2009/1, July 2009, (examining, inter alia, AU intervention in the
Comoros); Paul D. Williams, The African Union’s Peace Operations: A
Comparative Analysis, 2 AFR. SEC. 97, 105 (2009) (examining, inter alia,
the AU’s intervention efforts to restore democracy in the Comoros).
1093 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi
Is Taken into Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), https://www.ny
times.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html.
1094 See Dersso, supra note 1090.
1090
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elect a new government in Egypt. 1095 The AU never applied Article
25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance, which mandates that “the perpetrators of
unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to
participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold
any position of responsibility in political institutions of their
State.” 1096 General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the president Egyptians
elected in the aftermath of the military coup was actually involved
in the military overthrow of Mohamed Morsi. 1097 The el-Sisi regime
should have been sanctioned and seen as an illegitimate government
according to the principles adopted by the AU to guard against
unconstitutional changes of government. 1098
When the AU adopted Article 4(h), it “became the first
international organization to formally recognize the principle that
the international community has a responsibility to intervene in
crisis situations if the state is failing to protect its population.” 1099 It
was not until 2005 that the Member States of the UN accepted the
R2P principle as a norm of international law. 1100 In 2006, the UN
Security Council, in Resolution S/RES/1674, reaffirmed the
provisions of key paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, which deals with and defines the
scope of the R2P principle. 1101 As discussed earlier, the primary
purpose of and impetus to intervention, including military
intervention, without the consent and acquiescence of the State, is
considered “legitimate in extreme cases when major harm to
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended and the state in
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm or is itself the

1095

See AU Ends Egypt, Guinea Bissau Suspension After Elections,
REUTERS (June 17, 2014, 12:58 PM), https://af.reuters.com/article/
guineaBissauNews/idAFL5N0OY55720140617.
1096 AFRICAN
CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND
GOVERNANCE, art. 25(7) (2007), http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf.
1097 See AU Ends Egypt, supra note 1095.
1098 See Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 161.
1099 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 113. The Constitutive
Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in
2001.
1100 See G.A. Res. 60/1, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005).
1101 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006).
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perpetrator of the harm.” 1102 Additional legal support for this type
of intervention is evident in several other international legal
documents, including, provisions of various human rights
instruments, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UDHR, Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and The Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and their Additional Protocols on
International Humanitarian Law. 1103
It is important that the R2P principle is seen as an effort by
international law to ensure the practice of good governance; the
protection of human rights in every State; the accountability of each
government to its people and its constitution; the minimization of
government impunity; and the promotion and facilitation of human
development. Within R2P, a president can no longer violate the
human rights of his fellow citizens and expect to escape liability for
the abuse of power. 1104
African judiciaries, particularly those in Kenya and South
Africa, are gradually asserting their independence and making
judicial rulings that challenge the hegemony of their imperial
presidencies. However, many judiciaries across the continent are
still very weak and subservient to the executive. In these countries,
it is unlikely that national courts would prosecute a sitting president
for any crimes that he commits. Nevertheless, there is growing
interest within the international community to bring to justice any
political leaders whose abuse of power constitutes international
crimes. 1105
Generally, it is argued that international customary law
“accords serving presidents absolute immunity from any civil or
criminal liability for public or private acts done while they are in
office.” 1106 For example, in the case concerning Arrest Warrant of
11 April, 2000, (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium)

1102
1103
1104
1105
1106

Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(Merits), 1107 the ICJ held that the Kingdom of Belgium had violated
its legal obligation towards the Democratic Republic of Congo “in
that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo enjoyed under
international law.” 1108
Nevertheless, international law may make exceptions in certain
circumstances. If a president has committed what constitutes
international crimes—specifically, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes—international law may provide avenues
for the trial of such an individual. First, a president who has
committed an international crime may be prosecuted and brought to
justice in an international tribunal if “the text of the treaty
establishing the international tribunal so provides.” 1109 This was the
case with former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, who was
accused of committing international crimes in Sierra Leone during
the country’s civil war. He was subsequently prosecuted by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). 1110 The SCSL was
established by the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1111
which was an agreement between the UN and the Government of
Sierra Leone pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of
August 14, 2000. 1112 Article 1 of the Statute defines the competence
of the SCSL:
The Special Court shall, except as provided in
subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of

Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, Case No. I.C.J. 2002
I.C.J. 3; 41 I.L.M. 536, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 11, 2000).
1108 Id.
1109 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 114.
1110 Id.
1111 See The Trial of Charles Taylor Before the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: The Appeal Judgment, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (Sept.
2013), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/4faa81cc-80b2-4444-817
b-31b3c47f0530/charles-taylor-appeal-brief-20130924_0.pdf [hereinafter
The Trial of Charles Taylor].
1112 S.C. Res. 1315, (Aug. 14, 2000), https://www.refworld.org/
docid/3b00f27814.html.
1107
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international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30
November 1996, including those leaders who, in
committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra
Leone. 1113
Second, a president can be tried by the domestic courts of a
foreign country if that court has quasi-universal or universal
jurisdiction over “such international crimes making it unlikely that
a claim to absolute immunity will suffice.” 1114 These two important
international legal processes can help minimize “impunity [in
Africa] and promote good governance and respect for the rule of law
in [the continent].” 1115 The SCSL was a special court designed
specifically to prosecute international crimes committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone during the period of November 30, 1996 to
January 18, 2002. 1116 Nevertheless, the ICC, which was established
by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1117 is a
permanent court and is the appropriate tribunal to prosecute
individuals, including presidents, who commit international crimes.
According to Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in

STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE art. 1(1)
(Aug. 14, 2000), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.
1114 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 115.
1115 Id.
1116 See, e.g., The Trial of Charles Taylor, supra note 1111.
1117 The Rome Statute was adopted at a diplomatic conference in
Rome, Italy, on July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1, 2002. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court., July 17,1998, U.N. Doc.
A/COMF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
1113
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and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence. 1118
In addition, Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute also deals with
the issue of immunities. It states as follows: “Immunities or special
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 1119 Thus,
immunities granted African presidents and other officials by their
constitutions will not prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction
over them should they commit or be involved in the commission of
international crimes.
Nevertheless, we have already seen, in the indictment by the
ICC of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, 1120 that the ICC
does not have independent arrest powers. Instead, it must rely on the
cooperation of States Parties to effect the arrest of indicted
individuals and send them to the ICC. The ICC’s prosecutor has
accused several States Parties, including Jordan, Uganda, and Chad,
“of undermining the tribunal’s ‘reputation and credibility’ by
refusing to arrest Sudan’s president to face charges of genocide in
his county’s Darfur region.” 1121 When President al-Bashir made a
special visit to South Africa in 2015 to attend the AU summit, the
ICC asked the government of South Africa to arrest him and send

Id. at art. 27(1).
Id. at art. 27(2).
1120 The ICC issued the first warrant for the arrest of President alBashir on Mar. 4, 2009 and the second one on July 12, 2010. He was
charged with various crimes associated with his military’s activities in the
Darfur Region of Sudan between 2003 and 2008. See The Prosecutor v.
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, (Mar. 4, 2009),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.
1121 International Court: Failure to Arrest Sudan’s President
Undermines Us, TIMES OF ISRAEL, ¶ 1, (Dec. 13, 2017, 8:28AM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/international-court-failure-to-arrestsudans-president-undermines-us/. President al-Bashir has travelled to these
countries, but none of them has made any efforts to arrest him and send him
to the ICC to face justice.
1118
1119

210

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 16.1

him to The Hague to stand trial. 1122 Nevertheless, South African
authorities refused to effect the arrest and argued that “international
law granting immunity for sitting heads of state prevented it from
arresting al-Bashir and conflicted with the Rome Statute’s
obligations to arrest and surrender him to the ICC.” 1123 The ICC,
however, held that South Africa was wrong and stated that the
“customary international law provision of immunity that South
Africa [had] relied on has been superseded by the UNSC Resolution
1593 (2005) that referred Darfur to the ICC.” 1124 In addition, the
ICC judges argued that Resolution 1593 has “effectively place[d]
Sudan in the same legal position as a [S]tate [P]arty to the Rome
Statute,” 1125 and hence, as a sitting head of state under the Rome
Statute, al-Bashir could be held responsible for crimes committed in
his individual capacity. 1126
Of course, the ICC process is supposed to supplement and not
replace national legal systems, and hence, it is expected to operate
based on or “pursuant to the principle of complementarity.” 1127
Thus, if an African country’s legal system has the will and the
capacity to fully and effectively prosecute individuals accused of
committing international crimes, the ICC should not move to take
jurisdiction over the situations. 1128 As of 2019, thirty-three African
States have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, and hence, have

1122 See Adam Taylor, Why So Many African Leaders Hate the
International Criminal Court, WASH. POST (July 15, 2015, 2:11PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-so-manyafrican-leaders-hate-the-international-criminal-court/?utm_term=.4710be
332ee3.
1123 Allan Ngari, The Real Problem Behind South Africa’s Refusal to
Arrest al-Bashir, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., ¶ 6, (July 10, 2017), https://issafrica.
org/iss-today/the-real-problem-behind-south-africas-refusal-to-arrest-albashir.
1124 Id. ¶ 7.
1125 Id.
1126 Id.
1127 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 115.
1128 Id.
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consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 1129 Burundi, which ratified
the Rome Statute on September 21, 2004, notified the UN of its
intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute on October 27, 2016,
and its withdrawal became effective on October 27, 2017. 1130 Both
South Africa and The Gambia also notified the UN of their intention
to withdraw from the Rome Statute, but have since rescinded their
notices, and hence, are still States Parties to the ICC. 1131
Despite the fact that the relationship between the ICC, AU, and
several African countries has soured significantly because of the
indictment, by the ICC, of African leaders, such as al-Bashir of
Sudan, Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, and his then Vice President,
William Ruto, the international tribunal remains an important legal
mechanism for the fight against impunity in Africa. As argued by
some legal scholars, “the possibility of ICC proceedings for gross
human rights violations remains a formidable threat that African
politicians can no longer ignore.” 1132 With respect to the
complementarity principle, the ICC is expected to act only in
situations where national courts are either unable or unwilling to
hold accountable those individuals who are alleged to have
committed international crimes or engaged in serious violations of
human rights. 1133
The employment of what has come to be known as universal
jurisdiction can “dispense[] with the need to establish any territorial
or physical link between the accused and the state asserting
jurisdiction.” 1134 The AU has acknowledged that universal
jurisdiction is a principle of international law. In the Decision on the

1129 See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%
20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
1130 See Burundi: Situation in the Republic of Burundi, INT’L CRIM.
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi.
1131 See, e.g., Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the Threats of
Withdrawal, AFR. RENEWAL (May–July 2017), https://www.un.org/africa
renewal/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal.
1132 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 116.
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Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction, the AU states that
[t]he Assembly, RECOGNIZING that universal
jurisdiction is a principle of International Law whose
purpose is to ensure that individuals who commit grave
offenses such as war crimes and crimes against humanity
do not do so with impunity and are brought to justice,
which is in line with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of
the African Union. 1135
The AU concludes that “[t]he abuse and misuse of indictments
against African leaders have a destabilizing effect that will
negatively impact on the political, social and economic development
of States and their ability to conduct international relations.” 1136 The
Assembly requested that a moratorium should be imposed “on the
execution of those warrants until all the legal and political issues
have been exhaustively discussed between the African Union, the
European Union and the United Nations.” 1137
Some scholars have argued that, although there is potential for
abuse of universal jurisdiction, they question the AU’s decision to
intervene, especially given the fact that universal jurisdiction is
actually based on various international treaties, which many African
countries have voluntarily signed and ratified. 1138 These include, for
example, the Geneva Conventions (which establish the standards of
international law for humanitarian treatment in war); the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 1139
Many African countries overwhelmingly supported the
establishment of the ICC because they believed that government
impunity had become a major constraint to peace and security in the
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continent. 1140 In fact, in the aftermath of the failure of OAU to
prevent the atrocities that comprised the Rwandan Genocide, many
Africans, especially human rights activists, recognized the need to
support the establishment of an international criminal court with
jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the continent. 1141
The inclusion of Article 4(h) in the Constitutive Act of the African
Union supports the argument that the AU recognizes the problem of
impunity and is interested in dealing with it. 1142 Hence, it is argued
that the only possible explanation for the AU’s attack of universal
jurisdiction and its opposition to the ICC is that both the ICC and
universal jurisdiction represent a major threat to many of the
continent’s entrenched dictators. 1143

IX. CONCLUSION AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the demise of
apartheid in South Africa, there arose, throughout many African
countries, grassroots efforts to fight the violation of human rights,
presidential abuse of power, and government impunity. These
efforts, including those by the international community, have made
it much more difficult for African leaders, including presidents, to
hide “behind sovereignty, non-intervention or constitutional
immunities to abuse the exorbitant powers that they often arrogate
to themselves” 1144 and violate the rights of their fellow citizens.
Nevertheless, African countries and the international community
need to take concrete steps to eliminate government impunity and
put in place institutional and legal structures that can effectively
minimize the chances that government officials will engage in
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activities that violate human rights and threaten international peace
and security.
First, all African countries must revisit the issue of presidential
immunities. Granted, “[p]residential immunities of a clearly defined
and limited scope are necessary for the proper discharge of the
onerous duties that are bestowed on [African] leaders.” 1145
Nevertheless, such grant of immunity must be balanced well enough
to minimize impunity and ensure that presidents are accountable to
the constitution and the people. Of course, in countries with poorly
drafted constitutions, or those whose institutional arrangements do
not provide for effective checks on the exercise of government
power, presidential abuse of power is likely to remain rampant. This
brings us to the second issue that virtually all African countries have
to revisit—constitution making and state reconstruction. Through a
participatory and inclusive constitution-making process, each
African country can provide itself with institutional arrangements
characterized by true separation of powers with checks and
balances, including an independent judiciary and a “strong
bicameral legislature to counter the powers of the presidency.” 1146
A robust and politically active civil society, as well as strong civil
society organizations, such as a free press and viable opposition
political parties, can also help check on the exercise of government
power and minimize impunity and the abuse of presidential
privileges.
Third, national judiciaries, which are gradually rising up to
assert their independence, should use the powers granted to them by
their constitutions to interpret the constitution, as well as to
determine the constitutionality of laws, including customary law, to
strike down laws (and this includes customary laws) that are not in
conformity with provisions of international human rights and
international humanitarian law. Independent and progressive
judiciaries, such as the Tanzanian High Court and the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe, are already delivering rulings that positively
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impact the promotion and protection of human rights in the
continent. 1147
Fourth, international law has an important role to play in the
fight against impunity and human rights abuses in Africa. The
international community has established many systems to combat
impunity and significantly improve government accountability in
countries, such as those in Africa, which have relatively weak
institutions. In addition to the adoption of the principle of R2P, the
international community has also established an international
tribunal—the ICC—and empowered it to prosecute all persons,
including those in Africa, alleged to have committed international
crimes. 1148 Despite the ICC’s rocky start with respect to Africa, it
remains an important international legal mechanism for the fight
against impunity in the African continent and other parts of the
world. As argued by Fombad and Nwauche, “[i]n spite of the
contradictory and sometimes confusing position taken both by the
AU and individual African states with respect to the ICC, the latter
remains a formidable tool to combat abuse of presidential power and
impunity in Africa.” 1149
Fifth, the AU’s framework for promoting democracy and
protecting human rights in Africa allows the organization to
intervene in member states where international crimes are
committed. Unlike the OAU, which turned a blind eye to atrocities
committed against citizens in many countries throughout the
continent, the AU is expected to be more proactive and act with
“vigor and determination” 1150 in order to prevent presidential
excesses. Hopefully, with pressure from grassroots organizations in
the continent, as well as from the international community, the AU
can meet the obligations imposed on it by its Constitutive Act.
Sixth, there is growing interest throughout the continent to
institutionalize human rights constitutionalism. At the minimum,
this process involves four important issues, which include the
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centrality of human rights—their recognition, promotion, and
protection—in the structure of each African country’s constitution;
each country must have a Bill of Rights which recognizes and
provides effective protections for the rights of citizens and
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments;
each African constitution must provide for a truly independent
judiciary and empower it to enforce the Bill of Rights; and each
African country must educate its citizens on human rights and help
create, within the country, a culture of respect for human rights.
Finally, the additional pro-human rights structures that are
being created, especially in Africa, represent warnings to Africa’s
political leaders that they will be held accountable for all the crimes
that they commit while in office. Within the continent, institutions
such as the African Commission and the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, are expected to serve as important constraints to
impunity and the abuse of presidential powers. While these
structures may never totally eliminate “presidential abuse of powers,
especially in the form of corruption and violence against political
opponents,” 1151 African presidents and other political leaders have
been put on notice that there is a very strong likelihood, that should
they engage in human rights abuses or commit other atrocities
against their fellow citizens, they will be held accountable.
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